

Homo Nationis

**The Psychosocial Infrastructure of the
Nation-State Order**

Andreas Pickel

TIPEC Working Paper 04/2

Abstract

The central argument of this paper is that the global expansion of sovereign nation-states has been accompanied by the emergence of a particular type of modern individual, *homo nationis*. The general significance of this argument lies in the fact that this personality type, which is either taken for granted (untheorized) or ignored, constitutes an integral component of modern social order. That is, in addition to the constitutional and institutional foundations of the state and its political economy, the nation-state has a psychosocial foundation – a “national habitus.” The concepts of *homo nationis* and national habitus underscore that modern individuals are historical individuals, i.e. they have personality structures that are unlike those of individuals in other historical epochs, and that they should be explicitly conceptualized as such, rather than as a transhistorical *homo oeconomicus* or *homo sociologicus*. Many fundamental social processes, including those discussed under globalization, can be better explained with such a conception. The historical-structural context for *homo nationis* is the world order of nation-states that has only recently finished formally incorporating all other social formations from tribes to the remnants of empires, as well as the specific state-society to which the individual belongs. The paper notes the interest Durkheim and Weber had in habitual behaviour and draws on the exemplary work of Norbert Elias on national habitus to sketch its conception of *homo nationis*. The paper then assembles further evidence for the existence and significance of national habitus by perusing a diverse set of scholarly literatures, including national culture in business studies, national economies and economic nations, nationalism, comparative sociology, and normative political theory.

Introduction: Theoretical and Historical Contexts

In the social sciences today, the so-called “Hobbesian problem of order” is widely accepted as a foundational problem. The Hobbesian problem of order, simply stated, centers around the question, “how is social order possible?” Hobbes’s famous image of the individual in the “state of nature” – condemned to live in an unceasing, brutal war of all against all – has been elevated into a paradigmatic challenge for social and political theory. It sets up disorder and chaos as humankind’s natural state – a perennial threat to establishing or maintaining any stable human social order. This image of “man and society” is embodied in the *homo oeconomicus* that informs neoclassical economics and under the name of rational choice theory has made considerable inroads into other social sciences. More surprisingly perhaps, this view of the individual is embodied not only in *homo oeconomicus* but also in his traditional opponent, *homo sociologicus*. Both types of humans are ultimately conceived as isolated individuals in need of social order. In the economic approach, it is above all individual interests that, coordinated through particular social arrangements such as free markets and laws, produce social order. In the sociological approach, it is social norms, common beliefs and values through which individuals are integrated into society.

This formulation of the problem of order has become widely accepted as fundamental. The individual “and” or “vs.” society has been a constant theme in methodological debates in the social sciences for more than a century. How to conceptualize individual and collective dimensions of social life, and the corresponding implications for how to study political, economic, and cultural phenomena, do of course represent fundamental questions for social science. The problem with the “Hobbesian” conceptualization is that it turns the individual and society into two separate entities working with or against each other. In reality, individuals (whether primates or members of the genus *Homo*) have never existed prior to or outside society but always as part of societies.¹ Societies, in turn, do not exist apart from individuals – in fact they are entirely composed of individuals and their artefacts. We should therefore not be speaking of “society *and* individuals” or “individuals *and*

¹ Society is used in the generic sense of social group.

society,” but in Norbert Elias’s memorable phrase, of a *society of individuals*.² It is the so-called Hobbesian problem of order that turns a useful analytical distinction into a misleading ontological separation. “The problem of social order” is a generic name or category for what are always concrete, historically situated problems of order in particular social systems. In its contemporary historical context the problem of order refers above all to societies contained in sovereign states composed of increasingly individualized members.³ But “the problem of order” can refer to any social system, from the global system to the family, from organizations to loose networks, in the past and in the future. The globalization debate has called into question the future of the sovereign state framework, exposing the historical character of this basic pillar of modern social order. What has not been exposed and problematized in the same fashion is the historical character of the membership making up modern societies. In what sense are individuals historical?

What I want to argue in this paper is that neither *homo oeconomicus* nor *homo sociologicus* is a sufficiently rich, sufficiently historicized, concept to deal with the dominant type of human beings that has emerged in the twentieth century. I propose as an alternative the historically specific *homo nationis*: the individual who is born and raised in a particular national culture, and who lives most of her life in a nation-state of which she is a citizen. As a product of the emerging global order composed of nation-states, *homo nationis* became a truly global phenomenon in the second part of the twentieth century after two world wars and numerous anti-colonial struggles, all fought in the name of the nation. The globalization debate has drawn our attention to migrants, transnationals and binationals who do not neatly fit this conception. However, it is important not to exaggerate the relative significance of such populations and ignore the larger historical trend. *Homines nationes* have become the overwhelming majority of the world’s population in the course of the twentieth century. I will argue that this element of personality structure is not *exclusive* – real people have many additional personality characteristics – and it is not necessarily the *dominant* personality structure in every

² This is the title of one of his major works (1991).

³ I’m purposely speaking of nation-state societies as composed of “individualizing members” rather than individuals. This is to emphasize that individualism is not somehow opposed to society but rather has emerged in particular types of societies. More on the “historical individual” below.

contemporary society – some societies have little national coherence and strong regionally, religiously or linguistically based subcultures. Nevertheless, the “nationalized personality structure” is *fundamental* in most state-societies today. *Homo nationis*, like *homo oeconomicus* is driven, by individual interests and, like *homo sociologicus*, by social norms. However, a particular nationality – or national identity in a broad sense – gives a crucial and distinct psychocultural specificity and political and economic context to people’s individual interests and social norms at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

It should be emphasized again that there are many other competing and complementary elements that go beyond, or make for internal diversity in, distinct “national characters.” But for the most part “national habitus” – a key phrase that I will explain in detail below – expresses what has become a dominant habitus type in the world over the past century. The national habitus, a nationally specific personality structure, is the socio-cultural complement to the nation-state structure. It has emerged gradually at different times in different places under different political and economic conditions and is constantly evolving. Being historically specific, it is unlikely to remain a dominant social habitus in the long run as globalizing political and economic forces seem to be weakening the foundations of the national habitus – the sovereign state, the national economy, national culture. It is unclear, however, when and how this shift will occur. One future scenario is the gradual eclipse of the national by transnational or global forms of habitus and postnational identities, another the further fragmentation of the modern self into a variety of postmodern identities. A third is the survival of national habitus alongside, or in combination with, transnational and postmodern forms of habitus. Of course all three may come together in particular combinations. In other words, these different forms of habitus are not mutually exclusive. The focus of this paper is on revealing just how pervasive and yet largely unrecognized and taken for granted national habitus is at the current historical juncture at which globalizing processes dominate the collective imagination. One implication of the deep-rootedness of this psychocultural formation is that it is likely to stay around for some time even amongst processes of rapid economic and political “denationalization.” Psychosocial change is widely assumed to lag behind social-structural change (Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Elias). The national

habitus therefore has to be taken seriously even if, or perhaps especially if, it is increasingly anachronistic.

