

Working papers



Democratic Socialism in a Global(-izing) Context: Towards a Collective Research Programme

Mark Neufeld

TIPEC Working Paper 02/4

Maybe there are periods when one can get along without theory, but at present its deficiency denigrates people and renders them helpless against violence.

Max Horkheimer¹

What the masses need is ... theory which gives them the chance of making a system out of the detail acquired from experience, and which helps to forge a deadly weapon against our enemies.

Rosa Luxemburg²

Nancy Fraser has rightly observed that "no one has yet improved on Marx's 1843 definition of critical theory as 'the self-clarification of the struggles and wishes of the age'".³ What is undeniable is that in the current context, the "struggles and wishes of the age" are increasingly intertwined with global-level structures and processes. As a consequence, the "self-clarification" of emancipatory struggles and wishes at the end of the 20th century perforce must be conducted in globally-sensitive terms.

In fact, the view that what is required is "global" thinking - "act locally, think globally" - is hardly controversial. Put simply, a view of politics restricted to local or even intra-state processes and structures limits both knowledge and action. This observation holds no less for the project of developing a critical understanding of the world that allows for emancipatory practice.⁴

Problems arise, however, when we fail to recognize that while global-level thinking may indeed be a necessary condition for critical understanding, it is not sufficient. Indeed, one need only think back to early attempts to come to terms with the phenomenon of multi-national corporations as harbingers of what is now called globalization to see that a global perspective has long marked the thinking and practice of transnational elites themselves.⁵

The obvious point is that global thinking is not inherently critical. Accordingly, care must be taken to identify what kinds of global-level thinking are critical - that is, promote emancipatory change - and which do not. This undertaking is, by definition, a theoretical one and, as such, cannot suffice on its own.⁶ It is, nonetheless, an unavoidable task if theoretically-informed practice is to serve the ends to which progressive social movements are committed.⁷

To this end, in this paper I will undertake the following. In the first part of the paper, I will examine what is arguably the most developed of the theoretical traditions embracing both a global perspective and a commitment to emancipatory practice - that of Gramscian International Political Economy (IPE). While not denying its strengths, I will draw attention to important weaknesses and lacunae in this tradition. Then, in the second part of the paper I will shift to an examination of the work of a critical theorist - Rosa Luxemburg - which, I will argue, is not only compatible with the orientation of Gramscian IPE but which also offers important resources to address some of Gramscian IPE's weaknesses.

The "Italian School" in the Study of World Politics:

Gramscian IPE - also known as the "Italian School" - is considered to be one of only two fully-fledged schools of thought on world politics practised outside the United States.⁸ Its origins can be traced by to two germinal pieces by Robert Cox - "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory" and "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method", published in 1982 and 1983, respectively. Since then, the offerings of the Gramscian school, with its defining notions of "critical theory vs. problem-solving theory", "historicism", "historical structures", "intersubjective meanings", "production modes", and "counter-hegemonic struggles" have been expanded upon not only by Cox but by an impressive international group of neo-Gramscian scholars in Canada, Europe, Japan and even the United States.⁹

I will focus here on three themes which bring out the strengths of the Gramscian approach - and which will also allow for a more productive consideration of its weaknesses: i) dialectics; ii) double-movement; and iii) democracy. I will take them up in the order given, relying heavily on the work of Robert Cox.

i) dialectics

For neo-Gramscians, dialectics has two distinct, if inter-related, dimensions. First, it can be understood in terms of ontology, understood as process at the level of history. In Cox's terms, dialectics "is the potential for alternative forms of development arising from the confrontation of opposed social forces in a concrete historical situation"¹⁰. It is an approach which "places power at the centre of its attention", where social power is understood as a "totality"¹¹ - "a conjunction of the outward and the inward, of material capabilities and consciousness leading to purposive action".¹² Accordingly, it understands historical change to be the "result of conflicts, in which the emergence of a new form of consciousness leads to a shift in power relations which makes this new form of consciousness supreme over the erstwhile dominant form of consciousness". Finally, at the level of ontology, dialectics also sees conflicts as leading to an Hegelian *Aufhebung* (sublation) - for example, in the notion of the "internationalization of the state" which simultaneously preserves and abolishes previous state-society constellations.¹³

Dialectics must also be understood at the level of epistemology - as a way of knowing. In epistemological terms, dialectics means a dialogue seeking truth through exploration of contradictions. Central to this exploration process is a focus on intersubjective meanings that constitute human practices and institutions. In this, the neo-Gramscian approach distinguishes itself from all variants of positivism, which focus not on the dialectical relationship between consciousness and being, but on transhistorical regularities.

Finally, dialectics brings with it a reflexive recognition of the norms which inform all theorizing and the political projects different kinds of theorizing serve.¹⁴ In Cox's terms, "there is ... no such thing as theory in itself, divorced from a standpoint in time and place"; rather, "Theory is always **for** someone and **for** some purpose".¹⁵ Accordingly, for the Gramscian school, the theorist's role is clear: it is "as much to arouse consciousness and the will to act as to diagnose the condition of the world".¹⁶ As such, Gramscian IPE's "critical theorizing" distinguishes itself clearly from the status-quo oriented "problem-solving" theory offered by mainstream social science.¹⁷

ii) double movement

In the terms of Gramscian IPE, the notion of the "double movement" holds a central place. Borrowed from the work of Karl Polanyi,¹⁸ for neo-Gramscians the notion of the "double movement" refers to society's instinct for self-preservation, manifest in national terms in first half of 20th century after the triumph of liberalism in the 19th. Following Polanyi, they see social history in the nineteenth century as the result of the "double movement" in which efforts to extend the purview of the "self-regulating market" gave rise to a counter-movement i) on behalf of workers involving social legislation and factory laws; ii) on behalf of nature and the "culture of the countryside" in the form of agricultural tariffs, law and order policies and land laws; iii) on behalf of stability involving the abandonment of the international gold standard in favour of stable currency policies administered by central banks.¹⁹

The attraction of Polanyi's notion of the double movement for adherents to the Gramscian school is clear - in a context in which liberal notions of the "self-regulating market" are again hegemonic not only at the level of national social formations, but in terms of world order as well, the "double movement" serves as a Sorelian "social myth" that can serve subordinated social forces "as a weapon in the struggle as well as a tool for analysis".²⁰

iii) democracy

The final theme to be highlighted in Gramscian IPE is that of democracy. And here the approach offers important assets. First, it speaks of democracy not only as a formal structure, but as a process. It is a process, furthermore, which sees not only political elites as active participants in history. Rather, it envisages democratization as the mobilization of the marginalized against economic efficiency orthodoxy. As such, neo-Gramscians see democracy in relational terms - specifically, they see the process of democratization as the "determinate negation" of the process of globalization, itself understood as an inherent tendency of capitalism. In short, democratization is understood to involve freedom of initiative and freedom to build new world order "from the bottom up".

