

Working papers



Christine de Pizan as World Order Theorist

Mark Neufeld

TIPEC Working Paper 02/5

Introduction:

Achieving a fresh perspective on the world we live in can be a vital part of making sense of that world. At its best, International Relations Theory helps us to do just that. It can do so in different ways. It may involve applying the latest trends in social and political theory to the phenomena of world politics: the development of critical IR theory, both modernist and postmodernist variants, stands as an example. Alternatively, it may involve a return to the work of past thinkers - neglected as well as over-indulged - to see if a (re)-engagement with their work might shed new insights on the present.

It is the second approach that will be pursued here. Specifically, I will engage the work of a neglected figure in International Relations - the early 15th century writer Christine de Pizan - to see in what ways her writings on the social and political issues of her day might help us make sense of the current global context. Accordingly, I will examine Christine de Pizan as a theorist of "world order", in terms of three distinct but inter-related themes: i) her conception of the optimal form of state; ii) her conception of the corresponding optimal form of international order; and iii) the question of human agency and responsibility. For despite the centuries which separate her world from ours, her thinking remains highly relevant to the task of making sense of the globalizing world we confront at the end of the 20th century.

Listening for the Sound of Female Voices:

It is difficult to overlook the fact that the major figures in International Relations Theory are men. As shall hopefully be demonstrated, there is a certain irony in this fact, regardless of how the origins of that set of disciplinary practices we call International Relations is conceived. Let us

begin with the view that sees International Relations as a 20th century discipline. Conventional accounts of the origins of the discipline relate the story as follows:

Following the destruction and unparalleled human suffering associated with the First World War, there was an understandable preoccupation with the causes of war in the industrial age, deriving from the practical intent of avoiding another. What followed on the heels of WWI was, accordingly, the establishment of a series of institutions of higher learning and study to provide a response to the a question in need of an answer: why war?

Indeed, following Czempiel,¹ Krippendorff argues that the origin of the discipline of International Relations can be given a specific date - May 30, 1919 - for

On this day British and American delegations at the Paris Peace Conference agreed to establish scientific institutions in their countries for the purpose of investigating international relations.

The practical consequences of this decision were not long in coming. In 1920 the British Royal Institute of International Affairs and the American Council of Foreign relations were founded, as was the Berlin-based Deutsche Hochschule für Politik. Before the decade was over, they had been joined by other similarly-oriented institutions, perhaps the most well-known of which was the Institut Universitaire des Hautes Études Internationales established in 1927.

None of this should come as a surprise if one sees theorizing not as a disembodied activity, but one which is integrally bound up with a specific historical context and the practical problems that context throws up. What is problematic in the conventional story just recounted, however, is the idea that the discipline of International Relations was founded in order to provide an answer to a question which had, until the heady days of 20th century Realism and Idealism, eluded analysts of world politics. For the fact is that an answer to the question "why war?" had been developed long

before the establishment of mainstream institutes. It was the answer offered by marxist theorists in the early years of the 20th century - those now referred to as the theorists of "classical imperialism".

The problem, of course, was that their response to the query of how to avoid a repeat of the carnage of WWI - abolish capitalism - was as unpalatable to the economic and political elites of their day as it is to ours. Indeed, to the degree that their analyses and prescriptions were embraced by the disaffected masses, they posed a real threat to the established order.

It was to address this problem that International Relations was established - not to find an answer to an unanswered question, but to provide an answer to the problem of war in the industrial age that was less threatening to those with established power and privilege. What the new discipline was to do, in other words, was to develop and promote a view of war that would neutralize and marginalize those who argued that peace and capitalism were antithetical; that industrial society could choose one or the other, but that it could not have both.²

One might be forgiven for thinking, on the basis of mainstream engagements with the marxist analysis of classical imperialism, that the most important and original theorist was Lenin. For there is no question that it is Lenin's work on imperialism - *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*³ - that mainstream International Relations continues to engage, if only as a foil and in a highly caricatured fashion.⁴ In point of fact, serious marxist scholars are virtually uniform in their appraisal of Lenin's "pamphlet" as being a decidedly weak contribution to the analysis of world politics. Fairly typical is the conclusion reached by the noted marxist scholar Anthony Brewer, who concludes that *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*

