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**“Unhappy is the Land That Needs Hero”:
The Pearsonian Tradition and the
Canadian Intervention into Afghanistan**

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Introduction:

“Unglücklich das Land, daß keine Helden hat...”

[“Unhappy is the land, that has no heroes...”]

Bertolt Brecht
Leben des Galilei
Scene XII

I can recall clearly a class discussion in my Grade 13 Canadian History course on the question of Canadian heroes. Our teacher, Mr. Pollard, was adept at getting these discussions going with leading questions: The United States is very good at celebrating its heroes – what about Canada? Do we have heroes? Why not? Should we? Who from our past is a candidate?¹

I didn't realize it at the time, but what we were really discussing was whether any Canadian personalities were central to what Gramsci, borrowing from Sorel, called an animating “Myth”.² Such myths are vital to the efforts of mainstream intellectuals to motivate publics to active support for elite projects.

Because of their power, there is a natural temptation for mainstream public intellectuals to appeal to reigning myths in an effort to garner support from non-elites for elite agendas. Oppositional intellectuals too may be tempted to appeal to those same myths in an effort to re-orient public support away from such agendas. Such is certainly the case in terms of the on-going debate about Canada's involvement in the military campaign in Afghanistan. And what is particularly noteworthy in terms of this paper is that as both proponents and opponents have worked to stake out their position, a leading figure in a central Canadian animating myth has figured in the arguments of both sides: Lester B. [Mike] Pearson

¹ As I recall, my suggestion that J. S. Woodsworth should stand as a hero for his leading role in the Winnipeg General Strike met with a less than enthusiastic response. Canada's hegemonic discourse (propagated through civil society institutions like schools) can tolerate moderately-left social-democratic figures – witness the fact that Tommy Douglas won the CBC's “Greatest Canadian” contest – but only if they have made a “positive” contribution, like universal health care. Participation in excessively “negative” activities - civil disobedience, extra-parliamentary agitation – is sufficient grounds for disqualification. Fortunately, the latter have all but disappeared from the 21st century social-democratic repertoire.

For a more theoretical discussion of the Gramscian notion of hegemony/ hegemonic discourse in relation to Canadian foreign policy, see Neufeld (1995, 1999).

² See Augelli & Murphy (1996)

Hey Mike, Which Side Are You On?

There is no question that Mike Pearson – the only Canadian to have won the Nobel Peace Prize - has attained the status of Canadian hero. While not the overall winner, he polled well in the CBC’s “Greatest Canadian” Contest, where his case was championed by actor Paul Gross.³ It is also noteworthy that there exist no less than two books designed to instill a sense of admiration for Pearson among Canadian children.⁴ Finally, Canada’s largest airport, just outside Toronto, is named for the former prime minister.

Given the broad public respect for Pearson, it is hardly surprising that he has become a touchstone for opposing positions on the Afghanistan conflict. To begin, proponents of Canada’s continued involvement have been anything but shy in invoking Pearson to support their position. Jack Granatstein, for example, has argued that peacekeeping, while an innovation not completely without merit, was not the sum total of Pearson’s security repertoire. Peacekeeping is possible only under specific conditions, including an invitation from the parties on both sides of a conflict to foreign troops. However, as such conditions do not exist in Afghanistan,⁵ peacekeeping is not an option. In the same vein, neither are development or diplomacy until security has been enhanced and the situation stabilized.

Fortunately, argues Granatstein, Pearson provides us with a model of how to behave when peacekeeping is not possible. Noting, among other things, Pearson’s support for military intervention in the Korean war – an intervention that was not peacekeeping – Granatstein stresses that “hard-edged values”, “strength and alliances”, and a willingness to fight (Granatstein, 2008) are also part of the essence of the Pearsonian tradition. And it is for this reason, he concludes, it is Stephen Harper that deserves support, since it is his “resolve and strength” on the Afghanistan question that makes him “Mike Pearson’s true heir”.

