Assistant Professor of Philosophy
Office OSHAWA Office Rm 175;
Phone: (905) 435 5102 x 5056
UOIT: ERC 108 1B
Secretary Kathy Fife
Professor Connelly earned his B.A. from the University of Alberta, and his M.A. from the University of Saskatchewan, before completing a Ph.D. at York University in 2008. In his doctoral dissertation, entitled Wittgenstein and Early Analytic Semantics: Towards a Phenomenology of Truth, he developed and defended a novel methodological approach to classic and contemporary problems in philosophical semantics, inspired by Wittgenstein’s positive insights into the philosophy of language, the nature of rule-following, and the concept of mind. His current research focuses on the history of analytic philosophy, and in particular on the momentous philosophical interchanges between Wittgenstein and Russell, two of the 20th century’s most important and influential analytic thinkers. In several recent papers, Professor Connelly has in particular attempted to explicate Wittgenstein's notoriously enigmatic criticisms of Russell's 'multiple-relation' theory of judgment, and to explore the role that those criticisms played in the demise of Russell's 1913 Theory of Knowledge manuscript. More recently, he has attempted to explicate Wittgenstein’s novel conceptualization of logical space and transcendental subjectivity, and to deploy that conceptualization as a means of unraveling several interrelated exegetical puzzles in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, concerning Wittgenstein’s remarks on solipsism, ethics, death, God, and the meaning of life.
Recent and Selected Publications:
Wittgenstein and Early Analytic Semantics: Toward a Phenomenology of Truth (under contract with Lexington Books, completed manuscript submitted July 2014)
“Russell and Wittgenstein on Logical Form and Judgment: What did Wittgenstein Try that Wouldn't Work?” – Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy (Volume 80 Issue 3 September 2014), pp. 232-254.
“Russell’s Contribution to Philosophy of Language” – Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies, Volume, 33 Issue 1, Summer 2013, pp 85-94. (Review of: Graham Stevens. The Theory of Descriptions: Russell and the Philosophy of Language. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011.)
“Wittgenstein, Non-Factualism, and Deflationism” – International Journal of Philosophical Studies (Vol. 21 No. 4 October 2013, pp. 559-585)
“On “Props,” Wittgenstein’s June 1913 Letter, and Russell’s “Paralysis” – Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies (Vol. 31 No. 2. Winter 2011-12, pp. 141-66)
“Meaning is Normative: A Response to Hattiangadi” – Acta Analytica: Volume 27, Issue 1 (2012), pp. 55-71
“Can Wittgenstein Help us Understand Autism Better? Concepts, Rule following,
and the Nature of Explanation in Developmental Psychology” –Res per Nomen II Conference Proceedings, June 2009. (with Ljiljana Radenovic).
“On Siamese Twins and Philosophical Zombies: A New Reading of Wittgenstein’s ‘Private Language Argument.’” – Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Vol. XIX, July 2006.
“Wittgenstein’s Primordial Work” –Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies, n.s. 30, no. 2 (Winter 2009-10) (Review of: Michael Potter. Wittgenstein’s Notes on Logic. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.)
“Russell’s ‘Paralysis’” – Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies, n.s. 28,
no. 2 (Winter 2008-9) (Review of: Carey, Rosalind. Russell and Wittgenstein on the Nature of Judgment. London and New York: Continuum International, 2007).
“A Copious Harvest” – Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly, No. 128, November 2005. (Review of: Awodey, Steven et al (Trans. & Eds.). Frege’s Lectures on Logic 1910-14: Carnap’s Student Notes, Peru, Illinois: Open Court, 2004).