...makes little or no contribution to the development of a theory of imperialism. Its theoretical content is slight and derives from Hilferding, Bukharin and Hobson....This should not, perhaps, be a surprise. The work is a pamphlet (Lenin

describes it as such in his preface), a popular outline of the sort that has an honourable and important role in Marxist literature: a factual survey of the current situation together with a summary of the results of theoretical analysis (though not the detailed theoretical argument), designed to provide a basis for political decisions. To argue that the work contains no major theoretical innovations is not, therefore, a criticism of Lenin, but of the orthodox Marxist tradition which turned it into a sacred text. To treat any work as sacred is a thoroughly unscientific attitude; to treat a minor work (with the weaknesses which this one has) as sacred is a serious lapse of judgment.⁵

Clearly it is unfair to arrive at judgements about the merits of classical imperialism theory by examining what is arguably one of its weakest formulations. If Lenin's *Imperialism* is not the appropriate object of consideration, however, what is? A strong case can be made that it is the theoretical efforts of Lenin's contemporary - and critic - Rosa Luxemburg. Her work on imperialism not only predated Lenin's but, notwithstanding its own weaknesses, represented the most original effort to re-formulate Marx's approach for the 20th century, and continues to inspire important work on world politics.⁶

This is not the place to engage in an extended consideration of the continuing relevance of Rosa Luxemburg's work for the study of world politics.⁷ It is simply to ask the following question: If the origins of mainstream IR theory can be located in the fear prompted by increasingly popular marxist analyses of world politics whose most creative and eloquent expositor was a woman, is it entirely polemical to characterize mainstream IR as an effort to silence the radical, female voice?

Of course, it may be objected that this discussion misses the point. This brings us to the second version of the origins of the discipline, which goes something like this:

Theorizing about world politics predates the 20th century. Rather, the origins of IR must be sought at the beginning of the modern world system, where the shift from feudalism and heteronomy to capitalism and sovereignty first threw up the central questions that would preoccupy students of world order for the next several hundred

years. Accordingly, it is the contributions of prescient thinkers such as Machiavelli and Grotius to which attention should be directed.

Once again, however, it can be countered that women's voices - though subsequently neglected - were very much present during the formative period of the modern world system. The work of Christine de Pizan stands as an example of such a voice. Furthermore, her insights take on increased relevance for our own context of transition to a post-Westphalian world order. It is to her life and work that I now turn.

Christine de Pizan's Politics:

The details of Christine de Pizan's life are relatively clear. Bernice Carroll, one of the few International Relations scholars to have focussed on her life and work, provides a concise summary:

Christine was born in Venice in 1364. Her father, Thomas de Pizan, became court physician and astrologer to king Charles V of France, and in Christine's youth she led a comfortable and happy life at court. Her father encouraged her in learning and writing, as did her husband, Etienne du Castel, who was secretary to Charles V. She bore three children, of whom two, Marie and Jean, survived. After the deaths of her father and husband, she lacked means to support herself and her family. She began writing poetry after her husband's death, and soon found it a source of livelihood. Her creations won the patronage of members of the royal family and nobility of France, England, and Italy, who provided her with handsome gifts in return for her books. Some of her works were spontaneous offerings, while others, such as her biography of Charles V, were specifically commissioned. Her success enabled her to pursue the studies that she loved and to produce over twenty-five volumes of poetry and prose. But Christine's tumultuous era drove her to withdraw from secular life into the cloister. She spent the last decade of her life in a convent, probably at Poissy where her daughter was a nun. She died about the year 1430.⁸

What is less agreed upon is how she is to be interpreted. One tendency has been to take the fact that Christine de Pizan was a woman who wrote on issues of concern to women as sufficient

grounds on which to classify her as "the first modern feminist". Particularly in some quarters of women's studies, there has been a strong temptation to read contemporary concerns with women's equality and feminist politics back into the figure of Christine de Pizan.⁹ The most convincing counter to this tendency has been provided by Sheila Delaney. While not denying the importance of Christine de Pizan's work and contribution, Delaney raises important caveats about seeing her as a proto-feminist before her time, not least of which her firm opposition to peasant revolts, freedom of expression, and anything smacking of democratic governance, and, perhaps most problematic for contemporary feminists, her uncritical embrace of the patriarchal view that the proper role for a woman is in the home serving as an adjunct and support for her husband.¹⁰

