

Working papers



**The Political Economy of Security. Security  
Discourse in Post-Cold War Canadian  
Foreign Policy**

**Mark Neufeld**

TIPEC Working Paper 01/12

## INTRODUCTION:

Broadly speaking, approaches to the study of security can take one of two forms. One approach is to engage in a philosophical-theoretical "re-thinking" of security, in line with the idea that the passing of the Cold War has occasioned the need for just this kind of exercise. Such a re-thinking may involve a radical re-orientation of the conception of security thinking (such as linking it to the goal of human emancipation), or a more conventional one which rejects emancipatory notions of politics but which nonetheless seeks to broaden the concept of security beyond that of strictly military themes characteristic of the tradition of "strategic studies".

An alternative approach is to take up the theme of security by examining how security issues are framed in official political discourse and public policy. Such an approach, which is the one adopted here, is concerned with exploring the theory and practice of "actually existing security" in the post-cold war context.

Here it will be argued that what is distinctive about official post-cold war security discourse in the Canadian context is that it contains two distinct notions of security whose compatibility, at first glance, is not at all self-evident. It will also be argued, however, that a *Neo-Gramscian* political-economy approach<sup>1</sup> to global politics can help to clarify the underlying logic which makes of these potentially conflictual notions of security two sides of the same (capitalist) coin.

## METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS:

The approach taken here can be termed a critically "interpretive" one. In line with an "interpretive" approach, dominant ideas in political discourse are not conceived merely as intervening variables between context and response, but rather as "intersubjective meanings" which constitute certain actions as social practices (even as they are instantiated through them). As intersubjective meanings, furthermore, their "essentially contested" nature becomes underscored, as does the interpretive process engaged in by social actors as they draw on these meanings to orient their actions.

The methodology corresponding to such an approach is one which is best described as "rhetorical" in orientation. Such an orientation is marked by two elements:

i) attentiveness to political discourse, elite and oppositional, scholarly and "commonsense". A rhetorical approach sees that political discourse communicates not just propositions, but also attitudes; it not only represents the world, it also structures relationships between speakers and subjects. In the words of one authority, political discourse is "not only a set of ideas but also a mode of symbolic action";<sup>2</sup>

ii) appreciation of the dynamics of power, importance of argument as well as style, "involvement in the dialectic of elites and their publics, a strategic sensibility and an ambivalent mixture of technical skill and ethical themes". Within the rhetorical perspective,

the emphasis is on discourse - with a corresponding wariness of the conventional distinctions between speech and action, language and reality - yet the interest is in the effect the discourse has on conduct. Rhetorical analysis probes the relationship between the content, forms and functions of discourse and it demonstrates the capacity of speech to affect judgment and action, particularly in respect to political decision-making.<sup>3</sup>

A rhetorical methodology, by definition, involves a heavy reliance on texts as the objects of analysis. Such texts may include formal and rehearsed statements (e.g., official communiques, prepared speeches, Green and White Papers; editorials) as well as unscripted ones (e.g., impromptu comments, press interviews) associated with elite and oppositional spokespersons, respectively.

Finally, the specific case that will be used to illustrate the central arguments of this paper is that of Canada. A member of the elite club of nations which constitute the G-7, an unwavering ally of the United States, and a self-identified "middle power" committed to multilateral management of the global order,<sup>4</sup> the Canadian case provides an excellent example of the bifurcated nature of security discourse and the practices which correspond to it, and may serve as a harbinger of the direction of security discourse in the north more generally.

#### THE EVOLUTION OF SECURITY DISCOURSE IN CANADA:

One cannot but be struck, when surveying the evolution of security discourse in the Canadian context over the past few decades, of how great a shift has occurred. During the Cold War period

official security discourse conformed closely to conventional, deterrence-oriented understandings of security. In the 1980s, for example, the Department of External (now renamed "Foreign") Affairs affirmed that "National defence is the foundation of a country's security."<sup>6</sup> In this period, official security policy and discourse reflected the assumption that in the anarchical context of international politics "the most serious threat to international peace and global human welfare was international communism and the strength of the United States was the primary bulwark against its spread."<sup>6</sup> It was this assumption, moreover, which provided "the underlying unity to such seemingly disparate policies as Canada's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, its close military and defence production links with the United States, its expanding aid programme, its active role in peacekeeping, and its effective participation in international institutions"<sup>7</sup>