Consistent with this "participatory" notion of democracy goes a recognition of "difference" within the global polity. Cox in particular has developed a parallel treatment of "civilization" - like democratization, understood as a process of history and product of social struggle - to try to address

the issue of identity and difference in the context of coordinated struggles against the power of globalizing - and homogenizing - structures and processes.²¹

In sum, for its rootedness in the marxist historical materialist tradition, for its offering of a collective research programme oriented to the search for alternatives to the established order, and for its global perspective, Gramscian IPE deserves serious consideration by those for whom socialism "is not merely a subject for facile speeches at Sunday public meetings". This is not to say, of course, that the approach does not suffer from lacunae and significant weaknesses. It is to a consideration of those that we now turn.

The Antinomies of Gramscian IPE.²²

As way noted above, it is a fundamental assumption of the Gramscian approach that "Theory is always **for** someone and **for** some purpose". What holds for theory must also hold for critique. Accordingly, it is appropriate that some space be given here to reflecting upon the perspective underlying the critique of Gramscian IPE that will be offered.

It can be seen as a measure of the success of Gramscian IPE in establishing itself as an approach to be reckoned with that critiques of the approach have begun to appear in the scholarly literature. These critiques fall into one of two camps. First, there are those which grow out of and reflect (often unacknowledged) mainstream assumptions and commitments (conservative as well as liberal-reformist).²³ Such critiques certainly merit respectful consideration, and require a serious response. The themes they raise - for example, how Gramscian IPE stands in relation to Gramsci scholarship as a whole²⁴ - are interesting and important questions. However, given that they do not share historical materialist epistemological and ontological assumptions, democratic socialist social and political commitments, they are of limited use in advancing the goal being pursued here.

The critiques within the second camp, in contrast, are of direct relevance, given that they do flow from a shared concern with radical, emancipatory change, and take, as the neo-Gramscians do, the precepts of historical materialism as the foundation for theory and practice.²⁵ These offerings are motivated by and oriented toward exactly the kind of "exploration of alternatives" and "democratic socialist practice" required by the collective research programme envisioned.²⁶ As such, they stand as a regulative example of the kind of critique that will be offered.

To begin, the notion of dialectics raises important questions in terms of the conceptualization of the theory-practice relationship. As noted above, in the effort to "be a guide to strategic action for bringing about an alternative order",²⁷ neo-Gramscian theorizing aims "to arouse consciousness and the will to act".²⁸ Accordingly, neo-Gramscian theorizing incorporates an "educative" - as opposed to an "instrumental" - conception of the relationship of theory to practice. What is distinctive about an educative conception of the theory-practice relationship is that it

does not see social theory as useful because it allows people to manipulate causal variables so that they can get what they want in an efficient manner. Instead, social theory is seen as a means by which people can achieve a much clearer picture of who they are, and of what the real meaning of their social practices is, as a first step in becoming different sorts of people with different sorts of social arrangements The purpose of ...theory is to engender self-knowledge and so to liberate people from the oppressiveness of their social arrangements.²⁹

In short, an educative conception of the relationship between theory and practice corresponds not to the positivist goal of the replacement of politics by the "administration of things", but to the democratic ideal of human beings consciously acting together to define and organize the community in which they live; not to the positivist *telos* of "social engineering", but to the Aristotelian *telos* of the "leading of a good and just life in the *polis*". Even to the degree that one accepts this position, further elaboration is necessary. At a minimum one would like some indication from neo-Gramscians as to how consciousness is to be "aroused"; how the insights of critical forms of theorizing are to be made "real" to people; how those who produce that theorizing - intellectuals - should see their role.³⁰

A second set of questions can be raised in regard to the notion of the "double movement" which, as was noted above, is central to the efforts of the neo-Gramscians to conceptualize the possibility of organized resistance to global(-izing) capital. This notion is not without its difficulties, however. Perhaps the biggest liability in embracing the Polanyian notion of the "double movement" is that Polanyi's thinking about society was strongly marked by a conservative structural-functional ethos. As a close reading of Polanyi shows, for him the society-defending part of the

"double movement" seems to arise automatically. The implications are significant. As one neo-Gramscian scholar notes,

If this impulse for social protections is seen to have arisen automatically, even unconsciously and as a consequence of the objective contradictions of the self-regulating market, then what need is there for self-conscious agency in this analysis?³¹

Given the apparently uncritical embrace of this concept, it is hardly surprising that, while adept at analyzing the power of capital, so many neo-Gramscians seem content to look to structural contradictions of globalization as sufficient for the construction of counter-hegemony, and neglect to engage in a sustained analysis of the more self-conscious efforts of social movements to contest globalization. Ultimately, however, this approach is severely limited. As Healy notes, "This sort of functionalism may suffice as a reform position which perceives resistance as that which simply slows down inexorable processes, but is insufficient for a counter-hegemonic political project seeking socialism as its goal".³²

A second set of questions relating to the double movement relate to the issue of what the proper level at which to engage in counter-hegemonic struggle. Neo-Gramscians argue that we are once more at the beginning of the double movement, where the notion of the "self-regulating market" is again hegemonic. The difference between the 19th century and the present, however, is that now the extension of market relations is taking place not at the national but at the global level. It is not only state-society complexes which are being transformed, but the nature of world order itself.³³

This raises the question of whether counter-hegemony should again be organized first and foremost at the level of the national social formation, or whether it should be organized "transnationally".³⁴ In this regard, one can take note of Panitch's critique of Cox. While praising Cox as an exception in a context in which "very few embrace the insights and tools of analysis of the theory of the state as a way of understanding the role the state is playing in the construction of a global capitalism",³⁵ Panitch is concerned with how the state is theorized. He suggests that Cox underemphasises the importance of the national social formation in determining the character of the state, leading him to over-emphasize the possibility for counter-struggle at the international level.