More recently, Bernice Carroll offers what is, notwithstanding some valuable insights, a similarly questionable reading. Specifically, Carroll takes Christine de Pizan's stated concerns with conflict - both inter and intra-state - as grounds for arguing that she was a "pivotal figure" not only in terms of feminist theory and women's studies,¹¹ but also in terms of the "origins of peace theory" and modern peace research. As a concern with the condition of women, while necessary, is, in and of itself, insufficient to qualify someone as a modern feminist, so a concern with issues of peace and conflict, while necessary, is, in and of itself, insufficient to qualify someone as a "peace researcher" in the modern sense. The recipe for peace must also be taken into account. In Christine de Pizan's case, her recipe for social peace is an inherently conservative one,¹² and as such very much at odds with the neo-idealist, liberal-reformist orientation of contemporary peace research.¹³

None of this is to say, however, that Christine de Pizan's writings cannot serve to prompt our thinking in new ways about our own times. Indeed, in a context of extremist neo-liberalism, even

a conservative vision can serve a critical-progressive agenda. At least, that is the hope that underlies the discussion which follows.

Christine de Pizan's Problematique:

Christine de Pizan was a major contributor to the medieval and Renaissance "Mirror of Princes" literature, of which Machiavelli's *The Prince* stands as one of the best-known examples.

As one authority has noted:

The "mirror for princes," or prince's handbook, was an important genre for the development of political thought throughout the Middle Ages. It served as a transmitter of many classical Greek and Roman ideas about politics, but also altered them, giving them Christian rhetorical and political significance. As a genre, the mirror for princes follows certain conventions....The substantive discussion of political ideas is organized around a narrative order - the transformation of the prince into an ideal king....All political mirrors emphasize the development of character, good judgement, and the classical virtues of courage, justice, temperance, and prudence, as well as the princely qualities of liberality, magnificence, generosity, and authority. The differences in mirrors stem from their authors' disagreements about the essential nature of kingship and the problems of ruling **as well as the differences brought about by political culture and context.**¹⁴

This raises then the question of the context in which Christine de Pizan wrote, and the problematique she engaged. In general terms, Christine de Pizan's world was marked by political upheaval and social unrest that would prove unsettling to someone as loyal to the established order as she. As Delaney notes, in France in this period the social tensions which associated with the dying feudal order

were exacerbated by war with England and by a ruling elite whose self-indulgence literally turned every holiday into a national financial disaster. The country was in constant turmoil which during the lifetime of Christine de Pizan coalesced into several nationwide insurrections. The Jacquerie - the great national peasant revolt of 1358 - linked up with dissatisfied bourgeois in many cities who were already organizing general strikes against royal fiscal policy. The Maillotin insurrection of 1382 culminated months of tax-riots by bourgeois and artisans in major cities, taking its name from the police mallets seized by the rebels. During 1383 and 84, guerrilla

warfare was carried on throughout the south by bands of dispossessed peasants and urban poor, the so-called Tuchins....Christine herself witnessed and wrote about one of the most important of these insurrections, the 1413 Cabochian revolution, centred in Paris.¹⁵

As noted above, context is vital for making sense of the individuality of a contribution to the mirrors for princes literature. In Christine de Pizan's context the central problem facing society was that of a lack of effective central authority. Her concern with promoting such an authority is the sub-text to her analyses and prescriptions. I will take these up in terms of the form of state, international order, and view of agency and responsibility.

Christine de Pizan and the Form of State:

The form of state which Christine de Pizan was seeking to promote can best be described as "authoritarian-corporatist". Her antipathy to democratic forms of governance is clearly visible in her writings. She did understand, however, that a stable order could not rest on coercion alone. Accordingly, she gave specific prescriptions to ensure adequate public tolerance - if not enthusiastic support - for the court and its rule.