This paper will make the case for the central place of national habitus in contemporary problems of order. It will sketch the outlines of *homo nationis* in general terms. Since every concrete national habitus is historically specific, it would be mistaken to generalize that the national habitus has the function of integrating modern society. It may have that effect, but not necessarily so. Take extreme forms of nationalism that lead to violence and the collapse of state institutions. Or think of a weakly developed national habitus that plays at best a secondary role relative to other habitus forms rooted in religious, class, tribal or local social systems. In a world system composed of formally sovereign states, what one can say in general terms with some certainty is only that, for better or worse, national culture matters – for political legitimation, economic development, social conflicts. This may not be much, but it does allow us to pose as serious historical and empirical questions how national culture matters, and whether it is more or less functional for a variety of political and economic processes such as democratization and postcommunist transformation. Stability and change of national cultures and forms of habitus are historical processes that, as the historical record shows, have been unfolding in a rich variety of ways. The nationalization of culture and habitus has helped to establish and maintain arrangements of social order largely compatible with and conducive for progressive development in some states (such as Britain, France, the Scandinavian countries, Costa Rica, or Botswana). In others (such as the United States, most in Latin America, Germany, Japan, or South Africa) this process was accompanied by periods of profound political and economic crisis from which these countries emerged or are emerging only gradually. Then there are the postcommunist countries whose political and economic order simply collapsed.⁴ Finally, in a large number of states (most of them post-colonial states), the nationalization of culture and habitus has occurred in the context of colonial legacies, domestic instability and economic and political dependence on other states. However, regardless of country-specific circumstances, the

⁴ Whereas the economic and political regimes of communism, and in three cases the federal state itself, collapsed, national identity and culture survived and thrived. In spite of certain ideological declarations to the contrary, communist states did not de-nationalize their populations, and more often than not reinforced their national specificity.

nationalization process is fundamental in all states. As a central social process, it is involved in and affected by other social processes, including those referred to as globalization.⁵ But what is nationalization of culture and habitus?

What is habitus?

In current debates, the concept of social *habitus* (the Latin term for habit) is usually associated with the recent work of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (e.g. 1984; 1990), who is widely known and cited not only in the social sciences, but also in the biosocial sciences and in applied fields such as medical sociology (e.g. Lyndbladh and Lyttkens 2002). Habitus to the scientifically minded appears as a somewhat vague and dubious concept. It has no place in the dominant frameworks and approaches that speak about preferences, interests, behaviour, attitudes, values, cognition, rational action, social structure, and perhaps even emotion and passion, but not about habits. Why introduce a concept of questionable value when there are so many more rigorous, established and operationalizable concepts that refer to the same things?

First, the concept of habit does not have to be newly introduced into the discussion; it has been around for a long time. As the quotations below illustrate, the concept of habit has an important place in the works of the founding fathers of modern sociology who themselves continued a tradition going back to the Enlightenment and Greek philosophy. The concept was embraced equally by English utilitarians and German idealists. “Despite the efforts of biologists, physiologists, and psychologists to carry habit off in other directions, it remained a standard term by which social theorists captured *those forms of action in the social world that were seen to be less reflective and more self-actuating*. It was in this context that Emile Durkheim and Max Weber wrote (Camic 1986, 1050, emphasis added).” Take the following short examples which are extracted from the detailed analysis by Camic (1986). First, Durkheim:

[I]t is not enough to direct our attention to the superficial portion of our consciousness; for the sentiments, the ideas which come to the surface are not, by far, those which have the most influence on our conduct. What must be reached are the habits [. . .] these are the real forces which govern us (Durkheim 1905-1906, 152; quoted in Camic 1986, 1052).

⁵ Being products of an ongoing social process, national culture and national habitus should not be treated as – independent or dependent – variables.

Contrary to the assumptions underlying *homo oeconomicus*, Weber considered habit to be of “far-reaching economic significance” in regulating the behaviour and interaction of economic units, as well as fundamental attitudes towards work and what is now called “professionalism.” More generally, he saw habit as crucially involved in various processes of group formation, such as “mere custom . . . facilitating intermarriage,” “the formation of feelings of ‘ethnic’ identification,” and “the creation of community” (Weber 1922a, 320). “[T]he great bulk of all everyday action [approaches an] almost automatic reaction to habitual stimuli which guide behavior in a course which has been repeatedly followed” (Weber 1922, 337; quoted in Camic 1986, 1059). In Weber’s view, habit was also at the foundation of modern political and legal orders (PS313; WG655). Camic (1986, 1062) argues that “Weber’s writings on traditionalism may be seen as developing (in a way that, to my knowledge, has nowhere been matched), a macrosociological perspective on habit.” Not only Durkheim and Weber, but also Marx, Comte, Tönnies, Simmel and other social theorists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (Camic 1986, 1050) employed the concept of habit in the broad sense of guiding action, influencing the emergence of norms, and posing powerful inertia to social change.⁶

The concept of habit became a victim in the struggle of early twentieth-century American sociologists for academic influence and recognition as a discipline in universities. Since more established disciplines like psychology and physiology had occupied the field with their own conceptions and explanations of habit, it was abandoned by sociologists largely for political reasons. The preeminent American sociologist Talcott Parsons, probably the most influential Weber interpreter and translator in the Anglo-Saxon world, was a key figure in banishing the concept from the modern sociologist’s toolbox. Readers of English translations of Durkheim and Weber in the latter half of the twentieth century were ill-prepared to recognize the concept of habit as of any particular significance for the social sciences, even though it played such an important role in their works (Camic 1986).

⁶ The same habits that for a long time support or are at least compatible with the existence of a particular social order, however, may under certain conditions also have the opposite effects of facilitating revolutionary action and regime collapse, as was the case in many of the communist regimes in 1989. For an interesting illustration of this point in the context of East Germany in 1989, see McFalls (forthcoming).

Second, it is questionable whether the established concepts such as norms, behaviour, attitudes, values and so on can capture certain social phenomena as well as or even better than the concept of habit. Habits are involved in the whole spectrum of human action and interaction – from habits of obedience to habits of economic behaviour. They can be cognitive, emotional or moral. They may be simple and automatic such as a particular gesture, or complex and reflected such as in modes of moral reasoning. The concept of habitus has the great virtue of allowing us to conceive of individual forms of thinking, feeling, perceiving, wanting, acting, and interacting as structured by corresponding general patterns, i.e. that habitus loosely structures personalities and individual behaviours. Habitus is here conceived as an *emergent property of a social system*, i.e. a habitus is social-system specific.⁷

Third, the concept of habitus has played a central role in the work of another mid-twentieth century sociologist who has become more widely recognized only in the last two decades.⁸ In his two-volume *The Process of Civilization* (1939/1978-1982; first published in German in 1936), Norbert Elias undertakes a sweeping and unique historical analysis of the emergence of Western civilization. Two aspects of his work make it particularly exceptional. Elias explores the psychocultural changes in human personality structure over a period of several centuries, conceiving of the civilizing process in terms of specific changes in human behaviour. He examines everyday behaviours from eating habits and spitting etiquette to more general dispositions of aggressiveness and changing gender relationships. Fascinating as a historical study of changing habits, Elias does more than document these profound habitus changes. He simultaneously provides a structural analysis of social change in the context of which those fundamental changes in habits occurred. His ambition is to demonstrate key relationships between social structural and psycho-cultural change. The general process of civilization he traces is the gradual evolution of more differentiated and integrated social structures. Elias is clear, however, that there is no overall historical necessity at work that drives societies towards ever higher levels of differentiation and integration – the way Spencer thought. There are

⁷ I consciously depart here from conceptions such as Bourdieu's social field, which alludes probably to much the same thing but is a vague and idiosyncratic social ontology. Regardless of the unfortunate connotations of the phrase "social system," I adopt Mario Bunge's systemic philosophy (e.g. 2003, 1998) which has nothing to do with system *theories* such as those of Parsons or Luhmann.

⁸ Camic, writing in the mid-1980s, does not mention Elias once.

periods and places where we can observe long-term stagnation or de-differentiation and disintegration. Elias poses two central questions: are there changes in affect and control structures of members of particular societies that over generations run in the same direction; and can these changes in personality structure be related to social structural changes? (Elias 1978)

In the introduction added to the 1968 edition of *Process*, Elias delivers a powerful critique of Parsons' system thinking that foreshadows many later criticisms of structural-functionalism. But Elias sees a number of conceptual fallacies still deeply embedded in post-Parsonian social science, such as the view that social systems move from one state of equilibrium to another, making social change into a disruptive transition from one state of normality to another – a strongly held implicit assumption, for example, in much of the literature on postcommunist transitions. He holds the “national idea” responsible for diverting attention from what is changing to what is seen as unchangeable, i.e. the nation – a fundamental idea that has subtly shaped the world views and modes of thinking of modern intellectuals (Elias 1978, 38; Hofstede 1996), notwithstanding their usually adverse views of nationalism.