It can be argued that Panitch's concerns rest more on a mis-understanding of Cox than on substantive disagreement. As one neo-Gramscian has argued in response, "In the end, Panitch and Cox end up in the same place, looking for the basis of contestation in nationally based movements which may be 'exemplary for one another', but which do not operate primarily at the international level".³⁶ Indeed, Cox has argued clearly that the choice between the national and the international is a false one.³⁷ But even if one accepts this, it can still be argued that neo-Gramscians are insufficiently clear about how the two levels of struggle are connected, and about the relative weighting of national political initiatives, on the one hand, and multilateral institutions, on the other.

Questions can also be raised about the neo-Gramscian conceptualization of democracy. As was noted above, democracy - understood as a process which can counter-act the globalizing tendencies of capitalism - is central to the neo-Gramscian framework. As Cox notes, however, democracy is a term which has many different meanings, and which can be bound up with radically divergent political projects.³⁸ This raises the question of what democracy means in neo-Gramscian terms. And here, it must be conceded, it is easier to discover what democracy is not, than what it is understood to be.

Cox is quite clear, for example, that the "formal democracy" of bourgeois liberal pluralism is not what he has in mind. This notion of democracy involves a clear separation of the "political" and the "economic"; the market is understood to regulate the latter which simultaneously setting boundaries for the former. It is a conception of democracy which corresponds to the image of the state as a "transmission-belt", adapting the domestic population to the needs of the international economy.³⁹ Nor, however, is democracy to be understood as being embodied in the social-democratic "welfare state", the Soviet-style bureaucratic centralist state, or even the "producer self-management" market-socialist state.⁴⁰

The nearest one can find to a clear affirmation of a conception of democracy is an expression of approval for "populist democracy", which must be "more than formal democracy" if it is to address the "democratic deficit" to which the latter has given rise.⁴¹ This may well be true. Still, one could hope for greater precision on a concept so central to the neo-Gramscian political project.

In summary, then, despite considerable strengths, neo-Gramscian IPE does suffer from some significant lacunae. It is in the hopes of redressing some of these weaknesses that we turn to the work of one of the most original minds in 20th century socialist theory: Rosa Luxemburg.

Toward a "Neo-Gramscian-Luxemburg Line":⁴²

To begin, it is necessary to meet head-on the view that Rosa Luxemburg and contemporary followers of Antonio Gramsci are separated by too much in terms of assumptions and problematique for the work of the former to be able to make a contribution to the latter. Fortunately, the last several decades have seen impressive work in terms of the "retrieval" of the contribution of Luxemburg that more than demonstrates the commonalities in perspective and commitment.⁴³

To begin, like today's neo-Gramscians, Luxemburg was an inherently "dialectical" thinker, both in terms of epistemology and ontology.⁴⁴ In terms of the former, she distinguished clearly between non-critical "bourgeois" forms of theorizing and the critical, marxist tradition. In terms of the latter, she consistently adopted the viewpoint of "totality" in viewing history as a process. Indeed, as Lukács noted with reference to Luxemburg in his *History and Class Consciousness*,

It is not the primacy of economic motives in historical explanation that constitutes the decisive difference between Marxism and bourgeois thought, but the point of view of totality.⁴⁵

Indeed, if "totality" taken to be the defining characteristic of the 20th century "Western Marxist" tradition - a tradition in which Gramsci is regularly placed - then Luxemburg can stand alongside the philosopher of Sardinia not only as a fellow Western Marxist, but as the very originator of that tradition.⁴⁶

A second clear point of commonality between Luxemburg and the Gramscian framework is the stress upon the masses as active agents of history, and of the central role of human consciousness in the making of history. This perspective, moreover, directs the theorist to write history from a particular perspective - what Kaye has termed "history from the bottom up".⁴⁷ It also directs the theorist to conceive of the future as something made in the present through self-conscious mass struggle, and not as the result of inexorable tendencies working themselves out behind the backs of social agents.⁴⁸

A third point of convergence with the neo-Gramscians - in particular, Cox's recent work on "civilizations" - is Luxemburg's attentiveness to "difference". Given her varied international experience, living in Poland, Russia, Switzerland and Germany, Rosa Luxemburg was well aware that "context matters", and that theory and practice must be sufficiently sensitive to any given context. As a Jew and a woman she also understood the importance of gender and race identities.⁴⁹ In contrast to certain currents with postmodernism,⁵⁰ however, Luxemburg - like present-day neo-Gramscians - was concerned not just with difference, but with the commonality within difference - for example, shared inequalities in wealth and power across particular identities of race or gender - that make collective action both necessary and possible.⁵¹

Last but certainly not least, Luxemburg shares with neo-Gramscians a commitment to viewing politics not just in local or even national terms, but from a global perspective. Her work on imperialism,⁵² notwithstanding its limitations, remains as one of the most creative and original efforts of the 20th century to theorize capitalism with due regard to its global dimensions. As such it continues to inspire critically-oriented theorists who find Luxemburg's questions - when not her answers - of continuing relevance in the study of capitalism.⁵³ Perhaps most importantly, the originality of her interpretation of imperialist expansion as being neither i) a reformable, if lamentable, aspect of capitalism (the view of social democrats) nor ii) simply a "stage" of capitalism (the view of Lenin), but rather iii) an inherent and perpetual tendency within capitalist social relations which can be blunted through collective action but remains a threat even then and which will not be eradicated until capitalism itself is transformed is of considerable relevance to our present. In essence, the Luxemburgian view of imperialism anticipated the neo-Gramscian understanding of globalization, viewed in essentially the same terms.⁵⁴

Indeed, the continuing relevance of Luxemburg's understanding of imperialism for conceptualizing globalization underscores the point of the present-ness of her thought. To recall Rosa Luxemburg's contributions from the beginning of this century now at its end is no exercise in nostalgia. As proof of this statement, I turn now to a consideration of how her thought can help to address some of the lacunae in neo-Gramscian thinking identified above.⁵⁵

Luxemburg's Offerings to a Critical Research Programme:

Before turning to a discussion of the specific contributions of the thought of Rosa Luxemburg to a collective research programme, it is worth reflecting on how research programmes are to be understood and how they are to progress.⁵⁶ First, research programmes should be understood as broader than a single theory; rather, they regularly involve a theoretical tradition or what might be called a "family of theories". As such, intellectual work within a given research programme focuses on a broad range of problems or "puzzles" that are thrown up by the programme itself. Sociologically-speaking, research programmes by definition are never individual in nature, but always involve a community of scholars who share its broad suppositions. What binds these scholars together as a community, moreover, is not that they share the same conclusions - they may well have serious differences of opinion in this regard. Rather, what binds them is a shared set of questions and a shared set of successfully-solved puzzles which stand as "exemplars" to guide the community as a whole as it works through those puzzles which are not yet solved.⁵⁷ It is only to the degree that puzzles continue to be solved that a research programme remains "progressive". To that end, the greater the number of exemplars available to inspire and guide, and the greater the extent of creative questioning which can suggest new ways of thinking about unresolved puzzles, the greater the chance a research programme will remain vibrant.