It was in reaction to the official and very much traditional conceptualization of security that important elements in Canadian civil society organized themselves to promote an alternative. Indeed, it was in the context of public questioning of the traditional assumptions about the international order by emerging oppositional social groupings which led, outside of official circles, to a substantive redefinition of the notion of "security." Pratt has referred to this social grouping, which arose in the late 1960s and which remains active into the present context, as the "counter-consensus" - a collection of "internationally minded public interest groups", which exist in substantial number, which have traditionally been peripheral to decision-making in Canadian public life. Within this grouping one finds church-related organizations like Project Ploughshares, the Canadian Council for International Co-operation, Oxfam, the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace, Ten Days for World Development, the Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America, the taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility, as well as secular organizations such as disarmament, peace, or Third World solidarity groups and the national feminist organization, the National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC). What distinguished and united the members of the counter-consensus was their rejection of the principal assumptions informing elite discourse about the global order, leading them to voice criticism, in explicitly politico-normative terms, of the militarism associated with the Cold War.

Radicalization and expansion of the social base of the "counter-consensus" through the 1970s and 1980s, most recently in the context of anti-free trade struggles, led to increased emphasis on the links between disarmament, economic development and wealth re-distribution, environmental policy, and democratization at the global level with radical change at the domestic level. In this respect the "counter-consensus" could be understood as forming part of an emerging "counter-hegemonic bloc".

Of particular importance for the discussion here is the fact that the counter-discourse of the "counter-consensus" gave new life to the notion of "security". Significantly, the links of the official notion of "security" to support for an American-led hegemonic order were severed. Rather, "security" was recast to signify radical progressive change in terms of disarmament, economic development and wealth re-distribution, environmental policy, and the democratization of the foreign policy-making process.

The re-configured notion of security - now designated "human security" - is clearly in evidence in a document produced by the counter-consensus after a country-wide consultative process in the early 1990s: Transformation Moment: A Canadian Vision of Common Security. The inquiry's list of co-sponsors reads like a virtual "Who's Who" of the counter-consensus, including the Canadian Peace Alliance, the Assembly of First Nations, the Canadian Council for International Cooperation, the Canadian Council of Churches, the Canadian Labour Congress, and the National Action Committee on the Status of Women.<sup>8</sup> At the centre of that report are calls for the radicalization of the notion of security. As the report noted,

One of the most common themes expressed during our hearings was that a true security policy must promote the security of all Canadians, and ultimately of all people. In keeping with this focus, a great many witnesses raised concerns that traditionally have not been considered to be part of security, but which - from a human perspective - clearly do become issues of security.<sup>9</sup>

Included within the notion of security were issues of economic justice, equality, the rights of women and Canada's First Nations, and, perhaps most centrally, the "democratization" of security policy. In accordance with the shift in the definition of security, the report proposed a number of

concrete reforms, including reforms dealing with parliament and its role. The democratization of security policy was to extend beyond parliamentary reforms, however. It was also to involve greater public participation in the policy-making process, including "more open access to government information" and "regular public hearings"<sup>10</sup>:

It is striking to note to what degree the discursive terms of the counter-consensus on security have entered Ottawa's official lexicon. The clearest evidence of this shift is to be found in the series of public statements made by Lloyd Axworthy, Canada's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the late 1990s. Under Axworthy's direction, the notion of "human security" has become a permanent fixture of the department's foreign policy discourse, marking almost every public statement it issues.

In the spring of 1997 Axworthy published an extended set of reflections on the notion of human security in Canada's establishment IR journal: *International Journal*. Entitled "Canada and Human Security: the Need for Leadership,"<sup>11</sup> the article merits close examination as it provides an excellent example of how the formerly oppositional discourse on security came to be endorsed by a leading figure in the federal government.