It is true that Stephen Harper has evidenced a new-found - and arguably somewhat

³ Pearson placed sixth within the top ten, out-pollled by Tommy Douglas, Terry Fox, Pierre Trudeau, Frederick Banting and David Suzuki. It is true, of course, that the “Greatest Canadian” contest is a less than scientific measure of popularity. I would argue, however, that it does give a good sense of where certain public personalities stand in the imagination of Canadians and, more importantly, serves as an example of the very kind of myth-making by a government-elite institution upon which elite manipulation of the public depends.

⁴ See Hughes (2004) & Whiteside, 2004), as well as Gibb, (2006). I don’t mean to leave the impression that this kind of myth perpetuation is particular to Canada alone. A parallel book series for children entitled “Uncle Lenin” was a standard feature of Soviet society and those of its satellites as well.

⁵ John Manley has made this point as well. See the Manley Report (2008), as well as his comments at the press conference at the release of the report. For the latter, see Ivison (2008).

surprising⁶ - appreciation for the core tenets of Pearsonian internationalism such as multilateralism⁷ and “middlepowermanship”. In a 2007 address to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, Harper stressed that success in the current global context requires not unilateralism, but multilateral cooperation “among capable, committed, like-minded nations”, as well as “middle powers who can step up to the plate to do their part”. Indeed, Harper concluded that with the positive changes made by his government (for example, rebuilding the fighting capability of the Canadian Armed Forces), Canada is now in a position, in cooperation “with other middle power” to make “a real contribution to protecting and projecting our collective interests, while serving as a model of a prosperous, democratic and compassionate society – independent yet open to the world”.

Logically speaking, opponents of Canada’s current involvement in Afghanistan have at least two possible strategies for contesting the efforts to link that involvement to Pearsonian internationalism. The first is to reaffirm Pearson’s legacy as being an inherently progressive one, marked by his innovations in peacekeeping, his independent voice, and his support for Third-World development, and, as such, one that is inherently at odds with the military intervention in which Canada is participating. A good example of this approach can be found in the writing of journalist Linda McQuaig. In a piece published in *The Toronto Star*, entitled “Canadian ‘Peacekeeping’ Troops in Afghanistan: Keep Pearson Out of It”, (McQuaig, 2008), McQuaig expressed outrage at Manley’s efforts to invoke the name of Lester Pearson in support of the Afghan mission. In defence of her position, she quoted Francis Boyle, a professor of international law, who noted that the “offensive use of military force (in Afghanistan) bears no similarity at all to Pearson’s peacekeeping force in the Sinai, which was genuine and legitimate peacekeeping”, and concluded therefore, that tying Pearson and the Afghan mission amounts to a “real desecration of (Pearson’s) memory and his monumental achievement for world peace”.

The problem with this response, of course, is that it can be countered by simply reiterating i) that no one is saying (or should be) that what Canadian troops are doing is peacekeeping (because the conditions for peacekeeping do not exist) and ii) Pearson was about more than peacekeeping, so to be involved in this kind of security-building exercise is not a betrayal of the Pearsonian internationalist tradition, but very much consistent with it.

Before we concede, however, that the proponents of intervention have won the argument, it is worth considering a second strategy – the critical re-examination of the Pearsonian internationalist tradition.

⁶ It is somewhat surprising since the Harper government has made extraordinary efforts to demarcate itself from previous Liberal governments, going so far as to adopt the phrase “Canada’s **New** Government” as its moniker. This is clearly at odds with a stance which openly embraces core values – specifically, the internationalism - of a former Liberal Prime Minister.

⁷ For an historical overview of the Canadian foreign policy record and the place of multilateralism, see Keating, (2002).