A good example of Christine de Pizan's thinking in this regard can be found in her major work of political philosophy, *The Book of the Body Politic*, written in the years 1404-1407. Drawing on an organic analogy which likens the politico-social orders to a body, Christine de Pizan stresses the interdependence of the various classes or "estates" of French society: princes - the head of the body politics, nobles and knights - the arms and hands, and the common people - the belly, legs and feet:

For just as the human body is not whole, but defective and deformed when it lacks any of its members, so the body politic cannot be perfect, whole, nor healthy if all the

estates of which we speak are not well joined and united together. Thus, they can help and aid each other, each exercising the office which it has to, which diverse offices ought to serve only for the conservation of the whole community, just as the members of the human body aid to guide and nourish the whole body. And in so far as one of them fails, the whole feels it and is deprived by it.¹⁶

In her advice to the prince, Christine de Pizan lays great stress on the need for an activist leader committed to the welfare of the nation as a whole:

The virtues of a prince are seen in three things, without which he will not achieve this crown of reputation, good name, and consequently, honour. The first and most important, is to love, fear, and serve God without dishonesty, but with good deeds rather than spending time withdrawn in long prayers.

Another is this: he ought solely to love the good and benefit of his country and his people. All his ability, power and the study of his free time ought to be for this, rather than for his own benefit. The third is that he must love justice above all, guarding it and keeping it without restraint, and must do equity to all people. By keeping these three points well, the prince will be crowned with glory in heaven and on earth.¹⁷

An activist prince committed to a stable order will ensure that the norms of justice and fairness are respected, she argues, by overseeing all aspects of the country. Indeed, she is willing to extend the responsibilities of the sovereign to include regulating the behaviour of church officials. And recognizing the need for the prince to assemble an armed force to protect the country from external attack, Christine de Pizan also goes to great pains to remind the prince that it is also his responsibility (for example, by providing adequate pay) to ensure his knights and soldiers respect the rights and property of the population they have been engaged to protect:

This does not mean that the soldiers themselves should pillage and despoil the country like they do in France nowadays when in other countries they dare not do so. It is a great mischief and perversion of law when those who are intended for the defence of the people, pillage, rob and so cruelly, that truly short of killing them or setting their houses on fire, their enemies could do no worse. This is not the right manner of warfare, which ought to be just and without extortion... Before God, there is no doubt that the justifiable curses of the people, when they have been oppressed too much, can cause evil fortune to fall ...¹⁸

The need to pay soldiers adequately, of course, raises the question of taxes. Here too, Christine de Pizan shows due recognition of the need to respect limits. Accepting the need of the prince to levy taxes, she warns about imposing excessively harsh burdens:

But this should be done compassionately and discretely so to hinder the poor less, and without taking more than what is necessary for the particular cause, such as war or for whatever it was set. And the rich, in this case, ought to support the poor, and not exempt the rich, as is done nowadays, leaving the poor the more heavily burdened. I dare say, no matter who is displeased, saving their reverence, it is a marvellous right that the rich and high officials of the king or princes who have their rank and power as a gift of the king and princes who are able to carry the burden, are exempt from taxes, and the poor who have nothing from the king have to pay. Is it not reasonable if I have given a great gift to my servant, and give him a rich livelihood and his estate, and it happened that I had some need, that he comes to my aid more than the one who has had nothing from me? It is a strange custom that is used nowadays in this kingdom in the setting of taxes....I say these things for the poor. Compassion moves me because their tears and moans come bitterly forth. There are some who come to pay this money imposed on them and then they and their poor household starve afterwards, and sell their beds and other poor possessions cheaply and for nothing. And it would please God if someone informed the king and noble princes. There is no doubt that their noble blood holds so much kindness that they could not allow such cruelty.¹⁹

Ultimately, Christine de Pizan understood that a stable political order is one which rests on the foundation of what Gramsci termed "hegemony" - where force is minimized and effective rule derives from the "consent of the common voice of the people";²⁰ where meaningful concessions are made by the dominant to the subordinate in exchange for their support. Significantly, to underscore this point, she holds up the example of the Romans to extol the virtues of material concessions:

The good prince who loves the universal good more than his own should be liberal, a very necessary quality from which he will profit triply; first it is for the good of his soul (if he is discreet), secondly for the praise and honour of his reputation; thirdly, he will attract the hearts of his own subjects to himself as well as those of strangers. There is no doubt that nothing profits a prince as much as discreet generosity. Oh, how much the Romans profited from it!... There is no doubt that because of their liberality, the Romans acquired sovereignty and dominion more than by force, because foreign counties seeing their noble and free customs, yielded to them, not in

hopes of being servants, but in order to be free. And Valerius said the same that the empire of Rome, that is, its superiority, did not increase so much from the strength of their bodies as from the vigour of their courage.²¹

Indeed, Christine de Pizan is hopeful that if the concerns of the poor, once communicated to the prince and his advisors (she assigns the rising middle class merchants this task) prompt not retribution but understanding and concessions, it will be possible to "bring back the common people or others who from fear or dread or evil want to rebel and take the wrong side".²²

Finally, her recognition of the element of consent in stable rule is evident in her insistence that an effective prince is one who is skilled in rhetoric and able to persuade others to follow him through public discourse.²³ The result is a stable order within a stable state.