It accords with this development that many twentieth-century sociologists, when speaking of “society,” no longer have in mind (as did their predecessors) a “bourgeois society” or a “human society” beyond the state, but increasingly the somewhat diluted ideal image of a nation state. [. . .] A mixture of “is” and “ought,” of factual analyses and normative postulates, relating primarily to a society of a very definite type, a nation-state conceived in broadly egalitarian fashion, thus presents itself as the centerpiece of a theory which claims to be capable of serving as a model for the scientific investigation of societies in all times and places. [. . .] [As a result] the concept of development itself [has been called into question], the very consideration of problems of long-term social development, of sociogenesis and psychogenesis. In a word, the baby has been thrown out with the bathwater (Elias 1991, 241-244).

Some of these arguments have more recently reappeared in the globalization debate, especially those that have identified as problematic the assumption of the nation-state as the “natural” unit of analysis. How this criticism affects the argument of this paper that national habitus should be treated as central will be addressed in the next section. Elias's critique, however, goes further than this particular argument. He regards as especially pernicious the widespread static conception of individual and society in contemporary

social science, and the related failure to adequately conceptualize the process character of social life. A major obstacle in this respect, according to him, is:

the extraordinary conviction carried in European societies since roughly the Renaissance by the self-perception of human beings in terms of their own isolation, the severance of their own “inside” from everything “outside.” [. . .] This self-perception in terms of one’s own isolation, of the invisible wall dividing one’s own “inner” self from all the people and things “outside,” takes on for a large number of people in the course of the modern age the same immediate force of conviction that the movement of the sun around an earth situated at the center of the cosmos possessed in the Middle Ages (Elias 1991, 250-251; 260).

This shifting balance between “I” and “we,” from almost exclusive emphasis on “we” to primary emphasis on “I,” this historical process of individualization represents one of the major psychosocial outcomes of the civilizing process in Western Europe.⁹

What is national habitus?

It might appear from what Elias says about the naturalization of the “national idea,” i.e. the tacit equation of the concepts of society and social system with an idealized conception of nation-state, that speaking of “national habitus” immediately forfeits whatever credibility might have just been established for the concept of habitus. National habitus would be yet another way of naturalizing what probably has no social reality outside the minds of nationalists. In contrast to the widespread, tacit universalization and naturalization of the national, my reconceptualization attempts to historicize and contextualize it. Elias (1991, 209) himself is explicit about his own view. “Looking more closely one finds that the traits of national group identity –what we call the ‘national character’ - are a layer of the social habitus built very deeply and firmly into the personality structure of the individual.” “National character” is not exactly a widely used concept in the social sciences. Bourdieu, who reintroduced habitus into the debate in the 1980s (1984; 1990), tellingly does not use the concept in the context of national character. He is interested primarily in the way a class-specific habitus functions in

⁹ The significance of habit in determining individual behaviour is also highlighted in recent psychological literature (Ajzen 2001).

processes of social exclusion, distinction, and power.¹⁰ So what is there to be said in favour of the concept of national habitus?

The long-term historical trend towards increasing social differentiation and integration into ever larger social units culminated in the creation of a global system of nation-states in the twentieth century. As the literatures on economic globalization, international governance and cultural transnationalization forcefully suggest, it would be naive to assume that the current age of globalization will leave the existing nation-state order intact. Whatever validity the concept of national habitus may have had, many argue that it is increasingly a personality structure¹¹ of the past that is being replaced by fragmented postnational selves and higher level transnational identities. In this long-term historical perspective, Elias himself predicts the eventual decline of the nation-state order. In the meantime, however, he notes, “[i]t may be that the nation-state-based we-identity of the individual in our day is almost taken for granted. One does not always remember clearly enough that the role of the state as a frame of reference for the we-identity of the great majority of all members of a state, i.e. the state’s role as nation state, is of relatively recent date. (Elias 1991, 206)

Only in the course of the two great wars of this century did the populations of the more developed industrial states take on the character of nations in the more modern sense of the word, and their states the character of nation states. Nation states, one might say, are born in wars and for wars. Here we find the explanation why, among the various layers of we-identity, the state level of integration today carries special weight and a special emotional charge. The integration plane of the state, more than any other layer of we-identity, has in the consciousness of most members the function of a survival unit, a protection unit on which depends their physical and social security in the conflicts of human groups and in cases of physical catastrophe (Elias 1991, 208).

The continuing individualization process diagnosed by Elias, and the related fragmentation of identities described by postmodern theorists¹², would suggest that all-encompassing collective identities, especially national identities, are similarly being

¹⁰ See however the work of Michele Lamont (1992; 2002) who also provides a critique of Bourdieu’s conception of habitus.

¹¹ If indeed it is recognized as such.

¹² For a critical assessment of these positions from a viewpoint similar to the one presented here, see Billig (1995), esp. ch. 6-7. A different view examining the relationship between Foucault and Bauman, on the one hand, and Elias, on the other, can be found in Dennis Smith 2001.

weakened and undermined. Individuality, it appears, is increasingly becoming a unifying characteristic and source of common identification for many people of different nationalities.¹³ While at one level this commonality is real,¹⁴ it does not follow that it occurs at the expense of or transcends the framework of the national culture.

Powerful as the advance of individualization has been in recent times, in relation to the nation-state plane we-identity has actually strengthened. One often finds that people try to overcome the contradiction between their self-perception as a we-less I, as a totally isolated individual, and their emotional involvement in the we-group of the nation by a strategy of encapsulation. Their self-perceptions as an individual and as a representative of a we-group, as a Frenchman, Englishman, West German, American, etc., are assigned to different compartments of their knowledge, and these compartments communicate only very tenuously with each other (Elias 1991, 209).

This radical separation is facilitated by the taken-for-grantedness or “second nature” that national habitus represents for most people most of the time.¹⁵ Much the same seems to hold for individuality as a part of habitus. The timeless, placeless self, personally experienced by a growing number of people – the subjective part of individualization processes – is however firmly tied to its national culture as source and reference point.

The deeply rooted nature of the distinctive national characteristics and the consciousness of national we-identity closely bound up with them can serve as a graphic example of the degree to which the social habitus of the individual provides a soil in which personal, individual differences can flourish. The individuality of the particular Englishman, Dutchman, Swede or German represents, in a sense, the personal elaboration of a common social, and in this case national, habitus (Elias 1991, 210).

The individual vs society dualism is therefore misleading even when we speak of the process of individualization itself. Individuality presupposes a particular cultural environment, and the central part of this environment is the historically evolved national culture. *Homo nationis* as an individual is constituted by his particular nationality – not exclusively, but primarily. If this argument asserting the significance of national habitus in contemporary societies is valid, then national habitus must be assumed to play an often

¹³ The EU as the leading case of transnational integration provides an ideal testing ground for whether and how strong postnational identities can emerge. See e.g. Cederman 2001; Soysal 2002.

¹⁴ I.e. in terms of similar values as measured, for instance, in the cross-national surveys of Inglehart (e.g. 1997).

¹⁵ The best recent treatment of this “banal” nature of nationalism is probably Billig 1995.

unrecognized role in a range of contemporary problems of order. This will further explored in the next section.

Why and where is national habitus significant?