The second strategy – in essence, a delegitimization strategy involving ideology critique – starts from the following understanding of what has been outlined above. To recap, those advocating a continued war-fighting presence in Afghanistan argue that the Pearsonian internationalist tradition is in keeping with the kind of mission Canada is pursuing in Afghanistan, and that, therefore, the Afghan mission is worthy of support. The counter, outlined above, argues that the Pearsonian internationalist tradition is not in keeping with the mission in Afghanistan, and that, therefore, the Afghan mission is illegitimate. What is noteworthy is what these two positions have in common: the unspoken – and arguably unexamined assumption - that the Pearsonian internationalist tradition is itself worthy and legitimate, and provides a politico-normative standard against which Canada’s foreign policy initiatives can and should be judged. It is this assumption that is long overdue for critical interrogation

It should be noted at this point that a detailed historical review of the entire record of Pearson’s career, from Foreign Affairs, to Minister of the same, to Prime Minister and after, is beyond the scope of this paper.⁸ I will simply choose some examples for that record, corresponding to the following three themes that are central to the animating myth of Pearsonian internationalism: security, independent voice, and development.

Security:

The story of Pearson’s achievements in helping to create the first UN peacekeeping force in response to the Suez crisis of 1956 is well known and need not be repeated.⁹ Even here, however, one can begin to rethink the “mythical” casting of this event. The first thing to keep in mind is that Pearson was a product of and active participant in the Cold War. As such, he accepted the basic tenets of what has been termed “Cold War Liberalism”: i) the cold war was started by an expansionist communist bloc bent on world domination, ii) the Western response was the response of free people in defence of freedom everywhere, and iii) the West had made no significant errors.¹⁰ No significant errors, that is, until Suez, where the Western alliance allowed its unity to be fractured, with France and Britain on one side, and the US and Canada on the other. For Pearson, one of the most serious aspects of the crisis was that the West no longer presented a

⁸ There are an increasing number of relevant histories in the scholarly literature, especially as documents are declassified. On Pearson and the Vietnam period, for example, see the comprehensive piece by Preston (2003).

⁹ See Keating, 2003.

¹⁰ I am indebted to my then graduate supervisor, Profess John Sigler, for pushing me to recognize something my then liberal-internationalist ideological commitments had not allowed me to see. In fact, this recognition is to be found in the work of careful mainstream commentators. See, for example, Preston (2003:110): “The anti-communist lenses through which policy-makers in Ottawa and Washington viewed the conflict in Vietnam were very similar...”

united front to the real enemy (global communism). Thus the motivation for the peacekeeping innovation had much to do with restoring unity to NATO – an institution Pearson had been instrumental in creating - so that the real war could be continued in an efficacious manner.¹¹

It was the fact that Pearson shared the hard line anti-communist views of his counterparts in Washington that clarifies other parts of the record. It explains, for example, his willingness to accept U.S. nuclear weapons into Canada, notwithstanding the fact that his decision violated Liberal Party Policy. His decision earned a strong public rebuke in the pages of *Cite Libre* from a radical Quebec journalist, who found absurd the idea that Canada, an independent country, was “obliged” to accept these weapons because of alliance obligations:

No importance was attached to the fact that such a policy had been repudiated by the party congress and banished from its program; not to the fact that the chief had acted without consulting the national council of the Liberal Federation or its executive committee; nor to the fact that the leader had forgotten to discuss it with the parliamentary caucus or even with his principal advisers. The "Pope" had spoken. It was up to the faithful to believe.

Fate had it that the final thrust came from the Pentagon and obliged Mr. Pearson to betray his party's platform as well as the ideal with which he had always identified himself. Power presented itself to Mr. Pearson; he had nothing to lose except honour. He lost it. And his whole party lost it with him.¹²

¹¹In the interest of fairness, it should be noted that some mainstream/ conservative commentators have viewed peacekeeping in less altruistic and more self-interested terms as well. Granatstein, for example, has accounted for peacekeeping’s popularity among policy-makers in terms of its relatively low cost, its contribution to Western solidarity, and its “fit” with our widespread anti-Americanism. See, for example, Granatstein (1992, 1993, 2007).