Christine de Pizan and the International Order:

Christine de Pizan recognized that the order she wanted to promote inside the sovereign state could not be created or maintained in isolation from the establishment of a complementary order in the international realm. Accordingly, her writings about intra-state order were paralleled by writings concerning the international order.

Christine de Pizan recognized that the anarchical nature of the inter-state system that is the result of the shift to an order whose principle of differentiation is sovereignty is one in which violence is an ever-present possibility. Indeed, one of her prime arguments against rebellion and civil unrest is the vulnerability to foreign invasion such behaviour brings with it:

Alas! Is that not the case of civil war in a country, and especially in this one, where noblemen were formerly a single body, as they should indeed still be? And then after the slaughter and rout come the diabolical commoners with their picks and maces, which they are so unwisely allowed to own and carry, who would have massacred the remaining noble ladies, maidens, and children, lacking sufficient good sense to

be aware that some foreign lord would soon arrive to subjugate them and kill them because the death of the nobles would leave them without anyone to resist the invader....²⁴

Her recognition of the ordering principle of anarchy, however, did not prohibit her from seeing the need for - and indeed, emerging outline of - a kind of international society, where institutionalized practices of diplomacy and the norms of conduct embodied in international legal principles can serve to minimize violence in dealings between states.

In 1410, Christine de Pizan, building upon arguments she had first sketched out in *The Book of the Body Politic*, wrote *The Book of the Deeds of Arms and of Chivalry*. Drawing on authorities such as Vegetius, Honoré Bouvet and John of Legnano, this work reads very much like the standard overview of International Law found in introductory IR textbooks. Specifically, Christine de Pizan addresses, in an accessible fashion, the three foundational themes for International Law: i) the subjects of international law; ii) what circumstances justify engagement in war (*Jus ad Bellum*) and iii) the rules regarding the proper conduct of war (*Jus in Bello*).

To begin, Christine de Pizan's discussion of legal subjects is strikingly close to the modern view reflective of Westphalian assumptions. As Willard notes, Christine de Pizan argued that a Just War "could be waged only by a king or a legitimate head of state, not as an individual but as one responsible for the welfare of his subjects".²⁵

As to when it was permissible to declare war, Christine de Pizan attached two clear conditions. First, it had to be waged for a just cause - to obtain justice, or against oppression and usurpation. Wars of aggression were illegitimate. Secondly, war could only be declared when all other routes to resolve conflicts between sovereigns had been tried. Christine de Pizan was quite specific about how state leaders were required to try diplomacy before violence was an option:

... in order that a prince may go about the matter justly, he will follow this course: he will gather together a great council of wise men in his parliament, or in that of his sovereign if he is a subject, and not only will he assemble those of his own country, but in order that there may be no suspicion of favour, he will also call upon those from foreign countries who are known not to take sides, elder statesmen as well as legal advisers and others, and he will propose or have proposed the whole matter in full and without holding any of it back, for God cannot be deceived, everything according to what may be right or wrong, and he will conclude by saying that he wishes to recount everything and to hold to the determination of doing right. In short, by these points the affair will be put in order, clearly seen and discussed, and if through such a process it appears that his cause is just, he will summon his adversary to demand of him restitution and amendment for his injuries and the wrong done him. Now if it comes about that the aforesaid adversary puts up a defence and tries to contradict what has been said, let him be heard fully without special favour, but also without willfulness nor spite. If these things are duly done, and if the adversary should refuse to appear - as the law requires - then the just prince may surely undertake war, which should on no account be called vengeance but rather the entire carrying out of due justice.²⁶