The concept of national habitus highlights that, in addition to formal institutions and abstractly rational individuals, the modern order rests on psychosocial foundations – what phrases such as “consent” or “nation as a daily plebiscite” (Renan) allude to, with the important proviso that habitus is much more encompassing and less voluntaristic than consent or voting. These foundations may be strong and evolving, or they may be brittle and dissolving. In either case, they exist in every modern state.¹⁶ They cannot be reduced to individual choices or systemic structures, though both are involved. The development of national habitus is structurally favoured by the global state system.¹⁷ It is functionally significant since national habitus plays a fundamental role in many social processes, as the remainder of this paper will illustrate.¹⁸ A social process like the development of a national habitus is a cultural fact, produced for the most part not by design but the result of unintended consequences of human action. A strong functionalist interpretation of national habitus as a “precondition” for modern society can therefore be misleading (cf. Gellner).¹⁹ The same holds for a causal interpretation that sees national habitus as a “necessary” outcome of the emergence of the modern state system. I propose to start with the more modest assumption that national habitus is a form of personality structure that has evolved in the context of a global system composed of states, and that it is causally involved in many facets of how this global system works. Each national habitus is a particular, historically specific, concrete social formation that has evolved under structural conditions (i.e. the rise of the nation-state system) that are normatively reflected in the theory of sovereignty. This should give us sufficient room to examine the actual effects of national habitus on political and economic processes without

¹⁶ Note that the claim here is not that national habitus works everywhere as the only, or necessarily major, psychosocial foundation of modern order. Such generalizations would be untenable given the diversity of nation-states.

¹⁷ There are other structural features of a state-society, such as internal linguistic or religious divisions, that do not favour the development of a national habitus.

¹⁸ See also a new set of analyses on the significance of economic nationalism under globalization (Helleiner and Pickel 2004).

¹⁹ For a critique of Gellner’s functionalist leanings, see O’Leary 1997.

overcommitting ourselves methodologically. The paper will now present more evidence for the existence and significance of national habitus by drawing on a diverse set of scholarly literatures, including national culture in business studies, national economies and economic nations, nationalism, comparative sociology, and normative political theory.

Why and where is national habitus significant?

National culture in business studies

It may come as surprise that business studies can be found among the academic fields explicitly recognizing the significance of the “national” – rather than merely employing it implicitly as the basic unit of analysis. Equipped with the assumption that economic actors are among the major driving forces of globalization, one might expect the management literature to be busy devising social technologies for the global firm, based on a conception of *homo oeconomicus*. Unlike their colleagues in mainstream economics, however, management theorists seem much more sympathetic to *homo sociologicus*. In fact, the literature sampled below suggests that *homo nationis* is no stranger in their field.

Because management is about people, it is part of the culture of the society in which it takes place. Culture is 'the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another'. The core element in culture are values. Values are 'broad tendencies to prefer certain states of affairs over others'. They are about what is evil and what is good, dirty and clean, immoral and moral, irrational and rational. Relationships between people in a society are affected by the values that form part of the collective programming of people's minds in that society. So management is subject to cultural values. Cultural values differ among societies, but within a society they are remarkably stable over time. This is why I claim that management processes, which are embedded in a culture, differ from society to society but within each society show strong continuity. [. . .] While I argue that management in the 21st century will not be basically different from management in the 20th, I do expect a breakthrough in the development of theories of

management, which will become more adapted to national cultural value systems in different parts of the world. (Hofstede 1999, 36, 39)²⁰

Nationality and national culture have been identified as significant or dominant influences in a variety of problems in business studies such as corporate policies and accounting practices, management styles and entrepreneurial orientations, mergers and acquisitions, employment systems etc. Take the following examples culled from some of the relevant books and journals.

In *The Myth of the Global Corporation*, Doremus et al. (1998, 9) write: “The empirical evidence . . . suggests that distinctive national histories have left legacies that continue to affect the behavior of leading MNCs. The scope of corporate interdependencies across national markets has unquestionably expanded in recent decades. But history and culture continue to shape both the internal structures of MNCs and the core strategies articulated through them.” Chui et al. (2002) report that in addition to economic performance, legal and banking systems, and other conventional variables, national culture has strong effects on a company’s capital structure and financial leverage. A study of local subsidiaries of a multinational corporation demonstrates the influence of nationally specific corporate policies and practices in relation to the environment (Guedes 2000). Salter and Sharp (2001) show that even apparently minor cultural differences in management control and accounting such as those between Canada and the United States can be the source of serious coordination problems. Other studies address the importance of nationality in behavioural attributes of executives (Hitt 1997), entrepreneurial orientation (Kemelgor 2002), and investment conduct (Thomas and Waring 1999). The global scale of many firms’ activities has led to a search for “best practices,” though as Hope and Muhlemann (2001) argue with respect to production and operations management, these practices are often not transferable from one national context to another. National differences, or inadequate national cultural fit (Weber et al.

²⁰ Contrast this rich conception of economic culture with economist L. Thurow’s (2000) thin conception: 'Traditionally, culture is older people telling younger people what they should believe and how they should act. What is frightening about the new electronic culture is that it is a 'for-sale' culture that jumps right across the generations directly to the young. In contrast to older forms of culture, this culture does not have any specific values that it wants to inculcate. Those who produce this culture provide whatever sells-- whatever the young will buy. It is a culture of economics (profits) rather than a culture of values (morals)'.

1996), have also played a significant role in international mergers and acquisitions, from preacquisition management (Angwin 2001) to the integrating mechanisms used to establish headquarter-subsiary control (Lubatkin et al. 1998). As Calori et al. (1994) conclude, firms are guided by their national administrative heritage when they acquire companies abroad.

The design of managerial information systems (Ishman et al. 2001) and the information seeking behaviour of banks (Zaheer and Zaheer 1997) have been found to be shaped by national culture. Significant cultural differences in national employment systems and national production regimes are reflected in relative job autonomy (Dobbin/Boychuk 1999) and levels of employee commitment (Hult/Svallfors 2002). In postcommunist Poland, the apparently generic practice of human relations management in MNC subsidiaries is widely perceived as an Anglo-American idea with no direct Polish equivalent (Hetrick 2002). Proactive career behaviors such as career planning, skill development, consultation, and networking differ from one national culture to another (Claes/Ruiz-Quintanilla 1998). Comparative analysis of professions such as solicitors and pharmacists (Lane et al. 2002) demonstrate the determining power of national culture. While international airline pilots – true agents of globalization themselves – share a professional culture, they are nonetheless influenced in their cockpit behaviour by their nationality (Merritt 2000). Contrary to the homogenization thesis in the globalization debate, internationally converging incomes are reported to lead to diverging consumer behaviour (de Mooij 2000). Finally, in a partial reversal of the causal arrow, Foster (1999) argues that while commodity marketing and mass consumption are nationally specific, they also play a significant role in *producing* nationally distinct consumption styles that may rival political identities in defining a nation.

Much of this literature is methodologically and theoretically problematic. The main purpose of this brief survey is to show that there is a strong sense of the significance of national culture in these different areas of management studies. Comparative perspectives on both explanatory and practical problems of international business seem to have fostered a strong awareness of the importance of national habitus. To be sure, the concept of national habitus is rarely used in these studies. Authors speak in general and

often vague terms about national culture and usually do not attempt to anchor their concepts of nation and national identity in sociological theories. (What they might find if they did will be briefly addressed below.) One of the most influential figures in business studies is the Dutch cultural psychologist Geert Hofstede quoted at length above. He has conceptualized national culture in terms of five dimensions, which facilitates operationalization and measurement through survey methods. The five dimensions refer to basic problems that are resolved differently in different societies: inequality, togetherness, gender roles, dealing with the unknown, and time orientation. The different solutions to these problems represent five dimensions of national cultures (Hofstede 1998). This approach has been widely applied. While I believe that the work of Hofstede and other researchers in management studies lends support to my argument that the national is of fundamental significance in a variety of social processes, I'm skeptical about how it is being conceptualized in that literature. I claim for my own conceptualization of *homo nationis* and national habitus that it is both more systematic and deeper than the implicit and undeveloped conceptions underlying the studies discussed above. Let us continue surveying other academic literatures that take the national seriously, particularly in the context of globalization.