From this perspective, the point in reviewing the thought of someone like Luxemburg is not so much to find definitive answers to the questions that now elude us, but rather to appreciate the novel kinds of questions she raised and the exemplars for successful "puzzle-solving behaviour" she offers. To that end, I will consider her work in relation to the weaknesses/ lacunae in the neo-Gramscian research programme noted above to see how Luxemburg's thought may point us in a direction that will involve a "progressive" - and not a "degenerative" - problem-shift.⁵⁸

Let us begin, then, with the question of the relation of theory to practice. As was noted above, neo-Gramscians share what can be termed an "educative" notion of the relationship of theory to practice. Nor is there any question that Luxemburg shared this perspective, in particular the conviction that theory was not a distraction from the "real work" of organizing or a "luxury" which the marginalized cannot afford until after radical change is achieved. Nowhere is this more in evidence than in her defence of her theoretically-oriented teaching at the Central Party School. The

right-wing of the party, fearing the Central Party School would serve to propagate radical doctrines, called for a shift in the teaching programme to emphasize "practical teaching". For Luxemburg, in contrast, the school existed precisely to fill a gap by teaching what the normal school of practical life could not provide - theory.⁵⁹

Luxemburg minced no words in defending the teaching of theory to the masses. The critics of the school, she argued

have not the slightest conception of the fact that the working classes learn "their stuff" from their daily life.... What the masses need is general education, theory which gives them the chance of making a system out of the detail acquired from experience, and which helps to forge a deadly weapon against our enemies.⁶⁰

There is no question that neo-Gramscians share Luxemburg's commitment to theory as a "weapon" of struggle, and of its production and dissemination by the specialized group known as "intellectuals". But what Luxemburg offers is not only a validation of the place of theory as a tool to educate the masses, but also the invaluable and neglected insight that participation in critical practice has an educative component as well; that theory, which has an educative function to sure, does not exhaust the education process. The exemplar she offers in this regard is to be found in her discussion of the role of the mass strike. While always stressing that the mass (general) strike presupposes the existence of both objective and subjective conditions which make it possible, Luxemburg simultaneously stressed how participation in the mass strike served an educative function by "bringing situations to a head, clarifying conditions, exposing the reality of society" and thereby "conjuring up new forces, new energy, a new will".⁶¹ As she noted,

... the most valuable thing in all this ebb and flow is the spiritual residue left over which will be permanent: the intellectual and cultural growth, in fits and starts, of the proletariat which is a firm guarantee that the future progress of its economic and political struggle is irresistible.⁶²

Neo-Gramscians in particular could learn from this insight and this exemplar. To make good on it, however, they would need to attend more to social forces engaged in the counter-hegemonic struggles than heretofore. Yet as was noted above, one of the impediments to extending their analysis beyond the structural power of capital to consider active resistance and how it might be

supported is the myth of the "double movement". And here again, Luxemburg offers an exemplar that bears serious consideration.

Central to Luxemburg's work was the notion of the revolution. As expected, she formulated her conception of the revolution in inherently dialectical terms. Specifically, for Luxemburg radical change was conceptualized in the terms of the movement of history not as a self-regulating series of "double movements", but as the product of class struggle, of the active - but not automatic - resistance of conscientized masses. In short, central to Luxemburg's thought was the notion of "revolution as process". As Basso notes, until the time of her death, Luxemburg clung steadfastly to this conception of the movement of history:

...for Rosa Luxemburg revolution is not an unheralded settlement of accounts between the proletariat and capitalism but a fact in the course of capitalist development which occurs whenever the contradictions and tensions produced by this development have reached their climax.... the triumph of the socialist revolution is not to be regarded as an act in a single moment of time, as a final violent collision, but as the conclusion of a revolutionary process⁶³

As she noted, "the seizure of power by the working classes can only be the end result" of a lengthy period of day-to-day struggle and "For this reason this task can also not be achieved at one blow but similarly over a long period of gigantic social struggle".⁶⁴

As she offers alternatives to structural-functionalist conceptions such as the "double-movement", so Luxemburg also suggests ways of rethinking the domain for practice appropriate to a global(-izing) context. To begin, Luxemburg accepted Marx's view that "the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle.... [that] the proletariat of each country must ... first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie".⁶⁵ However, in her willingness to apply the dialectical method to Marx's thought itself, she showed a willingness to recognize that nationally-based responses could not proceed without regard to the context beyond their borders. Indeed, anticipating the globalizing context of the present - and in particular, the neo-Gramscian discussion of international civil society represented by increasingly transnational capital - Rosa Luxemburg "precipitatively imagined ... an imperialistic state of development ... which would create supernational, organically linked economies, possessing their bourgeoisies, capable of competing

with the solidarity of the working classes".⁶⁶ Indeed, it was Luxemburg's sense that such a moment had already been reached at the beginning of this century that moved her to emphasise socialist **internationalism** as the only response appropriate to a bourgeoisie which was as much global as national in character.

None of this is to argue in favour of the neo-Idealist position according to which global capital must be controlled through the extension of democracy at the international level.⁶⁷ On the contrary, what is needed are nationally-based strategies - but ones which are fundamentally internationalist in orientation. Nor should this be understood as mere rhetorical flourish. Taking internationalism seriously involves implications for thought and practice.