Axworthy begins by noting that the end of the Cold War has not brought the era of unparalleled peace and prosperity initially hoped for. Significantly, he identifies the reason for this failure in the perpetuation of traditional conceptions of security:

The Cold War concept of security emphasized the prevention of interstate conflict in order to avoid the perennial danger of escalation. This strategy focussed on confidence-building measures (to reduce the possibility of an accidental misreading of intentions) and international arms control and disarmament negotiations.<sup>12</sup>

Echoing the long-standing critique of this notion of security by oppositional spokespersons, Axworthy concedes that

[i]t is now clear that this approach to security was inadequate to foster stability and peace. Canada ... began to reassess the traditional concept of security in order to identify those variables beyond arms control/ disarmament which affect peace and stability. From this reconsideration emerged the concept of "human security".

Axworthy goes on to echo the counter-consensus notion of human security in specifics as well, affirming that human security

is much more than the absence of military threat. It includes security against economic privation, an acceptable quality of life, and a guarantee of fundamental human rights. The concept of human security recognizes the complexity of the human environment and accepts that the forces influencing human security are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. At a minimum, human security requires that basic needs are met, but it also acknowledges that sustained economic development, human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, good governance, sustainable development and social equity are as important to global peace as arms control and disarmament. It recognizes the links between environmental degradation, population growth, ethnic conflicts, and migration.<sup>13</sup>

Given the prominence of the notion of "human security" in oppositional demands that the Canadian government rethink its priorities, there is considerable irony in the fact that no acknowledgement was made of the impact of the counter-consensus on official thinking. As Axworthy presents it, the re-thinking of security was a government initiative occasioned by policy-makers' own recognition of the limitations of the traditional notion of security, without reference to considerable energies directed toward this question in oppositional groupings.<sup>14</sup> Still, if the goal of oppositional activity is to influence government thinking in new directions, it is easy to understand how the apparent radical re-orientation of the world-view of a government minister might be celebrated as an unparalleled victory by many within the counter-consensus.

Such celebration would be premature. For while there is no gainsaying the fact that an expanded, non-traditional notion of security now informs the discourse of Foreign Affairs, it must also be recognized that the traditional notion of security has not disappeared - it has simply found a new home elsewhere in the Canadian state.

TRADITIONAL NOTIONS OF SECURITY: OLD IDEAS IN A NEW CONTEXT

The traditional notion of security is still to be found in the Canadian government's discourse - though not necessarily where it was most prominent in the past. To gain a sense of where it now resides, one must take note of recent statements by Paul Martin, Canada's Minister of Finance. In a 16 April, 1998 statement prepared for the Interim Committee of the International Monetary Fund, Martin provided strong evidence that the traditional notion of security is anything but dead in policy-making circles.

Prompted by the recent economic crisis in Asia, Martin's comments are very much consistent with traditional notions of security. Noting that "Today, we are meeting once again against the background of financial turbulence and, I believe, a great opportunity to further strengthen our economic and financial architecture," Martin proposed that global elites focus their attention on two aspects of the Asian financial crisis - "the management of the crisis and prevention of future crises."<sup>5</sup>

In terms of managing the current crisis, Martin stated that he was encouraged by the "upturn in confidence in the economies of Thailand and Korea since the start of the year," manifest in stronger currencies and stock markets. The newfound confidence, in his view, is a direct reflection of the "determined implementation of IMF programs and necessary structural reforms in each of these countries." Of course, it is also true that "confidence has not yet been restored in the Indonesian economy" - a fact which makes it all the more "imperative that the Indonesian government takes [sic] ownership of the new IMF agreement and implements [sic] it fully."

What we must now turn our attention to, argued Martin, is the task of preventing future crises:

While it is too soon to say for sure that the crisis is behind us, the recent stability in markets may give us hope that the crisis has at least been contained. As a result, it is time to turn the focus of international policy deliberations from crisis management to crisis avoidance.

Accordingly, he affirmed, it is necessary to find ways of strengthening national and international financial systems by strengthening the "institutional architecture". A key dimension of such an initiative "is the need for greater transparency and disclosure." Accordingly, Martin presented a

Canadian proposal to establish a new international secretariat to survey financial supervisory systems and identify financial sector problems before they become international crises. "What we seek is a secretariat capable of focussing the skills of individual countries and existing international institutions."