National Economies and Economic Nations

Based on a geographical definition of national economy, national economies do indeed appear to be dissolving insofar as economic activity, especially finance and trade, is rapidly internationalizing. But economic activity, especially production and consumption, still occurs in particular national social and political contexts which in turn provide fundamental resources and constraints for such global-level economic activity. Two literatures have made particularly significant contributions to establishing the continuing significance of the national economy. The first is the literature critical of the 'new global economy' thesis (see e.g. Wade 1996; Zysman 1996; Sorge 1999). The second is the 'varieties of capitalism' literature that calls into question the convergence thesis according to which globalization is producing one dominant model of market economy (Berger and Dore 1996; Goricheva 1997; Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997; Streeck and Crouch 1997; Streeck 1992). For the purposes of our discussion, the

following results are particularly important. Extension of economic activity beyond national boundaries does not equal the end of national economy; the latter, qua political, social, and cultural economy, continues to be the basis for the former. Generalizations about *the* national economy, now as in the past, ignore the great diversity of conditions for particular national economies.

Just as individual political nations have developed particular national political cultures (Bendix 1977, 1978), economic nations have their own economic cultures. Let us begin by illustrating the general concept with a concrete empirical example, drawn not from an earlier, now largely discredited literature on national character (Lamont 1995, 351), but from contemporary political economy.

German economic culture is often traditionalist. Savings rates are high, and consumer credit, although increasing, remains low by comparison. Price competition is mitigated by socially established preferences for quality. Markets do not per se confer merit: social status and solidarity interfere, and security is regarded as important. Speculation is not valued. Continuous monitoring of one's short-term balance of economic advantage is not a social norm, encouraging long-term orientations and commitments and supporting, among other things, a redistributive tax system. Professional competence is highly regarded for its own sake; German managers tend to be engineers and authority at the workplace is based on superior technical knowledge. Collectivism and discipline have given way as core cultural values to privacy and autonomy from organisational control and market pressure, as shown by strong cultural support for short working hours, low participation in paid employment, and a qualification-based organisation of work. (Streeck 1997)

The same author (Streeck 1999) has also coined the phrase 'competitive solidarity' to underline nationalism's economic potential in global competitiveness.

A critical view of a-cultural, thin conceptions of economic society can also be found in recent studies of national legal cultures (Boyle 2000; Chua 1998), public administrative cultures (Kouzmin 1997; Macdonald and Thomas 1997), and national 'repertoires of evaluation' (Lamont and Thevenot 2000). The general social and cultural embeddedness of markets is studied by economic sociologists (Granovetter and Swedberg 1992; Fligstein 2001; White 2001) and economic anthropologists (Macfarlane 1987; Gudeman 1986; Halperin 1994; Hefner 1998). The following points are particularly relevant. National economic cultures exist both as symbolic and as social

systems, and as such can be mapped. Economic cultures have limited variation within a society, but strong variations between societies.

Part of the distinctiveness of individual national economies arises from the specific patterns of interaction between state and economy that have evolved over time. These – in many respects nationally specific – roles of the state are examined in an extensive literature (Boyer and Drache 1996; Garrett 1998; Helleiner 1994; Iverson et al. 2000; Jessop 1999; Weiss 1998, 2003). This literature shows why and how even under the 'rule of the global economy' political economies are still governed by states. While economic globalization is a convenient shorthand for referring to changing global economic conditions, the decline or even end of the nation-state is not the other side of this coin. First, economic globalization has been engineered by certain nation-states and continues to be shaped by them. Second, given the continued significance of national economies, states remain the central actors in all political economies. Another literature with a long tradition (Gerschenkron 1962; Bendix 1977) underscores the centrality of nation and culture in state formation, industrialization, postcommunist transformation, and stability and change in modern nation-states (Bönker et al. 2002; Linz and Stepan 1996; Steinmetz 1999).

The Nationalism Literature

It should come as no surprise that the nationalism literature takes the national seriously. I briefly comment on it here in order to highlight some of the fundamental insights that this literature has recently generated. While the relationship between state and nation is a mainstay in the nationalism literature, it has paid relatively little attention to the relationship between the nation and the economy.²¹ In part, this is a result of an unfortunate division of labour between students of nationalism, on the one hand, and students of political economy and students of management theory, on the other. One of the major results of current scholarly debates on nationalism is the demolition of the categorical distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism (i.e. good Western or liberal patriotism and bad non-Western or authoritarian nationalism) (Billig 1995; Spencer and Wollman 1998). The upshot of this insight is that nationalism is increasingly conceived

²¹ See, however, Crane 1998; Abdelal 2001; Tsygankov 2002.

as a generic phenomenon that is in principle compatible with a variety of ideological content – from political liberalism (Miller 1995; Tamir 1993) to fascism, and from neoliberalism to new forms of protectionism (Helleiner and Pickel 2004).

Another fundamental insight of the recent nationalism literature is that both as symbolic system (discourse and ideology) and as societal structure (nation-state societies), the nation has become a fundamental pattern that is constantly being reproduced globally in a variety of forms (Calhoun 1997; Gellner 1983; Kyvelidis 2000; Meyer et al. 1997). As Charles Tilly has put it:

As in the cases of citizenship and democracy, nationalism exhibits the paradox of a general process characterized by path-dependent particularism. On one side, classic mechanisms of invention, ramification, emulation, and adaptation recur in the generation of nationalist claims. On the other side, each new assertion of nationalism responds to its immediate historical and cultural context, then modifies conditions for the next assertion of nationalism. Like all culturally constrained social processes, nationalism proceeds in cultural ruts that greatly limit the directions it can go, relies on collective learning, but by its very exercise alters relations – including shared understandings – among parties to its claims'. (Tilly 1999, 418)

A third insight is that the national is not only symbolic and systemic structure, but also political action in the context of particular historical conditions, in particular the expansion of a global nation-state order (Beissinger 1996; Brubaker 1996; see also Tarrow 1994). These novel insights represent the beginnings of a conscious linking of the nationalism literature to current debates in political science and sociology. In light of the theoretically extremely diverse if not chaotic state of this literature (Smith 2001; Spillman/Faeges forthcoming), this development seems quite promising. That such bridging work is necessary is in part also due to the low level of attention the social sciences have afforded the subject of nation and nationalism in their theorizing. However, on this side as well there seems to be a growing awareness that the significance of the national has been seriously neglected. Let us briefly survey recent developments in historical and cultural sociology.

Comparative Sociology

Marx, Durkheim and Weber did not provide much systematic theorizing on the nation that might have served as a foundation for subsequent studies.²² Marx considered the nation as a transitory historical phenomenon already in the nineteenth century.²³ Both Weber and Durkheim²⁴ experienced World War I with its unprecedented nationalist mobilization, which in hindsight marks the acceleration of a global nationalizing process that may have only now run its full course.²⁵ One wave of nation-states, mostly in Europe, emerged in the aftermath of World War I from the ruins of European empires, while the largest wave producing the greater number of new states was not to come until after World War II as result of large-scale decolonization. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 may well have ushered in the final wave of new nation-states. Both the postcolonial wave and the post-Soviet wave of nation-building have attracted a great deal of scholarly attention from social scientists.