Notwithstanding some superficial similarities between the arguments of those on the right and those on the left (and foreign policy is not the only domain of apparent convergence – one can think back to the critiques of the left and right directed to the welfare state) – the overall frameworks which give the individual arguments their meaning are fundamentally opposed. A left position that argues that the altruistic foreign policy discourse of Canada’s elites is a central element in the construction of a hegemony which preserves the positions of power and influence of the members of Canada’s dominant class is one not likely to be endorsed by a conservative like Granatstein, for example. For an argument from the left that advocates just this kind of position, see Neufeld (2004).

¹² Ironically, the same radical Quebec journalist who penned the words above – a certain Pierre Trudeau - would later use the same specious alliance obligation argument to defend his agreement to allow the U.S. to test its air-launched cruise missile in Alberta. On Pearson and the Bomarc Missiles, and on Trudeau and the cruise, see Keating (2002).

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is the (in)famous hotel-room meeting of Pearson with President Johnson on May 28, 1964. Pearson claimed it had been nothing more than a social talk. His account was, regrettably, not entirely accurate. Fortunately, there was an American aide – most probably, McGeorge Bundy - in the room who took notes. These notes were later leaked by Daniel Ellsberg in *The Pentagon Papers*. Those notes show clearly the following: i) the meeting was not social but about Vietnam; ii) that Johnson informed Pearson he was planning to escalate the bombing of North Vietnam; iii) that Pearson indicated his support for the U.S. intervention (as part of the wider global struggle against communism)¹³, with the proviso, as befits a Nobel Prize winner, that he hoped that the Americans would make every effort to limit themselves to non-nuclear “iron” bombs. Nuclear strikes, argued Pearson, would be difficult to sell to an increasingly skeptical public. One can almost hear Mackenzie-King intoning in the background: “Nuclear bombing of North Vietnam if necessary, but not necessarily **nuclear** bombing”.¹⁴

Independent Voice:

Two short vignettes should suffice to make the point here:

In 1954 Canada, having been nominated by the U.S., joined Poland (nominated for its part by the USSR) and India on the International Control Commission, established by the Geneva Conference on Vietnam. Poland’s job was, of course, to defend Hanoi and its Soviet masters. Canada was there to defend Saigon and the U.S. Its members did this by lying and spying. With regards to the first, members confirmed that though they knew it to be untrue, they reported regularly that all problems were the result of intransigence on the part of the North. With regard to the second, Canadian officers passed on first-hand observations on North Vietnam to the Americans. Once again, Pearson and Paul Martin Sr. denied this. However, retired Brigadier Donald Ketcheson confirmed that during his service on the Int’l Control Commission (1958-59), he regularly furnished the CIA with information about Communist troop movements, and that External Affairs knew, but “looked the other way” (Taylor, 1974: 18).

¹³ And Canada certainly did support the effort by providing billions of dollars, over the course of the war, in military goods and services. This was facilitated by the original free trade agreement – in this case relating to military materiel – the Defence Production Sharing Agreement (DPSA), signed in 1959. In the 1980s, well-know Canadian firms would again make significant profits selling goods to Indonesia then engaged in a genocide against the Timorese. Arguably, making money off the killing of South-East Asians is also part our noble internationalist tradition.

¹⁴ On this see Taylor (1974) as well as excerpts from Daniel Ellsberg, *The Pentagon Papers* in Granatstein (1993: 255).

I wait with baited breath for HISTORICA to produce a Canada Heritage Minute on this meeting.

The second vignette relates to Pearson's speech at Temple University on April 2, 1965. For proponents of the Pearsonian tradition as a progressive tradition standing in opposition to business as usual, this speech, second only to peacekeeping, is key. It stands, it is argued, as a clear and unambiguous example of the independent voice Canada has been and could yet be again on the world stage. There is, however, a problem. Despite its reputation, the speech is nowhere near the kind of critical, independent intervention that is so-often claimed.¹⁵

Pearson made the speech at Temple University on the occasion of accepting a peace award. What is significant – and yet, regularly overlooked – is that 95% of the speech is a reiteration and re-affirmation of the Cold War tenets and precepts that underlay US intervention. Indeed, given Canada's indirect yet very substantial participation in the war (by means of selling materiel to the Pentagon), and given the fact that Pearson shared the Cold War *Weltanschauung* held by Washington it would have been curious indeed had he provided any kind of principled critique. He did not. The speech is, first and foremost, a ringing endorsement of the goals and general strategy of *pax Americana*.