Once again, Luxemburg provides an excellent exemplar in this regard. It should be remembered that in the early part of this century German's Social Democrats saw themselves, not entirely without reason, as the "core" - the centre of insight and sophistication in regard to socialist thought and practice. Russia, in contrast, was seen, again not entirely without reason, as the "periphery" - an under-developed backwater of limited import for questions of analysis or strategy. Yet it was to Russia's experience that Luxemburg turned in developing her insights on the mass strike and revolution as a process. Furthermore she chided the SPD leadership for their unwillingness to consider that the experience of the Russian opposition would have anything to teach them. "Every day", she reproached them, "you read reports of revolution in the newspapers ... but it seems that you have eyes and you see not and ears and you do not hear... We can see the Russian Revolution and we should be silly fools not to learn from it".⁶⁸ And from the scene of the revolution itself she evidenced the same openness to learning from those struggling not just in the core, but in the periphery. "To be sure", she wrote,

this will probably be quite different after the revolution and the return to "normal conditions", but these events will not pass on without leaving some trace. Meanwhile, the achievements of the revolutions are immense: class antagonism has been deepened, social relationships exacerbated and clarified. And none of this is seen abroad!⁶⁹

Luxemburg's example could serve as a useful corrective to the parochialism and arrogance of the "North", where, lamentably, oppositional leadership often seem bent on reproducing the same

paternalistic - when not patronizing - attitudes to the "peripheral South" manifest in the attitudes of Northern bankers and industrialists. A willingness to see oppositional movements elsewhere as being in a position to teach us something - rather than as needing to be tutored by we who know better - may not exhaust the meaning of nationally-based internationalism, but it is surely a necessary component.⁷⁰

Finally, as she stressed internationalism an integral part of her understanding of socialism, so also Luxemburg stressed the centrality of democracy. Her critiques of Lenin and the Bolsheviks on this score are well-known and need not be repeated here in detail.⁷¹ It will suffice to make two points. First, notwithstanding her appreciation of the vital role of intellectuals in building effective popular movements - indeed, in part because of it and the recognition of the centrality of freedom of expression to intellectual activity - she was openly critical of the Bolshevik tendency to equate the "dictatorship of the proletariat" with the "dictatorship of the party", from which it is but a small step to the "dictatorship of the central committee". Liberal-bourgeois notions of freedom and human rights were insufficient (though, as she noted, even they proved too much for the bourgeois order), but they were suspended by socialists at their peril. Accordingly, affirming that "freedom is only and exclusively freedom for the one who thinks differently", she called for unrestricted freedom of the press and assembly since "without the free struggle of opinion, life dies out in every public institution, becomes a mere semblance of life, in which only the bureaucracy remains as the active element".⁷² And when it was countered that intellectuals should do more than contribute their specialized theoretical insights - that they must actually direct the struggle to ensure there would be no false steps - Luxemburg's response was typically blunt and to the point: The false steps which a real revolutionary labour movement makes are historically immeasurably more fruitful and valuable than the infallibility of the best central committee.⁷³

Beyond this, however, the question is whether she remained - as have neo-Gramscians - at a point of identifying what did not qualify as democratic governance (i.e., not Leninist "democratic centralism"; not bourgeois "liberal democracy"), or whether she gave indications of what would qualify as democratic. Once again, while one cannot claim she gave a definitive answer to the question of what constitutes democratic governance, it can be argued her writings provide a useful exemplar in this regard.

Significantly, Luxemburg did not focus in on the formal institutions of democracy. Rather, like Cox, her emphasis was on democratization - democracy as a process. Following Habermas,⁷⁴ what is fundamental to the process of democratization is the development of a "public sphere",⁷⁵ which has the function of organizing human experience and "mediating between the changing forms of capitalist production on the one hand and the cultural organization of human experience, on the other".⁷⁶ More recently Habermas has come under criticism for conflating the notion of the public sphere with that of the bourgeois public sphere *tout court*. Here again, Luxemburg's work on socialist democracy has been hailed as anticipating the critique of the bourgeois public sphere as an increasingly integral part of the capitalist production process, and the consequent need to create a robust "proletarian public sphere" to "oppose the organized interests of the bourgeois public sphere through its organization of human needs and interests".⁷⁷ As Oskar Negt has noted,

The foundation of the Rosa Luxemburg's perspective of totality is neither an imaginary class-substance, for example, the proletariat as historical subject, nor an organization, rather it is the working class itself, more precisely, a proletarian public sphere... distinguished by its refusal to recognize fundamental life-spheres such as production and socialization (education) as **private**⁷⁸

All of the implications for practice in the present are not immediately clear, of course. At the very least, however, the notion of the necessity of a proletarian public sphere for a fully-functioning democracy would suggest that in addition to the neo-Gramscian concern with production modes, the "consciousness industry", including television, the mass media, and the new information technologies, must figure centrally in any collective research programme.

Conclusion:

We have been focusing in this paper on outlining a collective research programme consistent with the goal of democratic socialism. It has been suggested that Gramscian IPE - with its focus on world order, forms of state, and counter-hegemony - supplemented with insights from the work of Rosa Luxemburg regarding conscientization, internationalism and democracy - warrants serious consideration as a candidate for such a programme.

I wish to conclude by reflecting once again on the more general question of a collective research programme. Recalling our discussion of research programmes above, it might be objected that to append the modifier "collective" is be redundant, given that research programmes, by definition, always involve a collectivity - the scholarly community. I wish to argue in favour of retaining the modifier, however, and for the following reason. What we are talking about here is not just any research programme, but one which seeks to promote democratic socialism in a global(-izing) context.

Put simply, what is being advocated is a "critical" research programme. Now it is worth noting that a critical form of theorizing must be validated on two distinct levels. At one level, it must, like conventional forms of theorizing, be validated by developing reasoned arguments in support of its claims which are successful in gaining the assent of the relevant academic/ intellectual community. Yet while this level of validation is crucial, it is not sufficient. In the words of Horkheimer:

General criteria for assessing critical theory as a whole do not exist, for they are always based on the recurrence of events and thus on a self-reproducing totality....⁷⁹

This being the case, how then is the value of a theoretical offering to be determined? Again, Horkheimer suggests an answer:

The value of a theory is not decided alone by the formal criteria of truth ... the value of a theory is decided by its connection with the tasks, which in the particular historical moment are take up by **progressive social forces**.⁸⁰

In short, a "critical" research programme must also validate itself in terms of the lives of those to whom it is ultimately directed. It must validate itself through its contribution to the concrete emancipation of human beings. This is the "collectivity" which is not included in the community-based validation process of mainstream theorizing, and to which the word "collective" in "collective research programme" refers, and to whose welfare our research must be directed.

Endnotes

*I wish to thank Roger Epp, Karen Hadley, Randy Germain and Teresa Healy for their assistance in the writing of this paper. Naturally I, alone, am responsible for its content.

1. Die gesellschaftliche Funktion der Philosophie", in Alfred Schmidt, (ed.), *Kritische Theorie: Eine Dokumentation* (Frankfurt: S. Fischer Verlag, 1968), II, p. 308, my translation.