The 1950s and 1960s mark a high point in the study of nation formation. Karl Deutsch, Reinhard Bendix, Seymour Martin Lipset and others produced theoretically diverse studies that had in common a rejection of the universalism of modernization theory. Deutsch (1953) conceived of the national as collective identity emerging from a common system of social communication. While strongly committed to quantification, he generated insights into processes that would nowadays be examined by discourse analysis. Much like the latter, Deutsch paid little attention to political institutions and processes. Bendix (1964), by contrast, emphasized inter-state processes leading to the formation and consolidation of nations, while largely neglecting the generation and role of collective representations and identity in these processes. His identification of the “global logic” of nation-building is a particularly important contribution to the theoretical literature. “[N]ationalism has become a universal condition . . . because the sense of

²² I rely in this section heavily on the more detailed evaluation by Spillman/Faeges 2003.

²³ Writing in the early 1970s, leading nationalism scholar Anthony Smith concluded that the debates of Marxist thinkers Kautsky, Luxemburg, Bauer, and Lenin were the “most consistently sociological of the attempts to explain nationalism until the present decade” (quoted in Spillman and Faeges forthcoming, 4).

²⁴ Durkheim, like Marx, was convinced of the transitory character of the nation, remarking presciently that “there is tending to form . . . a European society that has even now some feeling of its own identity and the beginnings of an organization” (quoted in Spillman/Faeges 2003, 5).

²⁵ With the addition of Timor-Leste (East Timor) in May of 2002, there are now 193 independent sovereign states in the world. There are 16 non-self-governing territories, with a combined total of fewer than 1 million inhabitants.

backwardness in one's own country has led to ever new encounters with the 'advanced model' of development of another country" (Bendix, quoted in Spillman/Faeges 2003, 13). Focusing on foundational values, Lipset's *The First New Nation* (1963) analyzed nation-building and collective identity formation in the United States, placing this case in comparative historical perspective – a perspective that was at odds with the dominant Parsonian framework of grand, often ahistorical and Western-centric generalizations.

The revival of macro-sociology in the United States in the 1970s, associated with scholars such as Theda Skocpol (1979) and Charles Tilly (1975), focused on bringing the state back in, leaving the nation on the sidelines of analysis. "In this intellectual field, a concern with understanding 'the nation' as a collective identity was suspect, associated, rightly or wrongly, with assumptions of value consensus which at best were untenable and at worst were coercive, and probably both. As cultural phenomena, 'nations' were peripheral to the main historical forces shaping modernity, since structures of domination such as the state could account for such collective identity formation and change" (Spillman/Faeges 203, 15).²⁶

A similar neglect of the sociological significance of national culture is also characteristic for the influential German sociologists Niklas Luhmann and Ulrich Beck. The major theme of Luhmann's (1995) systems theory is the functional differentiation of contemporary society that has no overarching and integrating system as I claim is provided by a national culture connected to a sovereign state. Beck (1992) is preoccupied with individualization processes that run counter to the nationalizing processes which I argue continue to be fundamental even in postmodern societies in the age of globalization. As Schwinn (2001; my translation) has suggested in his analysis of the problem of order with reference to such systems and postmodern approaches:

The differentiated institutions have to remain connected with each other so that individuals are able to pass through various institutions in their life times with continuity, in a planned fashion, and with stable expectations. Differentiated institutions do not provide this automatically but depend for this on the political system. Educational degrees, professions, access to the labour market, health and pension systems, are difficult or impossible to convert from one state to

²⁶ A correspondingly one-sided overemphasis of the cultural can be found in the idealist conceptualizations of nation in some of the works published in the 1990s. Greenfeld 1992; see also 2001 and Rutland 2003; Meyer et al. 1997.

another. Which explains why even in the EU there is little international mobility. The capacity to plan one's life remains tied to a cultural and state framework.

Membership in the political system, i.e. holding citizenship in a particular state, is the formal precondition for full and equal participation in other societal institutions. Membership (i.e. competence) in the national culture of a state-society is the informal precondition. Both citizenship and cultural membership are taken for granted by *homo nationis*. For non-members, such as economic migrants and political refugees, acquiring citizenship and becoming competent in a national culture are therefore prerequisites for equal status. The ways in which these might be fulfilled in a particular state-society are not culturally neutral but politically defined in and through a national culture. This takes us to current debates on citizenship and multiculturalism. What do they say about the national?

Normative political theory

Few state-societies nowadays are not to some degree multinational in composition. The debate in contemporary political theory has been between those who argue that liberalism can adequately accommodate ethnic and cultural minorities and those who argue that liberalism is not and cannot be culturally neutral. Accommodation and integration of cultural minorities under liberalism is therefore not possible on equal terms, thus requiring some sort of alternative, multicultural solution. The central question here is to what extent democratic citizenship can be separated from national culture. What is of interest in this debate for purposes of this paper is the question whether and how national culture is seen to play a role in these problems of order. The debate has long been shaped by the abstract juxtaposition of “cosmopolitanism” vs “ethnic nationalism.” From the perspective presented here, nationalism (whether strong or weak, more civic or more ethnic²⁷) is a general fact whereas cosmopolitanism is a utopian vision. Since this study is not primarily interested in normative problems of order but rather in the factual

²⁷ While the civic vs ethnic dualism in the categorization of nationalisms is now widely recognized as problematic, Zubrzycki (2001) shows how they may serve as ideal types if approached and employed with sufficient care.

significance of the national, the cosmopolitan position is of interest only insofar as it claims that a political order can rest on a culturally neutral foundation.

Veit Bader (1997) has attempted to develop a differentiated concept of transnational political culture that can deal with the weaknesses of both radical positions. He points out that mainstream liberal political philosophy has generally neglected cultures, habits, virtues, and practices. “Traditional liberalism (‘liberalism 1’) has underestimated the importance of communities and cultures. But liberal-democratic communitarianism or communitarian liberalism (‘liberalism 2’) has not yet fully addressed the exclusionary effects of communities and cultures.” (Bader 1997, 772) Can the institutions, cultures, habits, and virtues of liberal democracy be treated as separate from the national? Political theorists aware of the problem of universalism vs particularism have proposed “solutions” such as “liberal nationalism” (Tamir 1993; Kymlicka 1995; Miller 1995), “constitutional patriotism” (Habermas 2001, esp. ch. 4), “rooted cosmopolitanism” (Cohen 1995), and “multiculturalism” (Taylor 1992). Bader (1997, 773) cautions that the “specific meanings of these concepts are, however, quite vague, particularly when it comes to [actual] institutional settings and political cultures and virtues.” It seems that theorizing about the empirical significance of national culture has not moved beyond the implicit assumption that either it should be and can be ignored (mainstream liberalism) or that it cannot be dissociated from democratic institutions (communitarian liberalism). The former has thus little to contribute to the present discussion, whereas the latter recognizes the significance of the national for political theory, but leaves us with little more than the conclusion that “abstract or complete ethnic neutrality of the liberal-democratic state is unachievable empirically. As long as ‘ought implies can,’ it cannot be required normatively” (Bader 1997, 789).