Christine de Pizan extended the notion of a just war beyond that of something undertaken by legitimate authority for legitimate ends. It is also necessary, she argues, for war to be conducted justly. Accordingly, and in a manner reminiscent of modern efforts to ban certain classes of weaponry, she affirms that certain kinds of destructive capabilities not be developed:

It must be remembered that there is one way of making a certain fire, which some call Greek fire, invented by the Greeks during the siege of Troy; some have been heard to say, "This fire burns even in water; stones, iron, and all manner of things burn, nor can it be extinguished except by certain mixtures made for this purpose, but not by water". In addition, certain poisons can be made that are so powerful and lethal that if they contaminate iron, a mortal wound will result. But since such things should not be taught because of the evil that could result from them, they should be forbidden and cursed; it is not good to put them in books or otherwise reduce them to writing, because no Christian soldier should use such inhumane weapons that are in fact contrary to the laws of war.²⁷

Finally, Christine de Pizan, accepting that innocent civilian casualties are inevitable, stresses nonetheless that military personnel must make every effort to respect the principle of non-combatant immunity:

For I tell you that this is determined as a matter of law, that is the law of war. For if a war is judged by the counsellors of both kings or princes, the men-at-arms can win one over another. And occasionally the poor and simple folk, who do not bear arms, are injured - it cannot be otherwise, for weeds cannot take root among good plants, because the latter are so close together that the good ones do not sense their presence. But in truth it is right that the valiant and good gentlemen-at-arms must take every precaution not to destroy the poor and simple folk, nor suffer them to be tyrannized or mistreated. For they are Christians and not Saracens. And if I have said that pity is due to some, remember that not less is due the others; those who engage in warfare may be hurt but the humble and peaceful should be shielded from their force.²⁸

In sum, Christine de Pizan contributed not only a prescription for a stable domestic order but also a consideration of the corresponding parameters of international order. This on its own suggests her significance as a theorist of world order. There is, however, one additional dimension to her thought which makes her even more relevant to our current context.

Christine de Pizan's View of Agency and Responsibility:

Quentin Skinner has argued that Machiavelli's efforts to restrict Fortune's influence to only half of our actions is very much reflective of the humanist view that "God does not do everything so as not to take from us free will and part of the glory that pertains to us".²⁹ This view of the centrality of free will - and the corresponding need to take responsibility for one's actions - was a central part of the humanist spirit manifest in the Renaissance.

Significantly, writing a century earlier, Christine de Pizan's writings manifest a similar concern with ensuring that individuals in positions of authority "accept responsibility for their actions, thereby reinforcing the moral dimension of the sphere of government".³⁰ While it is true that in some places Christine de Pizan attributes the difficulties France was experiencing to Fortune, the fickle goddess whose actions are impossible to predict or control, overall she explains the country's

tribulations not in terms of Fortune's capricious nature, but as the consequence of the self-serving behaviour of France's political and social elites. What was worse, these same elites had become uncritical believers in the very pretexts they advanced to justify their behaviour. As Brown-Grant notes, what Christine de Pizan suggests is that "those responsible for the government of the country have lost the ability to see themselves and their actions in the light of Truth, that is, they have lost the ability to read their own actions and interpret their significance..."³¹ And given such a state of affairs, Christine de Pizan sees it as her responsibility as an intellectual to hold up a mirror to the country's rulers so they may see themselves as they truly are and alter their behaviour - before it is too late.

Christine de Pizan's Significance:

How then are we to assess the significance of Christine de Pizan as a theorist of world order? Here I can only make some suggestions that remain to be validated through more detailed research. First, in terms of theory, Christine de Pizan deserves a place in the canon of IR theory. As was already noted, it seems as much a stretch to see her as a precursor of modern peace researcher as it does a modern feminist before the fact. This is not to conclude, however, that she stands equally distant from all modern theoretical traditions. In light of her focus on order, domestic (analogy of the body) and international (international legal norms), and in light of her concern with society, both national (hierarchical) and international (anarchical), it does not seem unfair to classify her in what is now known as the "English School", otherwise known as the "society of states" tradition.³²

Certainly as much as Grotius, Christine de Pizan work embodies the central assumptions of that tradition - and this a full two centuries earlier.

In terms of practice, Christine de Pizan is also of significance for today's context. It is useful to consider, for example, what reaction she might have to those who now preach the inevitability of globalization - the extension of market-relations to all spheres of life. Despite the considerable social costs globalization imposes on the weak and the vulnerable, we are told repeatedly that "there is no alternative" because "globalization is the product of inexorable technological forces we are powerless to resist".