2. Quoted in J. P. Nettl, *Rosa Luxemburg*, I, (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 394.

3. "What's Critical about Critical Theory", in Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell, (eds.), *Feminism as Critique* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), p. 31.

4. In this regard it is striking that one of the more prominent among critical theoretical traditions - the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School - has been largely silent on global-level issues or processes. As a leading American Frankfurt School theorist has noted, with the exception of occasional comments by Marcuse in the 1960s, a macrological critique of imperialism or of systems of world domination was "inexplicably absent from most of Critical Theory". See Douglas Kellner, "Critical Theory, Poststructuralism, and the Philosophy of Liberation", unpublished manuscript.

URL: <http://www.uta.edu/huma/illuminations/kell7.htm>

Indeed, this obvious lacuna has prompted calls from contemporary proponents of Critical Theory for its reformulation in more globally-sensitive terms. Note, for example, the following comment from Thomas McCarthy:

I have wanted to underscore the need for critical theory to adopt a consistently global perspective, so as to locate the received problematics of the nation state in a broader web of interconnected histories.

See Thomas McCarthy, "Philosophy and Critical Theory: A Reprise", in David Couzens Hoy and Thomas McCarthy, *Critical Theory* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 92-93.

5. See Richard Barnet and Ronald Mueller, *Global Reach* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974), as well as the more recent Richard Barnet and John Cavanagh, *Global Dreams: Imperial Corporations and the New World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994).

The content of mainstream theories of international relations, arguably all concerned with developing a global perspective, stands as further and - lamentably, unassailable - proof of this argument.

6. It is important to resist the temptation, all too visible in some circles, to assume that any kind of "empirical" work is, by definition, tainted with the brush of non-critical thinking; that truly "critical work" can be done only in the most obtuse realm of meta-theory. Such a stance, if widely adopted,

would rob critical thinking of exactly the kind of productive engagement with the world around us that theory is meant to facilitate - not to supplant. The important question is, therefore, what kinds of empirical work are critical and which are not. The answer to this question should, then allow for the kind of empirical work needed to move critical understanding and emancipatory practice forward.

7. See M. Neufeld, *The Restructuring of International Relations Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). See also M. Neufeld, "Who's Afraid of Meta-Theory?" *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 23, No. 2 (Summer 1994), pp. 387-93, as well as M. Neufeld, "What's Critical about Critical IR Theory?", in Richard Wyn Jones and Roger Tooze, (eds), *Critical Theory and World Politics* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Press, 1998), forthcoming.

8. The other being the "English School" also known as the "society of states" tradition. See Roger Epp, "The English School at the Frontiers of International Society: A Hermeneutic Recollection", *Review of International Studies* 24 (1998), forthcoming.

9. The best introduction to Gramscian IPE remains the collection of articles by Robert Cox, published as *Approaches to World Order*, edited by Timothy J. Sinclair (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). See also the contributions by scholars from around the world in: Stephen Gill, (ed.), *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), and Björn Hettne (ed.), *International Political Economy: Understanding Global Disorder* (Halifax: Fernwood, 1995).

Robert and Jesse Cox were recently honoured in a *Festschrift - Innovation and Transformation in International Studies*, edited by Stephen Gill and James H. Mittelman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) - which also contains a number of articles by scholars working out of a Gramscian perspective.

10. "Social Forces, States, and World Orders", p. 95.

11. For a discussion of the notion of "totality" in the (Western) Marxist tradition, see Martin Jay, *Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukács to Habermas* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

12. R. W. Cox, "On thinking about future world order", in *Approaches to World Order*, p. 77.

13. On the "internationalization of the state", see Leo Panitch, "Rethinking the Role of the State", in James H. Mittelman, (ed.), *Globalization: Critical Reflections* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), p. 84. An earlier version of this paper appeared in *The Socialist Register 1994*. On dialectics, see M. Neufeld, "The 'Dialectical Awakening' in International Relations: For and Against". *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 2, (1997), pp. 449-54.

14. On theoretical reflexivity, both generally and in relation to Gramscian IPE, see Neufeld, *The Restructuring of International Relations Theory*, chapter three.

-
15. Cox, "Social forces, states and world orders", p. 87.
 16. Cox, "On thinking about future world order", p. 66.
 17. On the distinction between "critical" and "problem-solving" theory see "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory", in R. Cox, *Approaches to World Order*, Timothy Sinclair, (ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 85-123. Cox's discussion parallels Horkheimer's on the difference between "critical" and "traditional" theory. See Max Horkheimer, "Traditional and Critical Theory", in *Critical Theory: Selected Essays*, trans. Matthew J. O'Connell (Toronto: Herder and Herder, 1972), pp. 188-243.
 18. See Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944).
 19. See Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, pp. 191, 199. See also Teresa Healy, "Counter-Hegemony and World Order: Meeting the Post-Colonial Critique", unpublished paper prepared for the Canadian Political Science Association meetings, Ottawa, June 1998.
 20. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations", p. 131.
 21. See Robert Cox, "Civilizations: Encounters and Transformations", *Studies in Political Economy* 47 (Summer 1995), pp. 7-31.
 22. This title is, of course, an adaptation of the title of Perry Anderson's "The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci", *New Left Review* No. 100 (Nov. 76-Jan. 77), pp. 5-78. This critique of "Coxian historical materialism" organized around a discussion of the "three Ds" - dialectics, double movement, and democracy - was first presented at a roundtable on the work of Robert Cox (organized by Tim Sinclair) at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association in Toronto, 1997.
 23. For an example of the former, see Kenneth Waltz, "Response to my Critics" in Robert Keohane, *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985). For an example of the latter, see Randall D. Germain and Michael Kenny, "Engaging Gramsci: International Relations Theory and the New Gramscians", *Review of International Studies* 24, No. 1 (January 1998), pp. 3-21.
 24. See Germain and Kenny, "Engaging Gramsci".
 25. See, for example, Panitch, "Rethinking the Role of the State".
 26. In Panitch's terms, "the alternative [has] to involve fundamental challenges to capital's power and radical democratization of the state" (p. 102).
 27. Cox, "Social Forces, States, and World Orders", p. 90.