This is not to say, however, that Pearson provided no critique of any kind – just that in the 5% of the speech dedicated to critique it was a “pragmatic” and not a “principled” one.¹⁶ What distinguishes the latter is that it is rooted in some kind of fundamental, principle of right and wrong. A speech which had detailed the ways in which the US intervention violated basic principles of human rights, equality and sovereignty would have been such a critique. And though such speeches have been given, Pearson's was not one of them.

A pragmatic critique, on the other hand, limits itself to questions of efficacy and cost/benefit analysis.¹⁷ By definition, having accepted the essence of the anti-communist world view that underlay the US intervention, all that was left to Pearson was a pragmatic critique. Accordingly, his deviation from the Johnson administration's position was at the level of tactics, only. Specifically, Pearson suggested that the US stop bombing the North for two weeks to give the Vietnamese leadership a chance to re-think their position and their options. In short, Pearson was suggesting that a stick supplemented occasionally by a carrot is more efficacious than a stick alone.¹⁸

¹⁶ The distinction is Chomsky's (1975). See below.

¹⁷ To hold that “torture is wrong because it is wrong to intentionally cause pain to another human” is a principled critique. To say that “torture is wrong because if we get caught we could go to jail”, or better yet, that “that kind of torture is wrong because you're not doing it right; here, let me show you a better way that produces greater pain with less effort” is a pragmatic critique.

¹⁸ This is the dominant form of public critique of Canada's involvement in Afghanistan. Indeed, Michael Byers, in an interview with Michael Valpy, argued that “you don't need to have any particular ideological or moral perspective to realize that any kind of decision like this [Afghanistan] should be analyzed in cost-benefit terms” (Valpy, 2007). What such a position does, of course, is exclude principled critique and limit discourse to pragmatic assessments alone. Pragmatic critiques, by definition, shy away from questions

That Johnson, who had his own reasons for over-reacting, did over-react, in no way constitutes proof of the supposedly “radical” nature of Pearson’s critique. That Pearson’s speech has come to be seen as an example of independence of mind and spirit says much more about the power of myth than it does about an overwhelmingly conventional and *pax Americana*-derived re-affirmation of reigning orthodoxy.

Development:

Along with peacekeeping and the image of an independent voice, a concern for development is the third leg in the Pearsonian internationalist stool. It can be argued that Pearson had involvement in development issues throughout his life, from the Colombo Plan forward. Here, however, I wish to look briefly at his engagement with these issues at the end of his political career.

In 1968, Robert McNamara, who as President of the Ford Motor Company, had overseen the production of countless automobiles, and then as Secretary of Defense, had overseen the killing of countless South-East Asians, decided, in his current capacity of President of the World Bank, to push the development debate forward. Specifically, McNamara constituted a seven-person commission to study and make recommendations about

like “is it morally justifiable to invade another country”, and limit themselves to arguing “if the costs outweigh the benefits, we shouldn’t proceed”.

As Chomsky notes, what is distinctive about that kind of reasoning is that it is the kind that could have been used – and apparently was – by the leaders of the *Wehrmacht* when their *Führer* ordered them to invade Eastern Europe. “Of course, we stay away from value judgements – where does it get us to ask, ‘do we have the right to invade Russia and kill 20 million people’ – rather, we should focus on questions like ‘is it doable? And will the benefits justify the expenditure?, and above all, can we get away with it?’” Pace Byers’ assertions, given what it excludes from discussion pragmatic critique is itself highly ideological and morally dubious.