Without becoming lost in the specifics of Martin's proposals, it is worth noting how much the underlying assumptions of his initiative conform to the traditional discourse of security. First there is the context for security policy - the "anarchical" international financial system. Then there is the issue of what is to be made secure. In Martin's terms the answer is clear. Not human beings but the interests of the state - specifically, the national financial system - is what needs to be protected. The means to assure its security, meanwhile, is a combination of crisis management and crisis prevention. The former involves the strict application of neoliberal structural adjustment programmes, while the latter, typically, will involve confidence-building measures to ensure nationally-based investors have all the information needed to safeguard their assets.

In sum, while the expanded notion of security is in prominent view in current pronouncements from the Department of Foreign Affairs, the traditional notion of security remains very much alive in the discourse of government finance. This raises the question of the relation of these two discourses of security to government policy, as well as to each other.

#### SECURITY DISCOURSE IN THE NEO-LIBERAL CONTEXT:

The meaning of official discourses on security must be understood in relation to the nature of world order and corresponding form of state<sup>6</sup> now in existence. Following Cox, the shift from a world order marked by "embedded liberalism" to hyper-liberalism, in which market forces become increasingly determinant in virtually all realms, involves

a transnational process of consensus formation among the official caretakers of the global economy. This process generates consensual guidelines, underpinned by an ideology of globalization, that are transmitted into the policy-making channels of national governments and big corporations.<sup>17</sup>

The shift in world order also involves a corresponding change in the form of state, from the Keynesian welfare state to an "internationalized" state. In the words of Robert Cox:

The structural impact on national governments of this global centralization of influence over policy can be called the internationalizing of the state. Its common feature is to convert the state into an agency for adjusting national economic practices and policies to the perceived exigencies of the global economy.<sup>18</sup>

The changing form of state brings with it a re-ordering of the various parts of the state as well:

Power within the state becomes concentrated in those agencies in closest touch with the global economy - the offices of the presidents and prime ministers, treasuries and central banks. The agencies that are most closely identified with domestic clients - ministries of industries, labour ministries, and so on - become subordinated.<sup>19</sup>

The implications of this re-ordering process for our understanding of security discourse are major. Put bluntly, given the pre-eminent position of finance in the internationalized state and the hyper-liberal global order, it is the security discourse of that department which must be understood as most central in the determination of policy, both domestic and foreign. Accordingly, if there is a conflict between the policies deriving from security understood as protecting the interests of economic elites, on the one hand, and security understood as meeting basic human needs, on the other, one would expect the latter to be deferred in the interests of attending to the former.

In point of fact, this is a pattern which has marked Canadian policy formulation and implementation over recent years with predictable results. In domestic terms, neoliberal concerns with combatting deficits and debts as well as inflation - all in order to create attractive conditions for private investment - have come at the cost of human security for the most at risk. Child poverty rates, for example, have sky-rocketed: in the seven years after the House of Commons set a deadline for eliminating child poverty in Canada, half a million more children are living below the poverty line.<sup>20</sup>

Internationally as well, it is the traditional notion of security, manifest in the discourse of the Department of Finance, which informs current policies in the international institutions in which Canada participates. Strict implementation of structural adjustment programmes in crisis-ridden

countries of the Third World to protect the international investment community is the order of the day, despite the very real human cost in terms of basic human needs. Nor is there any apparent consideration of the probable requirement to escalate state repression to contain public discontent with rapidly falling living standards occasioned by the "tough medicine" meted out by international institutions. The students in Indonesia may see participatory democracy as the solution to their country's problems, but the priority of the Canadian government and its G-7 partners is first and foremost better surveillance and monitoring of the financial context. Democracy, to the degree that it is introduced, will have to be subordinated to the interests and exigencies of international capital.<sup>21</sup>

What then of the rhetoric of human security so prominent in the discourse of the Department of Foreign Affairs? It is interesting to note that in Cox's discussion of the internal re-ordering of state ministries and agencies in the "internationalized" state, there is no mention of that part of the state which traditionally has served as the link to the international context - that of the Department of Foreign Affairs. This raises an obvious question: if power within the state has become concentrated in those agencies most directly involved in the management of the global economy - the offices of the presidents and prime ministers, treasuries and central banks - what now is the position and role of Foreign Affairs?