Globalization, Christine de Pizan might well respond, is not the work of some fickle goddess named *Technology* whose actions can neither be predicted nor controlled. Rather, the changes in the form of state and international order that globalization has come to signify are exactly what one would expect in a context in which *The prince* prefers his own good over the public good³³ What is required now is what was required then - an activist state committed to guarding the welfare of the people by restraining those social forces - e.g. rapacious soldiers then/ multinational corporations now - which, if allowed free reign, will undermine the stability of the social order. For when a situation is allowed to develop in which day to day existence *Requires* more than a people can bear, then the people complain against their prince and rebel by disobedience. In such discord, they all perish together³⁴

Equally problematic, those who now preach the inevitability of globalization seem unable to see their own behaviour *In* the light of *Truth* they have confused their narrow interests with those of society as a whole. Accordingly, those who now direct society must be brought to see themselves for what they really are, and to take responsibility for their actions. In short, it is the task

of intellectuals at the end of the 20th century, no less than it was hers at the end of the 15th, to hold up the mirror to those in positions of power and responsibility - before it is too late.

Conclusion:

Like Marie von Clausewitz, who explained her temerity in publishing her husband's *On War* in terms of the obedience of a dutiful wife in the face of a direct command from her husband,³⁵ Christine de Pizan was well aware that as a woman publishing on political themes, she was treading on dangerous ground. Nowhere is this clearer than in her *Book of Arms and of Chivalry*, where she invokes the goddess Minerva in the hopes of legitimizing her intervention:

O Minerva, goddess of arms and of chivalry, which by virtue of your understanding beyond all other women, you founded and instituted among other noble arts and sciences because you initiated the habit of forging arms and harnesses of iron and steel Lady and high goddess, may it not displease you that I, a simple woman in no way comparable to your greatness in reputed knowledge, should dare to speak of such an institution as that of arms, which you first established in Greece. May it rather please you to be favourable to me because I am somewhat connected with the nation into which you were born, which then was called greater Greece but is now Apulia and Calabria in Italy, for I am like you, an Italian woman.³⁶

Christine de Pizan need not have worried of offending. Later French publishers of her book, sensitive to the fact that readers would find it impossible to believe that a woman could have written it, considerably removed Christine de Pizan's name, along with her invocation to Minerva, changed all pronouns from feminine to masculine, and either claimed the text as their own³⁷ or listed the author as "anonymous".³⁸

If her treatment is at all typical of women writers on world politics over the past six centuries, it is little wonder that IR today boasts so few female theorists. Retrieving and validating

the contributions of Christine de Pizan is an appropriate way to begin the process of recovering the female voice in the study of world order.

References

-
1. See Ernst-Otto Czempiel "Die Entwicklung der Lehre von den internationalen Beziehungen", *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 3 (1965), 270-90. See also Ekkehard Krippendorff, *International Relations as a Social Science* (London: Harvester Press, 1982), chapter 2.
 2. On this, see Krippendorff.
 3. See the recently re-published edition, with an introduction by Norman Lewis and James Malone (London: Pluto Press, 1996).
 4. See, for example, Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1979), chapter two. For a critique of Waltz's treatment of Lenin's theorizing, see Hayward Alker and Thomas Biersteker, "The Dialectics of World Order: Notes for a Future Archaeologist of International Savoir Faire", *International Studies Quarterly* 28, No. 2 (1984), pp. 121-42.
 5. Anthony Brewer, *Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical Survey*, Second Edition (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 116. One can perhaps forgive Kenneth Waltz for his uncritical embrace of the Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy that Lenin's *Imperialism* represents the pinnacle of marxist theorizing on world politics, given that his book appeared virtually the same time as that of critical marxist reassessments of Lenin. It is more difficult, however, to excuse those who continue to feature Lenin's *Imperialism* in this way now, almost two decades later.
 6. See, for example, Samir Amin, *Re-Reading the Postwar Period: An Intellectual Itinerary*, translated by Michael Wolfers, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1994), chapter three, and Roger Burbach, Orlando Núñez, and Boris Kagarlitsky, *Globalization and Its Discontents: The Rise of Postmodern Socialisms* (London: Pluto Press, 1997), chapter five.
 7. For such a consideration, with specific relation to neo-Gramscian theorizing, see M. Neufeld, "Democratic Socialism in a Global(-izing) Context: Toward a Collective Research Programme", unpublished manuscript submitted for consideration for the "Lelio Basso Prize".
 8. Bernice A. Carroll, "Christine de Pizan and the Origins of