Of course, it can be countered that as unsatisfactory as pragmatic critique might be, it is still preferable to a view which refuses to allow for the possibility that Canada is doing anything wrong. As an example of the latter, see Preston (2003). Though Preston’s review of the historical record and documents is excellent, his analysis and conclusions are puzzling, to say the least. A good example is Preston’s response to the “complicity thesis” on Vietnam, advanced by writers such as Taylor, i.e., that Canada bears some responsibility for the suffering of the people of Indochina in that it was complicitous in the U.S. war effort. The Oxford English Dictionary defines complicity as “Involved knowingly or with passive compliance”. Certainly Pearson’s statements in support of US policy and the freedom given to Canadian business to supply the American war machine would seem to qualify as complicitous, and this notwithstanding Preston’s arguments that Pearson tried to “moderate” US behaviour. Preston rejects the notion of complicity, however. See Preston (2003: 110).

Still, one hopes that “pragmatic critique” and “non-critique” are not our only choices.

international development. Significantly, only two of the seven commission members were from the south. Even more significantly, when it came to appointing an eighth member who would serve as Chair, McNamara chose someone whose cold war credentials and public support for even the most maligned dimensions of US foreign policy (e.g., US intervention into South-East Asia) were beyond question: the recently retired, Lester B. Pearson.

In 1969 the eight Commissioners produced a report – *Partners in Development* – which was authored largely by Pearson (1969). In it, Pearson made his well-known recommendation that developed nations should aim to direct 1% of GDP into development assistance.¹⁹ It is this target – a target met by some Scandinavian countries though never by Canada (despite years of Liberal government paying lip-service to it) – that stands as the most widely-cited evidence for the third leg of the progressive interpretation of the Pearson legacy.²⁰

Once again, however, a close reading of the report provides a useful corrective to the Pearsonian myth. To begin, in the same way as Pearson viewed security issues through a cold war liberal framework, he viewed economic issues through a capitalist, market-oriented lens (Cox, 1972). As he made clear in his report, the goal of development policy should be to promote a "global free-market economy" – the necessary precondition for development in the South. Furthermore, for Pearson it was clear that the main agents for positive change were Multi-National Corporations (MNCs). Accordingly, the surest path to development was for Northern MNCs to enjoy the maximum freedom possible to exert their influence.

This, then, made the problem of development clear. Largely through barriers and efforts at regulation by Southern states, Northern MNCs found themselves ham-strung. Accordingly, development aid provided by the North should come with conditions, the most important of which would be requiring Southern states to liberalize their economies, and to use Northern aid for the building of infrastructure (training, roads, power) upon which Northern MNCs depend.

This raised a second issue: that of compliance. Pearson argued that Northern states dealing one-on-one with Southern states was a recipe for a loss of potential influence. Rather, he

¹⁹ .7% of the 1% overall was to come from government sources. On this and the significance of the report overall, see Cox (1972).

²⁰ In this sense, it is rather unfair of Rick Salutin to single out Paul Martin for promising Bono, publicly and privately, to boost foreign aid, and then failing to come through on his commitment. Arguably, Martin was just acting in conformity with a long-standing Liberal tradition of failing to come through on progressive promises. Salutin at least softens his critique by noting that while Martin didn't do what he promised, Martin insists he did and – crucially - "seems to believe it". In other words, notes Salutin, Martin "can apparently lie and not know he's lying." Concludes Salutin: "It's a kind of honesty". As in the case of critique, however, one hopes we are not limited in political life to only this kind of "honesty". See Salutin (2006).

argued, Northern states should deal collectively with their Southern “partners”. To that end, he argued that a Northern-controlled international organization should be mandated to speak to the South on behalf of the North as a whole; to over-see the transfer of any capital from North to South; to enumerate conditions attached to those transfers and to monitor compliance on behalf of Southern States.