28. Cox, "On thinking about future world order", p. 66.

29. Brian Fay, *Critical Social Science* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), p. 89.

30. In the collections of essays by Cox, for example - a volume which runs well over five hundred pages - the question of "organic intellectuals" is dealt with in a single paragraph the content of which is limited to a re-statement of Gramsci's view that intellectuals are key in the construction of hegemony/ counter-hegemony, and the observation that for them to play their role in the creation of a new historical bloc under working class hegemony, "they would have to evolve a clearly distinctive culture, organization, and technique, and do so in constant interaction with the members of the emergent block". See Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations", p. 132.

For an interesting set of reflections on intellectuals from a Japanese perspective, see Oda Makoto, *Les Intellectuels Japonais*, translated by Jean Michel Leclercq, (Paris: Publications Orientalistes de France, 1979).

31. See Healy, "Counter-Hegemony and World Order", p. 13.

32. See Healy, "Counter-Hegemony and World Order", p. 13. A parallel analysis has been carried out by Mittelman who argues that the neo-Gramscian adoption of key Weberian notions is insufficiently cognizant of how those notions grow out of - and reflect - Weber's conservative, nationalist politics and mix uneasily with the borrowings from Marx and Gramsci. See James H. Mittelman, "Coxian Historicism as an Alternative Perspective in International Studies", *Alternatives* 23 (1998), pp. 63-92.

33. In Coxian terms, there is a shift in forms of state from the "mediator" state, which saw itself as needing to balance two sets of obligations - one to the international economy and one to its citizens - to the "transmission-belt" state, which sees itself as having obligations only to the world economy, whose needs are to be "transmitted" downward to its citizens. This shift in the form of state is paralleled by a shift at the level of world order - from a liberal world order, in which the market was regulated to a hyper-liberal world order, in which market is understood as "self-regulating".

34. For an argument for the latter, see David Held, "Democracy: From City-States to a Cosmopolitan Order?", *Political Studies* 40 (Special Issue), pp. 10-39.

35. Panitch, "Rethinking the Role of the State", p. It is noteworthy that Lelio Basso also made theorizing the state a priority in his analysis of politics. See Lelio Basso, *Gesellschaftsformation und Staatsform. Drei Aufsätze*, afterword by Oskar Negt (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1975).

36. See Teresa Healy, "Globalization in North America: Restructuring the Sites of Democratic Contestation", unpublished paper, prepared for the joint International Studies-Mexican International Studies Association convention in Manzanillo, Mexico, December 1997, p. 25.

37. See Robert Cox, "Debt, time and capitalism", *Studies in Political Economy* 48 (Autumn 1995), pp. 165-70.

-
38. See Cox, "Globalization, Multilateralism and Democracy", in *Approaches to World Order*, p. 532.
39. See Cox, "Globalization, Multilateralism and Democracy", in *Approaches to World Order*, p. 532.
40. See Cox, "'Real Socialism' in Historical Perspective", in *Approaches to World Order*, p. 229.
41. There are resonances here with C. B. MacPherson's notion of "participatory democracy". See Macpherson, *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). For a considered critique of MacPherson's contribution, see Leo Panitch, "Liberal Democracy and Socialist Democracy: The Antinomies of C. B. MacPherson", *Socialist Register 1981* (Halifax: Fernwood, 1981), pp. 144-68.
42. This phrase takes its inspiration from the title of a book on this theme - see *Die "Linie Luxemburg-Gramsci": Zur Aktualität marxistischen Denkens* (Hamburg: Argument-Verlag, 1989).
43. See, for example, Norman Geras, *The Legacy of Rosa Luxemburg* (London: New Left Books, 1976), Stephen Bronner, *Rosa Luxemburg: A Revolutionary for Our Times*, Norman Geras, *The Legacy of Rosa Luxemburg* (London: NLB, 1976), Andrea Nye, *Philosophia: The Thought of Rosa Luxemburg, Simone Weil, and Hannah Arendt* (New York: Routledge, 1994), and, of course, Lelio Basso's own *Rosa Luxemburg: A Reappraisal*, translated by Douglas Parmée (London: André Deutsch, 1975).
44. See Basso, "The Dialectical Method", in *Rosa Luxemburg*, chapter two, pp. 17-47.
45. Georg Lukács, "The Marxism of Rosa Luxemburg", in *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics*, translated by Rodney Livingstone (London: Merlin Press, 1971), p. 27.
46. For an alternative definition of Western Marxism - one which makes its defining characteristic its "estrangement from political praxis, its emphasis upon cultural matters, its abstruse use of language, as well as its domination by 'philosophers'" (Bronner, *Rosa Luxemburg*, p. 96) - and, as a consequence, one from which Rosa Luxemburg is excluded - see Perry Anderson, *Considerations on Western Marxism* (London: NLB, 1976). For a rebuttal of Anderson's position - and one with which I am in basic agreement - see Bronner, *Rosa Luxemburg*, chapter twelve.
47. See Harvey J. Kaye, "E. P. Thompson, the British Marxist Historical Tradition and the Contemporary Crisis", in H. J. Kaye and Keith McClelland, (eds.), *E. P. Thompson: Critical Perspectives* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), p. 254. See also Harvey J. Kaye, *The British Marxist Historians* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1984) for a valuable discussion of convergence between Gramsci and the British Marxist Historical Tradition - a tradition to which belong, in addition to Thompson, Maurice Dobb, Christopher Hill, and, particularly noteworthy for this discussion because of the critical and global perspective he brings to his work - most recently in his *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991* (London: Abacus, 1995) - Eric

Hobsbawm.

48. It might, of course, be objected that Rosa Luxemburg advocated just such a deterministic interpretation of the transition to socialism - indeed, Gramsci himself was doubtless labouring under such a misconception when he referred derogatorily to Luxemburg's "*ferreo determinismo economicistico*" - her "iron-law economic determinism" (*Quaderni*, 859). Such a reading is, however, a misreading, as has been shown by a series of serious Luxemburg scholars including Geras, Bronner and, Basso.

49. For a neo-Gramscian contribution to feminist theorizing - a theme which, lamentably, remains under-represented in neo-Gramscian work as a whole - see Sandra Whitworth, *Feminism and International Relations: Towards a Political Economy of Gender in Interstate and Non-Governmental Institutions* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).

50. See David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).

51. See, for example, "Women's Suffrage and Class Struggle", in Dick Howard, (ed.), *Selected Political Writings of Rosa Luxemburg* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), pp. 216-222.