Concluding Comment

In order to conceptualize *homo nationis*, this paper has suggested the concept of social habitus. It has pointed out that habitus, which is not a mainstream social science concept, played an important role in the work of Weber, Durkheim and others. Habitus captures better what more narrow standard concepts like values, attitudes, etc. refer to. The work

of Elias was presented as a prime example for the analysis of psychocultural changes in personality structure in historical context. Elias himself considered national habitus as highly significant in the contemporary period. The question was raised why a concept like national habitus should be embraced when national cultures are so widely seen to be in decline. The answer suggested was that not only is this view exaggerated, but even declining cultures have to be analyzed as dynamic elements of global change. Similarly, how can a national focus be defended when social scientists are trying to transcend “methodological territorialism” (Scholte 2000)? The approach suggested here differs fundamentally from the traditionally widespread and implicit use of nation as a fundamental unit of analysis. First, the “national level” has often been used as a synonym for state or country. Second, it is not recommended as a basic level of analysis, but viewed as a basic social reality that has not been sufficiently recognized and properly studied. Third, as a social reality it has to be in every case historicized and contextualized rather than being theorized in general terms. Fourth, national habitus differs from “national character” in the important respect that it is not essentializing and homogenizing. Forms of national habitus are constantly changing, and they are composed of different, sometimes conflicting elements (such as world views, practices, rituals, values or attitudes). Fifth, social differentiation and individualization as fundamental social processes of modernity and postmodernity are not inconsistent with national habitus. In fact, both processes depend on the moral, cognitive and political resources and constraints that national habituses supply.

References

- Ajzen, Icek. 2001. "Nature and Operation of Attitudes." *Annual Review of Psychology* 52, 27-58.
- Angwin, D. 2001. "Mergers and acquisitions across European borders: National perspectives on preacquisition due diligence and the use of professional advisers." *Journal of World Business* 36, 1, 32-57.
- Bader, Veit. 1997. "The Cultural Conditions of Transnational Citizenship. On the Interpenetration of Political and Ethnic Cultures." *Political Theory* 25, 6, 771-813.
- Beck, Ulrich. 1992. *Risk society : towards a new modernity*. London: Sage Publications.
- Beissinger, Mark. 1996. 'How nationalisms spread: Eastern Europe adrift the tides and cycles of nationalist contention', *Social Research* 63, 1: 97-147.
- Bendix, Reinhard. 1978. *Kings or People. Power and the Mandate to Rule*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Bendix, Reinhard. 1977. *Nation-Building and Citizenship*. 2nd edn. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Bendix, Reinhard. 1964. *Nation-Building and Citizenship*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Berger, S. and R. Dore (eds.). 1996. *National Diversity and Global Capitalism*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
- Biggart, Nicole W. and Thomas D. Beamish. 2003. "The economic sociology of conventions: Habit, custom, practice, and routine," *Annual Review of Sociology* 29, 443-464.
- Billig, Michael. 1995. *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage Publications.
- Bönker, Frank, Klaus Müller and Andreas Pickel (eds.). 2002. *Postcommunist Transformation and the Social Sciences*. Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. 1984. *Distinction : a social critique of the judgement of taste*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. 1990. *The Logic of Practice*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Boyer, Robert and Daniel Drache (eds.). 1996. *States against Markets: The Limits of Globalization*. London: Routledge.
- Boyle, Elizabeth Hegel. 2000. "Is Law the Rule? Using Political Frames to Explain Cross-National Variation in Legal Activity," *Social Forces* 78, 4, 1195-1226.
- Brubaker, Rogers. 1996. *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Calhoun, Craig. 1997. *Nationalism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Calori, R. 1994. "Control Mechanisms in Cross-Border Acquisitions – An International Comparison." *Organization Studies* 15, 3, 361-379.
- Camic, Charles. 1986. "The Matter of Habit." *American Journal of Sociology* 91, 5, 1039-87.

- Cederman, Lars-Erik. 2001. "Nationalism and Bounded Integration:: What it Would Take to Construct a European Demos." *European Journal Of International Relations* 7, 2, 139-174.
- Claes, R. and S.A. Ruiz-Quintanilla. 1998. "Influences of early career experiences, occupational group, and national culture on proactive career behavior." *Journal of Vocational Behavior* 52, 3, 357-378.
- Chua, Amy L. 1998. "Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for Law and Development." *Yale Law Journal* 10, 1-107.
- Chui, ACW et al. 2002. "The determination of capital structure: Is national culture a missing piece to the puzzle?" *Journal of International Business Studies* 33, 1, 99-127.
- Cohen, M. 1995. "Rooted Cosmopolitanism." In *Toward a Global Civil Society*, ed. Michael Walzer. Oxford: Berghahn.
- de Mooij, M. 2000. "The future is predictable for international marketers - Converging incomes lead to diverging consumer behaviour." *International Marketing Review* 17, 2-3, 103-113.
- Deutsch, Karl W. 1953. *Nationalism and social communication; an inquiry into the foundations of nationality*. New York: Wiley.
- Dobbin, F. and T. Boychuk. 1999. "National employment systems and job autonomy: Why job autonomy is high in the Nordic countries and low in the United States, Canada, and Australia." *Organization Studies* 20, 2, 257-291.
- Doremus, Paul N., William W. Keller, Louis W. Pauly, Simon Reich. 1998. *The Myth of the Global Corporation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Durkheim, Emile. (1905-6) 1956. *Education and Sociology*. Transl. Sherwood D. Fox. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.
- Elias, Norbert. 1978. *The Civilizing Process*. Vol. I. New York: Urizen Books. Translated by Edmund Jephcott.
- Elias, Norbert. 1982. *The Civilizing Process*. Vol.II. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Translated by Edmund Jephcott.
- Elias, Norbert. 1991. *The Society of Individuals*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Fligstein, Neil. 2001. *The Architecture of Markets. An Economic Sociology of Twenty-First-Century Capitalist Societies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Foster, R.J. 1999. "The commercial construction of 'new nations'." *Journal of Material Culture* 4, 3, 263-282.
- Garrett, Geoffrey. 1998. *Partisan Politics in the Global Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gellner, Ernest. 1983. *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Gerschenkron, Alexander. 1962. *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective*. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Granovetter, Mark and Richard Swedberg (eds). 1992. *The Sociology of Economic Life*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

- Greenfeld, Liah. 1992. *Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Greenfeld, Liah. 2001. *The Spirit of Capitalism. Nationalism and Economic Growth*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Gudeman S. 1986. *Economics as Culture*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Guedes, Ana Lucia. 2000. "Repensando a nacionalidade de empresas transnacionais" (Rethinking the Nationality of Transnational Enterprises). *Revista de Sociologia e Politica* 14 (June), 51-60.
- Habermas, Jürgen. 2001. *The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays*. MIT Press.
- Halperin RH. 1994. *Cultural Economies Past and Present*. Austin: Univ. Texas Press.
- Hefner, Robert W. 1998. *Market Cultures. Society and Morality in the New Asian Capitalisms*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Helleiner, Eric. 1994. *States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Helleiner, Eric and Andreas Pickel (eds.). Forthcoming. *False Oppositions. Reconceptualizing Economic Nationalism in a Globalizing World*.
- Hetrick, Susan. 2002. "Transferring HR ideas and practices: globalization and convergence in Poland." *Human Resource Development International* 5, 3, 333-351.
- Hitt, M.A. et al. 1997. "Understanding the differences in Korean and US executives' strategic orientations." *Strategic Management Journal* 18, 2, 159-167.
- Hofstede, Geert. 1996. "An American in Paris: The influence of nationality on organization theories." *Organization Studies* 17, 3, 525-537.
- Hofstede, Geert. 1998. "A case for comparing apples with oranges - International differences in values." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 39, 1, 16-31.
- Hollingsworth, J. Rogers and R. Boyer (eds.). 1997. *Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness of Institutions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hope, C.A. and A.P. Muhlemann. 2001. "The impact of culture on best-practice production/operations management." *International Journal of Management Reviews* 3, 3, 199-217.
- Hult, Carl and Stefan Svallfors. 2002. "Production Regimes and Work Orientations: A Comparison of Six Western Countries." *European Sociological Review* 18, 315-331.
- Inglehart, Ronald. 1997. *Modernization and Postmodernization*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Ishman, M.D., C.C. Pegels and G.L. Sanders. 2001. "Managerial information system success factors within the cultural context of North America and a former Soviet Republic." *Journal of Strategic Information Systems* 10, 4, 291-312.
- Iverson, Torben, Jonas Pontusson, David Soskice (eds.). 2000. *Unions, Employers, and Central Banks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jackman, Robert W. and Ross A. Miller. 1998. "Social capital and politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 1, 47-73.