As it was, Pearson’s vision was ahead of its time. However, thirteen years later, when Mexico threatened to default on its debt held by Northern Banks, Pearson’s vision was finally realized. The IMF was no longer needed, as it had been during the time of the gold standard, to regulate currency fluctuations – it was now free to assume the new role Pearson had envisaged. Thus from 1982 on, the IMF over-saw the restructuring of 3rd world debt, providing new loans with attendant conditions reflecting the Washington Consensus.²¹

- ☺ Austerity programmes? ☺
- ☺ They’re a Canadian idea! ☺

(And an insufficiently celebrated part of the Pearsonian internationalist tradition as well.)²²

Conclusion:

By way of conclusion, let me return to the question of peacekeeping and its relevance for the Canadian mission in Afghanistan. Even if one accepts that peacekeeping is not an option there – that, in the words of John Manley, “there is no peace to keep” – the Pearsonian tradition on peacekeeping still has something to teach us. On November 6, 1956, as peacekeeping was being devised and tried for the first time, Dag Hammarskjöld presented a report which laid down the general principles for successful peacekeeping (Reford, 1992:69).

The principles included the following:

- i) a peacekeeping force would not be a fighting force and would not seek to impose its will
- ii) a peacekeeping force would be neutral

²¹ The policies reflecting the Washington Consensus are varied, but the general working principle is that the problems in economies result from the fact that the poor have too much money, and the rich don’t have enough. Policies are thus designed to work to transfer wealth/ income from the have-nots to the haves. Enhancing the freedom and influence of MNCs is, of course, central.

²² Again, a Heritage Minute is clearly warranted – where are the HISTORICA people when you need them?

- iii) the sovereign rights of the nation on whose soil it was stationed would be respected
- iv) a nation providing troops would be responsible for paying them and providing their equipment. Other costs would be borne by the UN

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, great powers would not be included in the force. The reason for this prohibition – a prohibition which had the effect of making peacekeeping a mission for middle powers (i.e., the only non-great powers with enough resources to undertake such a mission) – was that great powers had colonial legacies which would accompany them into any peacekeeping mission and quite probably undermine it.

Canada is no great power. However, the general principle applies. It is vital for there to be clear recognition that in Afghanistan, Canadian troops have functioned as an invading and occupying force. As this is a fact that has generally been obscured, it is worth addressing the issue in some detail. I shall do so first by reviewing the top three justifications for the presence of Canadian troops in Afghanistan.

The first way in which the presence of Canadian troops in Afghanistan has been justified has been with reference to UN resolutions. In terms of hegemony-construction, this is a particularly potent form of justification as the UN – the dominant sponsor of the peacekeeping operations in which Canada has participated – is well-regarded by many Canadians. There a problem, however. It is true that the Security Council passed several resolutions after the Sept. 11 attacks: Resolutions 1368 and 1373 are most notable. As law professor Marjorie Cohn, has observed, these resolutions “ordered the freezing of assets, the criminalizing of terrorist activity, the prevention of the commission of and support for terrorist attacks, and the taking of necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist activist, including the sharing of information”. However, none called or offered justification for an armed intervention.²³ Francis Boyle, professor of international law at the University of Illinois College of Law, agrees, noting that the Security Council resolutions regularly cited by people such as John Manley in no way authorized military action. Rather, they called for the perpetrators of 9/11 to be brought to justice. In other words, the UN resolutions direct us not to military intervention, but to extradition and trial of those responsible for criminal activities within the evolving architecture of international criminal law and its institutions (e.g., International Criminal Court).²⁴

The second way the Canadian presence is rationalized is by arguing that Canada is there as the invited “guest” of the Afghan government. There is a kernel of truth to this claim: Canada has, in fact, been invited by the current Afghan government to help bring stability and order to the country, by means of troops if necessary.

²³ Marjorie Cohn, “Afghanistan: The Other Illegal War”. Alternet.org/story/93473/. Cohn is a professor at the Thomas Jefferson School of Law.

²⁴ See Linda McQuaig, (2008). There is also evidence that the Taliban government was open to moving down this road after Sept. 11 – curiously, however, soon all efforts became focussed on a military intervention and diplomatic solutions were abandoned.