One possibility is to argue that Foreign Affairs retains its traditional importance within the state through its involvement in international economic issues. In Canada, for example, the Department of Foreign Affairs is also responsible for "international trade".<sup>22</sup> The designation is telling, however. International trade is itself a relic of the "international" economy which assumed self-contained states regulating the flows of capital, goods and services across borders. In fact, it can be argued that what marks the hyper-liberal world order of the 1990s is not an "international" but a "world" economy, where state regulation of cross-border flows has been all but dismantled in favour of market forces. As such, the retention of the portfolio of "international trade" marks the marginalization, and not the continued relevance, of the Department of Foreign Affairs in policy terms.

Alternatively, one might re-conceptualize the role of Foreign Affairs in terms of Cox's notion of the "internationalized state" - specifically, in his observation that the "agencies that are most

closely identified with domestic clients ... become subordinated. In Cox's terms, formerly Ministries of industry and ministries of labour used to combine with their respective domestic constituencies to guide and implement national economic policies. In the new conditions, however, they play a different role:

These domestic-oriented agencies have in practice been subordinated to ministries of finance and offices of presidents and prime ministers that provide the direct links between world-economy negotiations (through bodies like the OECD, the IMF, and the economic summits) and the development of national policies that implement the national consensus reached in these negotiations. Domestic economic and social interests have as a result been diminished as policy influences. The domestic-oriented agencies of the state are now more and more to be seen as transmission belts from world economy trends and decision making into the domestic economy, as agencies to promote the carrying out of tasks they had no part in deciding.<sup>23</sup>

Significantly, it is just this identification with domestic - as opposed to international - clients that distinguishes Foreign Affairs in the current context. In response to the repeated calls from the counter-consensus for the "democratization" of Canadian security policy, the Chrétien government took a number of initiatives, including the creation in 1995 of the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, dedicated to ensuring "that the voice of Canadians [will] be heard" in the foreign policy process.<sup>24</sup> Operating with a budget of \$1.5 million per year, the main activity of the Centre has been the convening of annual "National Forums on Canada's International Relations," beginning in 1994. Involving a series of meetings across the country with select representatives of NGOs, academe, media, business and labour, as well as government officials, the National Forum has produced a series of reports and recommendations on Canada's foreign policy, on a variety of themes.<sup>25</sup>

The commitment to consult continues to figure prominently in official foreign policy discourse. Canada's foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, speaks approvingly of the role played by the National Forum, and other formal and informal consultations (including a Web-page "suggestion-

box")<sup>26</sup> in "maintaining a high level of support for Canadian foreign policy and activities abroad, and in setting priorities, particularly important in a time of resource constraints."<sup>27</sup>

The consultative process in general - and the "national forums" in particular - are one of the central means by which Foreign Affairs cultivates its links with its domestic constituencies. Most significantly, in the process of "consultation", potential critics from within the counter-consensus have been transformed into "stakeholders". As one critic has noted,

Unquestionably, stakeholder politics is an excellent tool of political management for state officials. It ensures that those primarily affected by a policy area will have an opportunity to have their say, to comment on proposed policy changes, to register their objections or to offer their ideas. It thus not only protects state officials against future claims by stakeholders; it also binds the stakeholders more tightly to the policies eventually adopted.<sup>28</sup>

Still, despite parallels with ministries of labour and industry in terms of a strong focus on its domestic constituency, it is not quite right to see Foreign Affairs as playing the exact same role as other domestic-oriented agencies. Following Cox, traditional domestic-oriented agencies of the state are increasingly "transmission belts from world economy trends and decision making into the domestic economy." Specifically, the role of these agencies is to translate the needs of the international capital for low inflation, higher profit margins into policies and programmes at the domestic level that will serve these ends -, e.g., high interest rate; lower corporate tax rates, reduced levels of social spending, weakened labour legislation, etc. In other words, the prime function of these agencies is to impose - while simultaneously attempting to justify as the only possible course under the new conditions of globalization - the material costs of neoliberal restructuring.