- Jessop, Bob. 1999. 'Narrating the future of the national state: remarks on remapping regulation and reinventing governance', in George Steinmetz (ed.). *State/Culture. State-Formation after the Cultural Turn*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UP.
- Kemelgor, B.H. 2002. "A comparative analysis of corporate entrepreneurial orientation between selected firms in the Netherlands and the USA." *Entrepreneurship and Regional Development* 14, 1, 67-87.
- Kymlicka, W. 1995. *Multicultural Citizenship*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Kyvelidis, Ioannis. 2000. 'State isomorphism in the post-socialist transition', *European Integration online Papers (EioP)* 4, 2: <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-002a.htm>
- Kouzmin, Alexander. 1997. 'From Phobias to Ideological Prescription: Toward Multiple Models in Transformation Management for Socialist Economies in Transition', *Administration & Society* 29, 2: 139-88.
- Lamont, Michele. 1992. *Money, Morals, and Manners: The Culture of the French and the American Upper-Middle Class*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lamont, Michele. 1995. 'National Identity and National Boundary Patterns in France and The United States', *French Historical Studies* 19, 2, 349-365.
- Lamont, Michele. 2002. *The Dignity of Working Men: Morality and the Boundaries of Race, Class, and Immigration*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Lamont, Michele and Laurent Thevenot (eds.). 2000. *Rethinking comparative cultural sociology. Repertoires of evaluation in France and the United States*. Cambridge University Press.
- Lane, Christel, Margaret Potton and Wolfgang Littek. 2002. "The Professions Between State And Market: A Cross-national Study Of Convergence And Divergence." *European Societies* 4, 2, 235-260.
- Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan. 1996. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1963. *The First New Nation. The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective*. New York: Basic Books.
- Lubatkin, M. et al. 1998. "Managing mergers across borders: A two-nation exploration of a nationally bound administrative heritage." *Organization Science* 9, 6, 670-684.
- Luhmann, Niklas. 1995. *Social Systems*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Macdonald, Roderick and Huw Thomas (eds.). 1997. *Nationality and Planning in Scotland and Wales*. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.
- Macfarlane A. 1987. *The Culture of Capitalism*. Oxford: Blackwell
- MacPherson, C.B. 1964. *The Theory of Possessive Individualism. Hobbes to Locke*. London: Oxford University Press.
- McFalls, Laurence. Forthcoming. "Choosing a State? 'Contradictory Consciousness' in the East German Revolution of 1989 and the Quebec Referendum on Sovereignty of 1995." In . . .
- Merritt, A. 2000. "Culture in the cockpit - Do Hofstede's dimensions replicate?" *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 31, 3, 283-301.

- Meyer, John, John Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco O. Ramirez. 1997. 'World Society and the Nation-State', *American Journal of Sociology* 103, 1, 144-81.
- Miller, David. 1995. *On Nationality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- O'Leary, Brendon. 1997. "On the Nature of Nationalism: An Appraisal of Ernest Gellner's Writings on Nationalism." *British Journal of Political Science* 27, 2, 191-222.
- Portes, Alejandro. 1998. "Social Capital. Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology." *Annual Review of Sociology* 24, 1-24.
- Rosenau, Pauline Vaillan and Harry C. Bredemeier. 1993. "Modern and postmodern conceptions of social order." *Social Research* 60, 2, 337-349.
- Smith, Anthony. 2001. *Nationalism*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Rutland, Peter. 2003. "The Muse of History" (Review of L.Greenfeld, *The Spirit of Capitalism*). *History and Theory* 42, 1, 116-126
- Salter, Stephen B and David Sharp. 2001. "Agency effects and escalation of commitment: do small national culture differences matter?" *The International Journal of Accounting* 36, 1, 33-45.
- Schwinn, Thomas. 2001. "Staatliche Ordnung und moderne Sozialintegration." *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 53, 2, 211-232.
- Skocpol, Theda. 1979. *States and social revolutions : a comparative analysis of France, Russia, and China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, Dennis. 2001. *Norbert Elias and Modern Social Theory*. London: Sage.
- Sorge, Arndt. 1999. "Organizing Societal Space within Globalization: Bringing Society Back In." *Working Paper*, Max-Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne.
- Soysal, Yasemin N. "Locating Europe." *European Societies* 4, 3, 265-284.
- Thomas, L.G. and G. Waring. 1999. "Competing capitalisms: Capital investment in American, German, and Japanese firms." *Strategic Management Journal* 20, 8, 729-748.
- Spencer, Philip and Howard Wollman. 1998. "Good and Bad Nationalisms: A Critique of Dualism." *Journal of Political Ideologies* 3, 3, 255-274.
- Spillman, Lyn and Russell Faeges. forthcoming. "Nations," in Julia Adams et al. (eds.), *The Making and Unmaking of Modernity: Politics and Processes*. Durham, N.C. Duke University Press.
- Steinmetz, George (ed.).1999. *State/Culture. State-Formation after the Cultural Turn*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Streeck, Wolfgang. 1992. *Social Institutions and Economic Performance: Studies of Industrial Relations in Advanced Capitalist Economies*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Streeck, Wolfgang. 1997. "German Capitalism: Does it Exist? Can it Survive?". *New Political Economy* 2, 2, 237-56.
- Streeck, Wolfgang. 1999. Competitive Solidarity: Rethinking the 'European Social Model'. *MPIfG Working Paper 99/8*.
- Streeck, Wolfgang and Colin Crouch.1997. *Political Economy of Modern Capitalism. Mapping Convergence and Diversity*. London: Sage.

- Tamir, Yael. 1993. *Liberal Nationalism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Tarrow, Sidney. 1994. *Power in Movement*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Taylor, Charles. 1992. *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Thurow, Lester. 2000. 'Globalization. The product of a knowledge-based economy', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 570 (July), 19-31.
- Tilly, Charles. 1999. 'Epilogue: Now Where?' in George Steinmetz (ed.), *State/Culture. State-Formation after the Cultural Turn*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UP, pp. 407-419.
- Tilly, Charles (ed.). 1975. *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- van Krieken, Robert. 1997. "Beyond the 'problem of order': Elias, habit and modern sociology." Paper presented at the Elias Foundation Centenary, Amsterdam, 20-22 June.
- Wade, Robert. 1996. 'Globalization and its Limits: Reports of the Death of the National Economy are Greatly Exaggerated', in S. Berger and R. Dore (eds.), *National Diversity and Global Capitalism*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UP, pp. 60-88.
- Weber, Max. (1922a) 1978. *Economy and Society*. Ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. 2 vols. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Weber, Max. (1922b) 1976. *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. Ed. Johannes Winckelmann. 2 vols. 5th rev. ed. Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck.
- Weber, Y, O. Shenkar and A. Raveh. 1996. "National and corporate cultural fit in mergers/acquisitions: An exploratory study." *Management Science* 42, 8, 1215-27.
- Weiss, Linda. 1998. *The Myth of the Powerless State*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Weiss, Linda (ed.). 2003. *States in the Global Economy. Bringing Domestic Institutions Back In*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- White, Harrison C. 2001. *Markets from Networks: Socioeconomic Models of Production*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Zaheer, S. and A. Zaheer. 1997. "Country effects on information seeking in global electronic networks." *Journal of International Business Studies* 28, 1, 77-100.
- Zysman, John. 1996. 'The Myth of a 'Global' Economy: Enduring National Foundations and Emerging Regional Realities', *New Political Economy* 1, 2: 157-85.