The problem with this argument is that the government which has invited us to stay was put into power as part of the original military intervention which toppled the Taliban government.²⁵ By this argument, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 – also at the invitation of a puppet regime the USSR had earlier put into power – would have to be seen as legitimate.²⁶

A third line of argument justifies the intervention in terms of the fact that very few states – by some counts only three – recognized the Taliban government at the time NATO troops toppled it. The problem here is that international law – in particular, the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (1933) – states that “The political existence of a state” – and by extension, rights attached to statehood such as equality, sovereignty and non-interference – “is independent of recognition by the other states”.²⁷ Put simply, a low quotient of recognition by other states cannot stand as justification for military intervention, any more than a professor’s unpopularity in their department can stand as a justification for a violation of their human rights.

All of this is arguably secondary, however: the real issue is how Canadian troops are regarded by ordinary Afghans. Opinion data is notoriously hard to obtain the case of a society like that of Afghanistan. There is growing evidence, however, that Canadian soldiers are not regarded as an unqualified force for good. Much is made of the number of Canadian casualties suffered in Afghanistan.²⁸ It is also important, however, to consider the number of Afghans – civilians as well as combatants – that Canadians have killed. As the *Los Angeles Times* reported in July 2007, “after more than five years of increasingly intense warfare, the conflict in Afghanistan reached a grim milestone in the first half of this year: U.S. troops and their NATO allies killed more civilians than insurgents did, according to several independent tallies”.²⁹ Canadian troops have been as implicated in “collateral damage” as much as any NATO participant. And the perceptions of Canada troops by ordinary Afghans have not been unaffected.

To repeat, then, Canadian troops have functioned as and are increasingly perceived as an invading and occupying force. And that legacy will have important implications for what Canada can do in the future. Assuming some kind of politico-social stability is achieved – and this remains a big assumption – it will be necessary to think about reconstruction and economic development. And here it is noteworthy that since the release of the Manley

²⁵ And it was only after the Afghanistan was invaded and the Taliban government toppled that UN authorization for the current government and the NATO intervention was achieved.

²⁶ Presumably this line of thinking would also take us to positive judgments about the legitimacy of NAZI Germany’s “humanitarian intervention”, at the behest of the Vichy government, into France.

²⁷ See, for example, Levi (1991), chap. six.

²⁸ And understandably so – by the end of 2008, more than 100 deaths.

²⁹ Cited in Fowler 2008).

Report there has been a growing emphasis on the need for Canada to remain in the long-term in order to contribute to the rebuilding of Afghanistan. However, just as great powers with a colonial legacy can have no part in peacekeeping, so middle powers with a legacy of intervention and occupation can have no part in development. Notwithstanding elite desires to generate public support for a continuation of the mission by stressing the popular theme of development, the reality is this: whatever part Canada might have played in rebuilding Afghanistan in the post-conflict setting was almost certainly sacrificed when the decision was made to be an active player in the conflict itself.

Finally, we return to the broader issue with which we began: the role of animating myths in eliciting popular consent for elite foreign policy agendas. Pace left-of-centre admirers of Pearson, it seems clear, in light of the historical record, that if the right has the easier task when it comes to harnessing the Pearsonian legacy to its agenda, this is the case for a very simple reason: Pearson was, quite simply, one of their own.

This is not the end of the story, however. Opinion surveys (Gee, 2008) indicate that the Canadian public continues to identify strongly with the ideals of progressive internationalism – ideals such as peacekeeping, independent voice, and development. Accordingly, we should consider the following: does progressive internationalism enjoy public support because it is seen to be Pearsonian? Or, what seems much more likely, is Pearson held in as high regard as he is because he is (mistakenly) thought to have been a progressive internationalist? If the second is true, the implication is clear. Though we need progressive internationalism, we may well not need Pearson in order to sustain it. In short, we might well be capable of living quite happily – and progressively – “as a land without a hero”. And as such, de-mystifying and rejecting the Pearsonian legacy may be a more productive use of energies than attempts to harness what is, in reality, a highly contradictory tradition at best, to progressive causes.

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