In contrast, the role of Foreign Affairs is neither to decide policy at the international level (as does Finance) or to implement the material costs of those policies domestically. What then is its role? Once again, official security discourse suggests an answer. In emphasizing Canada's foreign policy efforts to promote human security by improving "international governance through, *inter alia*, democratization, respect for human rights, and the peaceful resolution of disputes,"<sup>29</sup> Axworthy has also noted its domestic impact. Specifically, the popular image of Canada pursuing such an

orientation contributes to "a uniquely Canadian identity and a sense of Canada's place in the world."<sup>30</sup>

In short, it can be argued that in the new context, the function of Foreign Affairs is to provide ideological legitimacy to the domestic order as a whole. It does this by underscoring the essentially just and humane nature of Canada's foreign policy, understood in turn as the "natural expression" of the essentially just and humane political-economic order at home. Domestic policy is the referent to which the sign of foreign policy discourse refers. In sum, in the internationalized state, the function of Foreign Affairs is neither to participate in the international-(ized) decision-making process nor to act as a transmission belt into the domestic economy, but rather to provide a legitimating discourse in support of an increasingly fragile domestic hegemony.

#### CONCLUSION:

The conclusions that can be drawn from this discussion fall into two categories - security discourse and practices in the Canadian case, and implications for the study of foreign/ security policy more generally. In terms of the first, there is a certain irony in Axworthy's promotion of the notion of "human security" as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Lloyd Axworthy is considered a leading figure in the Liberal Party's progressive wing. Consistent with this reputation, while he was Canada's Minister for Human Resources (1995-97), Axworthy attempted to initiate a major renewal of Canada's social programmes, very much in line with the current discourse of "human security". His proposals were blocked consistently by the Department of Finance, whose agenda to eliminate the federal deficit had priority in the internationalized Canadian state.

The irony is, of course, that it has always been a key assumption of mainstream international relations theory that "progress" in pursuit of the "good life" is possible only within the domestic sphere - that the international domain could never be other than the realm of "survival" and the securing of the vital interests of the nation in the anarchical international context.<sup>31</sup> In the brave neo-liberal world order, however, we are now instructed that domestic progress toward the good life is a luxury we can no longer afford. The purview of the discourse of progress and the good life has been restricted to the international realm.

It has been argued here that the major function of Foreign Affairs in the current context is to provide a legitimizing discourse to stabilize the domestic politico-economic order. This raises the question of how successful official discourse on human security will provide to be in that regard. And here one may have serious doubts. First, in Gramscian terms, a stable hegemony is a product of a combination of ideological legitimation coupled with real concessions to subaltern groups (e.g., social welfare provisions). In this case, ideological legitimation must proceed in the presence not of meaningful concessions but of the withdrawal of those concessions (i.e., the dismantling of the welfare state) in accordance with the requirements of "global competitiveness". Even with support from its "stakeholders" in the counter-consensus, ideological legitimation on its own does not a stable hegemony make.

The other reason to question the long-term efficacy of the legitimating power of the discourse of Foreign Affairs is that the price the government must pay in its pursuit of stakeholder politics is the heightening of expectations about what the Canadian state will undertake on the international stage. Indeed, the expectation that Canada will contribute meaningfully to human security has begun to affect even the discourse of the Department of Finance, with Paul Martin publicly acknowledging the dire - though unavoidable (!) - human costs of financial stabilization measures in Asia. Notwithstanding such rhetoric - indeed, to an important degree because of it - the G-7's continued pursuit of "global financial security" to the detriment of "human security" cannot fail to impress upon important segments of the counter-consensus the lack of substance in official discourse.

