Professor Connelly’s research focuses on the momentous philosophical interchanges between Wittgenstein and Russell, two of the twentieth century’s most original, innovative, and influential thinkers. He is the author of Wittgenstein’s Critique of Russell’s Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement (Anthem Press, 2021) and was Visiting Professor in Russell and the History of Analytic Philosophy at McMaster University in Fall of 2023.
Selected Publications
“Aspect Perception and Rule-Following in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations” – Philosophical Investigations (Forthcoming 2025)
“Russell on Judgement” –The Oxford Handbook of Bertrand Russell. Fraser MacBride, Graham Stevens, & Samuel Lebens (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Forthcoming 2025)
"Why Russell Abandoned Theory of Knowledge: The Logical Interpretation" – Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 44(1): 45-86. (2024)
“Transfinite Number in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus” – Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 9(2): 1-28 (2021)
“On Operator N and Wittgenstein’s Logical Philosophy” – Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 5(4): 1-25 (2017)
“Russell and Wittgenstein on Logical Form and Judgment: What did Wittgenstein Try that Wouldn’t Work?” – Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy 80(3): 232-254 (2014)
“Wittgenstein, Non-Factualism, and Deflationism” – International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21(4): 559-585 (2013)
“On “Props,” Wittgenstein’s June 1913 Letter, and Russell’s “Paralysis”” – Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 31(2): 141-66 (2012)
“Meaning is Normative: A Response to Hattiangadi” – Acta Analytica 27(1): 55-71 (2012)