52. Rosa Luxemburg, *The Accumulation of Capital* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1951).

53. See, for example, Samir Amin, *Re-Reading the Postwar Period: An Intellectual Itinerary*, translated by Michael Wolfers, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1994), chapter three, and Roger Burbach, Orlando Núñez, and Boris Kagarlitsky, *Globalization and Its Discontents: The Rise of Postmodern Socialisms* (London: Pluto Press, 1997), chapter five.

54. It can also be argued that in this Luxemburg re-captured Marx's understanding of capitalism as being beset by "globalizing" tendencies. See Colin Leys and Leo Panitch, "The Political Legacy of the Manifesto", *Socialist Register 1998 - The Communist Manifesto Now* (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing Co., 1998), pp. 18-48.

It is, of course, not only neo-Gramscians who view globalization in what are, arguably, Luxemburgian terms. For example, the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW) have a similar perspective. For the CAW position, see the CAW Discussion Paper "Globalization, National Struggles and Internationalism" (PEL Binder Sheet 3 - Econ 7 - Oct 97). For background on the CAW, see Sam Gindin, *The Canadian Auto Workers: The Birth and Transformation of a Union* (Toronto: Lorimer, 1995).

55. It is important, at this point, to note a possible objection, namely that what the neo-Gramscians need to improve their theorizing is not a greater familiarity with the work of Luxemburg but a better understanding of Gramsci himself. To meet this objection adequately would require another paper. I will respond, then, simply by saying that while no one could object to achieving as adequate an understanding of Gramsci's theorizing as possible, Luxemburg does offer important insights on themes (democracy, internationalism, the pedagogical dimension of practice) which are either not as developed in Gramsci's work, or, indeed, not present at all.

56. This is an extensive literature on this subject within the philosophy of science as generated by figures such as Thomas Kuhn, Karl Popper, and Imre Lakatos. For an accessible introduction, see A. F. Chalmers, *What is This Thing Called Science?* Second Edition (St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1982). For the original exchanges, see I Lakatos and A. Musgrave, (eds.), *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974).

57. Exemplars are particularly important for socializing new generations of scholars so they may replace senior scholars and, thereby, keep the research programme alive beyond a single generation.

58. The term is taken from Lakatos. See his "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes" in *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, pp. 91-196.

59. See Nettle, *Rosa Luxemburg*, I, pp. 392-396.

60. Quoted in Nettle, *Rosa Luxemburg*, I, p. 394. Luxemburg was, by all accounts, a committed and popular teacher. Her pedagogical experience was also crucial to the development of her own thinking, noting that it was "only by sharpening the subject matter through teaching that I was able to develop my ideas" (quoted in Nettle, p. 392). A number of her lectures have been gathered together. See Rosa Luxemburg, *What is Economics?*, translated by T. Edwards (New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1954).

61. Basso, *Luxemburg*, p. 93.

62. Luxemburg, quoted in Basso, *Rosa Luxemburg*, pp. 93-94.

63. Basso, *Rosa Luxemburg*, p. 84.

64. Quoted in Basso, *Rosa Luxemburg*, p. 84.

65. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, reprinted in Leo Panitch and Colin Leys, (eds.), *The Communist Manifesto Now - Socialist Register 1998* (Halifax: Fernwood, 1998), p. 250.

66. Basso, *Rosa Luxemburg*, p. 114.

67. See Held, "Democracy: From City-States to a Cosmopolitan Order?" for an example of the neo-idealist position. For an incisive critique, see Leo Panitch, "Rethinking the Role of the State".

68. Quoted in Basso, *Rosa Luxemburg*, p. 91.

69. Quoted in Basso, *Rosa Luxemburg*, p. 93.

70. Two examples from the Canadian context may serve to make this point more clearly. First, in 1994 the leadership of the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW) - self-designated (and not completely

without reason) as the most progressive wing of the Canadian labour movement - organized a trip to meet with their counter-parts in Mexico, where they spent a good deal of their time lecturing Mexican labour activists on how best to respond to neoliberal restructuring. More recently, one of Canada's most prominent left-wing social commentators (contributing the sole progressive weekly column in Canada's "national newspaper" - the *Globe and Mail*) was heard to remark that Canadian social movement activists have a lot to teach Mexicans about how to respond to continental "free trade" initiatives, and seemed genuinely nonplussed when confronted with the suggestion that Mexicans might have something to teach Canadians about structural adjustment. Of course, it is quite possible that Canadian socialists might have something to teach their southern counterparts. What Luxemburg would suggest, however, is that Canadians - and other Northerners - might have something to learn as well.

71. For a useful discussion, see Geras, *The Legacy of Rosa Luxemburg*, chapter four.

72. Quoted in Bronner, *Rosa Luxemburg*, p. 185.

73. Quoted in Basso, *Rosa Luxemburg*, p. 103.

74. Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (1962) Trans. Thomas Burger with Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989).

75. *Öffentlichkeit* can be translated as publicness, the public, publicity or, most commonly, the public sphere. As Miriam Hans notes, the German term *Öffentlichkeit* refers not only to the social space implied by the English phrase "public sphere", but to "an ideational substance or criterion - 'glasnost' or openness (which has the same root in German, 'offen') - that is produced both within these sites and in larger, de-territorialized contexts. See Hansen, Foreword, *Public Sphere and Experience: Toward an Analysis of the Bourgeois and Proletarian Public Sphere by Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. ix. For a useful introduction and overview to the literature on this theme, see Craig Calhoun, "Social Theory and the Public Sphere", in Bryan S. Turner, (ed.), *The Blackwell Companion to Social Theory* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 429-70.

76. Eberhard Knödler-Bunte, "The Proletarian Public Sphere and Political Organization: An Analysis of Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge's *The Public Sphere and Experience*", *New German Critique* No. 4 (Winter 1975), p. 51.

77. See Knödler-Bunte, "The Proletarian Public Sphere", p. 51. See also Negt and Kluge, *Public Sphere and Experience*.

78. Oskar Negt, "Rosa Luxemburg: Zur materialistischen Dialektik von Spontaneität und Organisation", in *Rosa Luxemburg oder Die Bestimmung des Sozialismus* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1974), pp. 190, 191, my translation. See also Oskar Negt, *Keine Demokratie ohne*

Sozialismus: Über den Zusammenhang von Politik, Geschichte und Moral (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1976).

79. "Traditionelle und kritische Theorie," in Max Horkheimer, *Kritische Theorie: Eine Dokumentation*, I, ed. Alfred Schmidt (Frankfurt: S. Fischer Verlag, 1968), p. 190, my translation.

80. Quoted in David Held, *Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 192, emphasis in the original.