Finally, this discussion has implications for the study of foreign/ security policy more generally. The analysis carried out here underscores the fact that any comprehensive understanding of policy must involve an attentiveness to how guiding concepts (e.g., national/ human security; national/ human interests) are used and to what purpose. Such an approach has the merit of helping us to resist the pitfall of Idealism@by directing us to be aware of the way in which the meanings and practices of policy never float unattached, but are always embedded and embodied, always dependent on context for their content. It helps us to remain cognizant as well of the way meanings are created and changed through a process of real people acting to make history, though, of course,

not necessarily in the circumstances of their own choosing. This kind of attentiveness is vital if we are to ensure that the analysis of foreign policy in all its facets serves not elite, but genuinely human interests.

## REFERENCES

- 
1. The Aneo-Gramscian@approach is associated, first and foremost, with the work of Robert W. Cox. See his Approaches to World Order, Timothy J. Sinclair, ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
  2. See Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman, Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations, (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1996), p. 10.
  3. Ibid, p. 11.
  4. See Mark Neufeld, "Hegemony and Foreign Policy Analysis: The Case of Canada as Middle Power", Studies in Political Economy 48 (1995), pp. 7-29.
  5. Canada's International Relations, DEA, Government of Canada (Ottawa: 1986), p. 12.
  6. See Cranford Pratt, "Dominant class theory and Canadian foreign policy: the case of the counter-consensus", International Journal 39 (Winter 1983-4), pp. 120-121.
  7. Pratt, "Dominant Class Theory", p. 121. For a discussion of the seamier side of Canadian diplomacy in the service of Pax Americana, see Noam Chomsky, "The Drift Towards Global War", Studies in Political Economy, 17 (Summer 1985), pp. 5-31.
  8. Transformation Moment: A Canadian Vision of Common Security, The Report of the Citizen's Inquiry into Peace and Security, (Co-Published by Project Ploughshares and the Canadian Peace Alliance: March 1992).
  9. Transformation Moment, p. 6.
  10. Transformation Moment, p. 53.
  11. International Journal, 52 (1997), pp. 183-96.
  12. pp. 183-84.
  13. p. 184.
  14. Tracking the movement of the notion of "human security" from the counter-consensus into official discourse is an interesting enterprise. Following its appearance in the 1992 Citizens' Inquiry Report, it appeared again in the United Nations Development Programme 1994 Human Development Report (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), chapter two. It also appeared (as part of the broader notion of "global security" in Our Global Neighbourhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) before becoming a

---

mainstay of official Canadian foreign policy discourse.

15. The full text of Martin's speech is available at the following URL:

<http://www.fin.gc.ca/newse98/98-043e.html>

All quotations are taken from the on-line version.

16. The notion of "forms of state" is that of Robert Cox. See his Approaches to World Order, *passim*.

17. Robert W. Cox, "Global perestroika", in Approaches to World Order, p. 301.

18. p. 302.

19. p. 302.

20. See "1 in 5 kids said living in poverty", Toronto Star, May 12, 1998, p. A7.

21. For an interesting consideration of the limited modes of democracy that can be tolerated by international capital, see William Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). For an elaboration of the Canadian contribution to "democracy promotion", see M. Neufeld, "Democratization in/ of Foreign Policy: Critical Reflections on the Canadian Case", Studies in Political Economy 58 (Spring 1999), pp.97-119.

22. Officially the "Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade" - (DFAIT).

23. Cox, "The Global Political Economy and Social Choice" in Approaches to World Order, p. 193.

24. Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, Annual Report(1996/1997), p. 1.

25. The most recent, for example, focuses on the themes of i) peacebuilding, ii) international communications and iii) child protection. See the 1996 National Forum on Canada's International Relations Report (Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development).

26. At <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca>.

27. L. Axworthy, "Canada and Human Security: the Need for Leadership", International Journal (52, Spring 1997), p. 195.

28. Kim Nossal, "The Democratization of Canadian Foreign Policy: The Elusive Ideal", in Maxwell A. Cameron and Maureen Appel Molot, (eds.), Democracy and Foreign Policy: Canada Among Nations 1995 (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995), p. 38, emphasis added.

29. "Canada and Human Security", p. 184.

---

30. "Canada and Human Security", p. 185.

31. See Martin Wight, "Why is There No International Theory?" in Diplomatic Investigations, Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, (eds.), (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966).