Peace Theory@, forthcoming in *Women Writers and the Early Modern British Political Tradition*, edited by Hilda L. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

9. See, for example, Joan Kelly, "Early Feminist Theory and the *Querrelle des Femmes*, 1400-1789", in *Women, History and Theory. The Essays of Joan Kelly* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).

10. See Delaney, "Mothers to think back through= Who are they? The ambiguous example of Christine de Pizan@ in Delaney, *Medieval Literary Politics: Shapes of Ideology* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), as well as S, Delaney, "History, Politics and Christine Studies: A Polemical Reply@ in Margaret Brabant (ed.), *Politics, Gender and Genre: The Political Thought of Christine de Pizan* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).

11. It is but a small - and understandably tempting - step to represent Christine de Pizan as a feminist IR theorist before her time. Such an appropriation of her can already be discerned in Marysia Zalewski's "Women, Gender and International Relations Ten Years On: 'To Return as a Woman and Be Heard'".

12. A position held by the foremost authority on Christine de Pizan, Charity Cannon Willard. See her *Christine de Pizan: Her Life and Works* (New York: Persea Books, 1984), esp. chapter nine.

13. Significantly, by the end of her paper Carroll seems to reach the same conclusion acknowledging that

Christine's politics and ideas were often not what a radical feminist - let alone a feminist pacifist - would like. In many ways she was closer to the thinking of Machiavelli and Hobbes than to the egalitarian and pacifist strains of contemporary radicalism - of her own time or ours. (p. 10-11).

This being the case, however, it is not clear in what sense it makes sense to link her with contemporary peace research more, say, than with its arch-rival classical realism, which, like Christine de Pizan, rejects universalist crusades and seeks peace "in the real conditions of ...a national state system" (Carroll, p. 11).

14. Kate Langdon Forhan, "Introduction@to Christine de Pizan, *The Book of the Body Politic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. xvii-xviii, emphasis added.

-
15. Delaney, *Mothers...@* p. 93.
 16. *The Book of the Body Politic*, p. 90.
 17. *Book of the Body Politic*, p. 11.
 18. *Book of the Body Politic*, p. 17.
 19. P. 20.
 20. *Book of the Body Politic*, p. 51. It should be stressed again that this recognition in no way implies Christine de Pizan's support for republican forms of government - a fact made very clearly in Part III.
 21. P. 26.
 22. P. 17.
 23. *Book of the Body Politic*, pp. 45-48.
 24. From *The Book of Peace*, excerpted and translated in Charity Cannon Willard, (ed.), *Writings of Christine de Pizan* (New York: Persea Books, 1994), p. 314.
 25. Charity Cannon Willard, "Christine on the Art of Warfare", in Marilyn Desmond, (ed.), *Christine de Pizan and the Categories of Difference* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), p. 12. See also Frances Teague, *Christine de Pizan's Book of War@*, in Glenda K. McLeod, (ed.), *The Reception of Christine de Pizan From the Fifteenth Through the Nineteenth Centuries* (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1991), pp. 25-41.
 26. From *The Book of the Deeds of Arms and of Chivalry*, in *The Writings of Christine de Pizan*, pp. 293-94.
 27. *Ibid*, p. 297.
 28. *Ibid*, p. 299.
 29. *Machiavelli*, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981), p. 28.
 30. Rosalind Brown-Grant, "L'Avison Christine: Autobiographical Narrative or Mirror for the Prince?", in Brabant, *Politics, Gender and Genre*.
 31. Brown-Grant, p. 99.

32. For a treatment of similar themes, see Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1995).

33. *Book of the Body Politic*, p. 16.

34. *Book of the Body Politic*, p. 91.

35. See Marie von Clausewitz's Preface to Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (eds.), (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).

36. From Willard, "Christine and the Art of Warfare", p. 9.

37. Vérard, 1488.

38. Phillip, 1527.